Iran’s ‘Boiling Frog’ Strategy

Iran’s ‘Boiling Frog’ Strategy

One of many ways to interpret the U.S. midterm results is that they were an opportunity for Americans to express their concerns about the war in Iran. In that reading of events, Tehran’s strategy to hurt U.S. President Donald Trump has had at least some impact. But now that the elections are over, what will change? Will Trump feel like he now has no electoral constraints, widening his range of options in the war? And will Tehran feel like it has lost some leverage? According to Vali Nasr, a longtime Iran watcher, Iranian leaders believe that sustained disruptions to the global economy serve as a lever to change the actions of Western leaders—and perhaps act as a future deterrent. “Iran sees the result of the U.S. elections as proof of this concept. Their strategy is to boil the frog gradually,” he said on the latest episode of FP Live. Nasr is a professor and former dean of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of, most recently, Iran’s Grand Strategy. The full interview is available on the video box atop this page or on the FP Live podcast on Spotify, YouTube, or Apple. What follows here is a lightly edited transcript. Ravi Agrawal: Let’s start with the U.S. point of view on the Iran war. The consensus has been that Trump has three options. He could escalate militarily, but that has very uncertain outcomes. He could spin a victory and get out, but the spin is . Or he could focus on diplomacy and try to return to the memorandum of understanding (MOU) we had last summer, but that is a lot of hard work. What do you think the White House strategy is now that the midterms are over? Vali Nasr: I think the president is actually pursuing all three strategies at the same time. Leaning in on diplomacy does not mean that he’s setting aside war plans, and asking for war plans does not mean that he is doing less diplomacy. He doesn’t have any good choices. Ideally, Trump would end this war through a negotiated settlement, much like what happened in June, but he has to meet the Iranian price for doing that, which is actually quite steep for him. Currently, the positions of the two are too far apart. The Iranians want him to first go back to the MOU and implement it before they talk about anything else, such as the nuclear issue. Trump, on the other hand, needs the nuclear issue to be at the forefront in order to justify why he went to war for nine months. War is also not really an option, because in order for war to be meaningful, Trump has to do something big. But something big opens the door to Iranian retaliation, particularly in the Persian Gulf, which could devastate the global economy in larger ways. I’m sure Trump is hearing from Chinese President Xi Jinping and Arab, Chinese, and Russian leaders that nobody wants that kind of damage to the global economy. So he’s settling for the third option, which is to let Iran sit under the blockade and do nothing. In my opinion, that’s not a strategy. That’s twiddling his thumbs. The blockade is not foolproof. Iran is getting oil out and making money. At the same time, the Strait of Hormuz is still under a lot of pressure. The Iranians have actually increased the number of attacks they’re making there. Furthermore, I don’t think it’s sustainable, financially or otherwise, for the U.S. Navy to maintain the blockade long term. It is quite financially and labor intensive for the Navy to do so, and it doesn’t have any bases in the Persian Gulf that could provide relief. If the Iranians are able to sustain themselves with the amount of holes that already exist, then, ultimately, this is not sustainable. In fact, if the blockade starts working in the way in which the U.S. treasury secretary and U.S. secretary of state say it will, then Iran is likely to escalate. So ultimately, this strategy that everybody thinks is settled on is not tenable in the long term. Either it will collapse under its own weight, or one or the other party is bound to disturb it, which might bring us back to war. RA: I imagine that you could have said a lot of this two weeks ago. The big change that has come in the last couple of weeks is, of course, the U.S. midterm election results. Come January, the Democrats will have power in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. They feel that part of the mandate from the American people is trying to find a way to end the war. What is your sense of how Congress might impact how Trump tries to prosecute the end of this war, or dilly-dally, as you said? VN: One outcome of these elections is a much more visible push within the United States against the war. It’s not just that the American people have spoken. If there was any shadow of a doubt that they really, really disliked this war, it has been dashed, particularly within the Republican Party. They might now think that if the Republican Party is to have any chance in 2028, this war should end now. So there is a sense that there is more momentum for diplomacy after the election than there was before. In fact, when U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance wrote to Iran’s leadership, everybody said, “That’s exactly what we thought the consequence would be of the drubbing the administration got.” But Trump is unpredictable. He has his own view of what’s in his interest as well as what’s in America’s interest. He may go back to a conflict with Iran, so we’re not out of the woods. But the Iranians know that the economic cost of the war is having a tangible political impact on America, as well as France and Germany, even if it is not being reflected in the stock market on a daily basis. Ultimately, these countries are likely to decide at some point that this war is not worth the political blowback it’s causing. RA: I was going to come to how Tehran is gaming out the post-midterms scenario. You make the point that Iran may sense that it is getting some of what it wants—it is imposing costs. The flip side of that could be that the costs have been imposed, and Trump has now seen the worst of it. He seems to be doubling down. With nothing to lose, he may now be impervious to electoral pressure, meaning the Iranians may not have much leverage with him. VN: That’s very true. This is a gamble. It doesn’t mean that because the elections happened, the Iranians can declare victory and say, “OK, we humiliated President Trump, now let’s sit down and talk.” Yes, they had a big win in terms of the midterm results, but now they have to deal with Trump. I think the way they see it is that the decision to go to war is still uncomfortable for President Trump. It’s true that he’s not looking at another election, but the Republicans are looking at 2028. And ultimately, the longer this war goes on, the more the pressure it brings about, particularly if the next phase of the war is more destructive. The Iranians are broadcasting that loud and clear as a form of deterrence. They’re saying they’re going to wreak havoc on the region and the global economy, no holds barred. If that’s the case, then President Trump still has to think about his legacy. He has to think about the future of the Republican Party. And he has to consider that if he enters into a wider war with Iran and he still isn’t able to defeat it, the scale of his failure will be even greater than it is now. Until now, the most important factor on the American side hasn’t been some kind of a calculated, rational, technocratic national interest. It has been the psychology of one man from the get-go of deciding to go to war, to Trump’s various permutations. Nobody—whether it’s the United States’ allies or Iran or China—can say with any certainty how Trump might actually act. So I think the Iranians are taking this one step at a time, reading the tea leaves and applying pressure where they can with Congress—particularly the new Congress coming in—to see whether they can avoid a big war and get a settlement that would benefit them. RA: Let me put something to you that I’ve been hearing from Trump administration officials I’ve spoken to on background. They say that Iran’s hand has significantly weakened over the last few months. The reasons they point to are that the amount of Gulf crude going through Hormuz has actually dropped significantly, from 83 percent to 60 percent, because Gulf states are using pipelines more and relying less and less on Hormuz. The rial is down to 1.7 million to the dollar. Recent U.S. sanctions have targeted the regime explicitly, as opposed to targeting the Iranian people. They’ve shut down parts of Mahan Air, which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) relied on, as well as a United Arab Emirates branch of Banque Misr, which served the IRGC. There’s a sense in the White House—or at least, it’s their narrative—that these measures must really hurt the people in power in Iran, and at some point the pain will be so great that the regime will be forced to make different choices. Do you buy any of that? VN: No, I don’t. This is largely self-serving, anecdotal rhetoric, which has gotten us to this point. I don’t see a sign that the degree of pressure that this administration thinks it is imposing on Iran is actually being felt there and changing attitudes. When Iran sent its diplomats to the United Nations, the proposal they presented to the United States was an expansion of the Islamabad-brokered MOU, changed in ways that benefited Iran more. The Iranians referred to it as “Islamabad-Plus.” Let’s also consider the fact that when Mecca defense alliance members and Pakistan’s army chief went to Tehran in October, Iran’s response to Vice President Vance’s letter was that Iran was sticking to its demands that Washington must fulfill all seven preconditions to resuming talks and reopening Hormuz. The United States’ pressure tactics are not working. This administration doesn’t want to go to war or make a deal with Iran. They need to sell this “do nothing” strategy as a viable, working strategy, so they’re repackaging the blockade and saying it’s going to work this time. Two months ago, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent was promising that there would be a run on the Iranian banks. That hasn’t happened. So I’m suspicious of these kinds of claims. Iran is under a tremendous amount of pressure, but I don’t think the administration has a gauge of where the tipping point for them is. So it’s throwing a Hail Mary pass with more sanctions, hoping that they will do the trick, and then we get a lot of rhetoric trying to sell the current holding pattern as an actual strategy. RA: So in response to everything you’re saying, Tehran’s strategy might be to wait out the next two years. VN: If they have to, yes. Although, I don’t know. Iran’s supreme leader said in his last major statement that this “no war, no peace” situation is not sustainable or acceptable to Iran. When and how will Iran disturb this status quo? We don’t know. We can already see that they are escalating pressure on shipping. In the past week, more of the shuttle ships that the UAE has been using to ferry oil from inside tankers in the Persian Gulf to tankers in the Arabian Sea are being hit. The number of mines installed in the Strait of Hormuz has also increased. More oil might go out on some days than others. So the Iranians are making the situation more unstable. There is a difference between the way the West and Iran look at this situation. The U.S. and many observers think a move from Iran has to be really big to be meaningful. For instance, if they can’t bring the cost of oil to $200 a barrel, then they’ve lost. But the Iranians actually do not look at things this way. Very early in the war, they understood that the price of oil is not 100 percent in their hands. What they believe works is sustained instability in the energy market. The costs of oil, natural gas, jet fuel, diesel, fertilizer, and so on are far above where they were. None of these measures by themselves will break the global economy, but if you put them together for long enough, they’re very effective. Iran sees the result of the U.S. elections as proof of this concept. Their strategy is to boil the frog gradually. I think sometimes in the West we look at this and say, “Well, the frog is just sitting there and nothing’s happening to it, so the Iranians have failed.” So I think this is a race between whether Iran runs out of gas first or its strategy works. Right now, I detect a certain degree of confidence from Iran. I don’t see the trepidation that observers on the outside are assuming the regime has. So either Iran has a good poker face, or it’s seeing the picture very differently than Washington does. RA: It’s fascinating, and it’s always so hard to know whom or what to believe. I’m curious what you make of these reports that claim to be from U.S. intelligence suggesting that Iran is developing plans to detonate a dirty bomb in Washington, D.C. These are just reports. Tehran, of course, denies that any of this is true, but I’m curious how you are reading that story and reacting to it. VN: We’re in the midst of a war, and there’s a lot of disinformation. There are people in the United States or in Israel who want the United States to go back to war with Iran, to “finish the job,” so to speak. After the elections, which made it very obvious that the American public is firmly opposed to this war, you could only change that public opinion in favor of war if there was this kind of threat against America, or if you could posit that Iran is a deranged and crazy regime that must be taken out. So it could possibly be disinformation. On the other hand, Iranians have also been taking certain actions as a form of deterrence. I don’t know whether Iran actually launched a cyberattack on refrigerators in France—French intelligence claims they did, though the Iranians deny it—but it’s a message. “If you attack us, then we have cyber capabilities that could paralyze your cities.” It’s a kind of deterrence tactic. It’s a similar case with Iran issuing warnings to air bases in the U.K., which ultimately got the United States to move its airplanes from two different air bases. Some of this benefits Iran, because it’s a way of saying, “Do not assume that the next war would be cost-free. Our reach is much farther than you assume.” It also suggests to me that Iran doesn’t want to go back to war. Rather, its game plan is to try to get the United States to come to the table to accept their terms.

Original Source

Read the full article at Foreignpolicy →

KhanList aggregates and links to publicly available news content. We do not host full articles from third-party sources. Always verify important information with original sources.