Italian Ex-Foreign Minister Giulio Terzi: Italy Is Unequivocally on Ukraine’s Side

Giulio Terzi di Sant’Agata, Italy’s former foreign minister who currently chairs the Senate’s Committee on European Union Policies, discussed with the Kyiv Post Italy’s support for Ukraine, Kyiv’s path towards EU membership, European defense, post-war recovery and accountability for Russian aggression. During his diplomatic career, he served as Italy’s ambassador to Israel and the United States, as well as Italy’s permanent representative to the United Nations in New York. He was appointed foreign minister in Mario Monti’s government in November 2011. Giulio Terzi di Sant’Agata (Photo courtesy Giulio Terzi). JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. Ugo Poletti: Senator Terzi, drawing on your parliamentary and diplomatic experience, what specific role can Italy play in relations between Ukraine and the European Union today, distinguishing itself without weakening the unity of the member states? Giulio Terzi di Sant’Agata: Since the beginning of Russia’s military aggression, Italy has distinguished itself as a strong and unequivocal voice in support of the Ukrainian people. At the most recent summits – the G7 meeting in Evian, the European Council, the NATO summit in Ankara and, finally, the meetings of the Coalition of the Willing and the integrated ballistic-missile defense coalition – as on many previous international occasions, Italy has consistently upheld the inviolable principles of freedom and national sovereignty for which Ukraine has been fighting for more than four years. Other Topics of Interest Ukraine Is Better Prepared for Winter Strikes, Koretskyi Says Prime Minister Serhiy Koretskyi said Ukraine is better prepared for winter energy attacks, though fully protecting all sites is impossible. Italy has also worked to foster dialogue and cohesion among EU and NATO members in reaffirming their support for Kyiv. It has endorsed and voted for all 21 packages of sanctions against Russia, as well as the decision to end Russian gas supplies to Europe. There can be no doubt that Feb. 24, 2022 was a watershed. Since then, security, deterrence and defense against the tangible threat of extremely serious military aggression have once again become central concerns. Italy wants to help develop a stronger culture of security and defense throughout European society. This is connected with the need to build an increasingly cohesive Euro-Atlantic community, within which a genuine and credible European pillar of defense can be defined and established as quickly as possible. I believe that Ukraine is already an integral part of that pillar, even though the necessary legal, political and treaty conditions have yet to be fully established. Does support for Ukraine, therefore, also provide a foundation for strengthening a common European security and defense policy? How can this be achieved without creating duplication or tension with NATO? At the latest NATO summit, Italy reiterated a principle that has become more important than ever. “It is time for Europe to guarantee its own security,” Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said. In addition to the US commitment to authorize the production of Patriot missiles in Ukraine, the summit consolidated one essential point: the Alliance must be judged by the concrete capabilities each country contributes to collective defense. As the Meloni government has consistently argued, the European Union must therefore become an increasingly credible security actor within NATO – in terms of its technological and military capabilities, operational readiness and political determination. Europe’s contribution to the Alliance must become strong enough for the European pillar to serve as the principal foundation of our continent’s security. This would consequently be of vital importance to our non-European allies as well. Europe’s collective security rests on the indispensable value of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, but also on Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union. The latter stipulates that, if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states are obliged to provide it with aid and assistance by all the means in their power. Giulio Terzi di Sant’Agata (Photo copyright Alessandro Di Meo) These are rights, duties and responsibilities that European and Atlantic Alliance countries have signed and ratified over the years, without qualification or reservation. In principle, these provisions take precedence over national legislation. This is reflected in Articles 11 and 117 of the Italian Constitution and in comparable provisions in the constitutions of other member states. Ukraine regards membership of the European Union as a strategic choice and a matter of national identity. Which reforms should it undertake most urgently, and what must the EU do to ensure that accession does not remain an indefinite promise? Kyiv is demonstrating a firm determination to join the European family. That ambition has roots extending well beyond Putin’s aggression. It dates back to the time when the Ukrainian people and their government were alone among the former Soviet republics in refusing to join the Moscow-led Commonwealth of Independent States. The European Council meeting of June 18-19 welcomed the intergovernmental conference on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union and the opening of the cluster covering fundamental issues on June 15, 2026. It also looked forward to the opening of the remaining clusters, in accordance with the merit-based approach. That said, let us be clear: Kyiv is already European. Ukraine is already a member of this family. The progress it continues to make – in the rule of law, the judicial system and public administration – shows that Ukraine is genuinely mobilizing all the resources at its disposal in its struggle for freedom and independence, and to affirm itself as a sovereign nation in the face of Putin’s bloody designs. The progress already recognized by the EU in Ukraine’s alignment with European standards represents a series of fundamental steps. I recently met Oleksandr Vasiuk, a member of the Verkhovna Rada’s Committee on Legal Policy, who explained in detail how the government in Kyiv is implementing the reforms required by the EU. He described the important results achieved in reforming the judiciary and the institutions of both constitutional and ordinary justice. I was also pleased to learn of Kyiv’s strong drive to digitalize administrative documents and procedures. We should also consider the reforms of the anti-corruption system, which has now been strengthened through an independent National Anti-Corruption Bureau with procedural autonomy and a specialized anti-corruption prosecutor. In my view, all these reforms represent important progress along the path towards Ukraine’s gradual integration into the European Union. We must hope that this process can be completed quickly. European support for Ukraine now encompasses military, economic, humanitarian and diplomatic assistance. How can a partnership born during an emergency be transformed into a lasting, structural relationship? This is already happening. A structural relationship is taking shape within the defense industry. Ukraine’s operational capabilities have been amply demonstrated – not only in defending its territory, but also in significantly slowing what, until a year ago, appeared to be an unstoppable Russian advance. Ukrainian forces have shown that they can operate at long range, making Russia’s frontline supply routes increasingly vulnerable. Consider Ukraine’s drones and cutting-edge technologies, which are effectively unique in the world today. Europe is seeking to build a robust security architecture. This will involve not only institutions, but businesses above all. In countries such as Italy and Germany, a large proportion of small and medium-sized enterprises contribute to defense supply chains. What will happen next? These companies will require further investment and expansion because defense manufacturing is extensive and highly interconnected. The F-35 production program, for example, relies on more than 2,100 suppliers worldwide, almost half of which are small businesses. There is therefore enormous potential for cooperation with Ukraine, which has acquired technological and operational expertise of unmatched value during these years of war. That is not all. Cooperation with Ukraine is also extremely important in countering Russia’s hybrid warfare against the EU, including interference, disinformation, cognitive manipulation and cyberespionage. There is now far greater awareness of the hybrid threats Moscow directs against Europe and the West as a whole. Russian aggression against our democracies does not consist solely of incursions into European airspace. It also takes the form of propaganda, political interference, cognitive manipulation and attempts to subvert our electoral processes. Ukraine has experienced direct Russian military aggression since the conflict unleashed against Donbas and Crimea, culminating in the full-scale invasion of 2022. Even before then, however, Kyiv had faced an extraordinary wave of manipulation, violence and subversion, particularly from the time of the Euromaidan protests onwards. Both hybrid warfare and the evolution of conventional warfare require sophisticated, technologically advanced instruments of deterrence. The EU and its member states are now working to develop those capabilities. What practical contribution can Italy make to Ukraine’s reconstruction – not only through funding and business involvement, but also in such fields as public institutions, culture, education, healthcare and the protection of cultural heritage? Ukraine’s reconstruction was a priority during Italy’s G7 presidency and has long occupied a central place on the European agenda. In recent months, numerous meetings have been held in Kyiv between Italian ministers, ambassadors and business representatives and members of the Ukrainian government, confirming our country’s strong interest. The Ukraine Recovery Conference was held in Rome a year ago, where important commitments were made. One prominent example is Italy’s leading role in the reconstruction of Odesa Cathedral. Rebuilding a country means bringing it back to life. It means reconstructing schools, hospitals and energy infrastructure, restoring livelihoods and creating the best possible conditions for Ukraine’s revival. In other words, it means providing Ukraine with genuine security. That security cannot be limited to empty promises and declarations such as those contained in the three great deceptions shamefully inflicted upon the Ukrainian people in the past. The first was the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, under which the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia provided security assurances concerning Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange for Kyiv relinquishing its vast nuclear arsenal, which was subsequently transferred to Russia. The second was the 1997 Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty, a bilateral agreement in which Russia recognized Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders, including Crimea. The third was the vague promise of Ukraine’s eventual NATO membership made by the Alliance at the 2008 Bucharest Summit. We cannot allow Ukraine to be deceived again. This time, reconstruction cannot begin without a full understanding of what genuine security for Ukraine entails in practice. Important humanitarian questions must also be addressed. I recently met Yana Zinkevych at the Italian Senate. She is a member of the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada and commander of the Hospitallers volunteer medical battalion. She recalled some tragic figures: more than 4,000 schools are unusable, 330,000 homes have been destroyed, and more than 1,000 kilometers of railway lines and bridges need to be rebuilt. The EU – and Italy is once again at the forefront – wants to participate in this reconstruction. In a majority resolution approved by the Senate in preparation for the June European Council, the government was called upon to work to ensure that “the European institutions provide full political, economic and operational support to associations and organizations working to address the humanitarian consequences of the war of aggression.” What minimum conditions must be met for a ceasefire to begin and open the way to a peace process? First and foremost, the aggression must stop. Russia must cease bombing Ukraine – its homes and the facilities essential to civilian life, including hospitals, nurseries, schools and power stations. Russian raids are killing civilians. That is unacceptable. Russia’s systematic attacks on Ukraine’s agricultural industry, ports, grain terminals and merchant vessels also demonstrate Moscow’s intention to spread chaos and continue the madness of these crimes. All of this must end before there can be a ceasefire and the beginning of serious peace negotiations. When negotiations between the two sides eventually begin, there will clearly be certain points – or preconditions – that cannot be negotiated away. Russia must compensate Ukraine for the immense damage caused by the war. Ukraine’s full sovereignty, complete independence and national identity must also be definitively recognized and effectively guaranteed. How can responsibility for crimes committed during the war be established, and how can the victims’ right to justice be upheld? There is broad agreement that a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine is urgently needed, and its establishment is now taking shape. The Council of Europe and the European Union have signed an agreement concerning its financing. I also want to emphasize the importance of initiatives such as the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine at Eurojust. Its work complements the arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court for Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials, including Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia’s Commissioner for Children’s Rights, in connection with the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. These issues cannot be relegated to the background. They concern human rights, the right to compensation for the damage caused by a war of aggression unleashed by President Putin, and the right of every family to be reunited with children deported to Russia.