[Interview] Ukrainians should lose their illusions about the EU before joining, says EIB chief in Kyiv

Kristína Mikulová has been running the European Investment Bank’s branch in Ukraine for almost six months. Before arriving in Kyiv she worked in Lebanon, another country afflicted by conflict and occupation. When she was in Beirut, many of her acquaintances were convinced that the West would not let Ukraine fall under any circumstances. “Now it is a huge shock for my Lebanese friends when they see what is happening in the United States. They ask what it means for them if the West cannot even support Ukraine, which they saw as first among unequals,” she said when we met in Lviv in western Ukraine, where she had come to open a renovated hospital and kindergarten. Mikulová has long focused on Central and Eastern Europe, including Ukraine; she wrote her doctoral thesis on the country while a PhD student at Oxford. Since she started working there, she has been surprised at how demanding some processes are. “I used to think that where there is political will, there must also be a way. Now I understand that political will often fails because of many technical problems,” she said. As an example, she mentioned that some grants require more than 30 signatures. “You are renovating a school, but you cannot move beyond the construction phase of the project, because somewhere in the middle of the process someone has still not paid one of the thousands of invoices that have to go through your main partner in the government,” she explained. For Ukraine, she said, it is crucial to receive a genuine promise of accession to the European Union. Do you remember when you first went to Ukraine? I remember it very well. As my grandfather was of Ruthenian origin and studied in Uzhhorod, my roots also predisposed me to be interested in this region. I went there shortly after finishing secondary school, when I first took a train from Bratislava to Odesa and then on to Chișinău in Moldova. At that time the train still went through Transnistria, today a territory occupied by Russia. We travelled in the summer heat and could forget about air conditioning. How has Ukraine changed since then? The trains have definitely changed – today the Ukrainian railway company Ukrzaliznytsia is one of the most impressive firms they have here. And what about other things? When I first came to Ukraine, I had the feeling I recognised patterns of behaviour that I knew from home. As a Slovak, I assumed they would follow us in everything, only a few stages behind. Today I understand that this was a mistake. Ukrainians, also because of the extremely difficult conditions they have found themselves in, are following their own path. In the middle of a war that did not start here in 2022 but already in 2014, they have found an enormous number of ways to make things happen. For example, in digitalisation and innovation they have in many respects overtaken their neighbours. How should we imagine that in concrete terms? I came to Ukraine from Lebanon, where I had spent two years functioning in a cash economy. The little things I have got used to here would be absolutely unimaginable there. For example, when I go for a coffee, I can pay via QR code or use it to split the bill with friends into individual parts. Now there is a debate about a ceasefire and also discussion about whether digitalisation could play a role in organising elections. Because of Ukrainians abroad? Also because of them – there are perhaps seven to eight million Ukrainians living abroad. And then there are Ukrainians in the occupied territories. Do you think those people could vote as well? From a political point of view, it is an extremely sensitive question. I would rather point out that millions of Ukrainians are in the West abroad and in the East in occupied territories, and it is now important to consider how to approach them. Digitalisation could offer practical solutions. You mentioned that you came to Ukraine from Lebanon. In what ways are these countries similar, and in what ways are they most different? Both countries are affected by conflict, although in Ukraine we do not call it a “conflict” but Russian aggression. In any case, in Lebanon I experienced an environment that, in our peculiar technocratic language, we describe as “fragile”. In my last year there, a war with Israel broke out on its southern border. The greatest parallels I see are that people were extremely resilient, creative and tried, even in a difficult environment, to keep faith that life could continue at least to some extent. Despite the harsh environment, they sought every possible way to improve their quality of life. The biggest difference, in my view, is the role of the state and how it cares for its population. In Lebanon, I observed the complete collapse of the system of public hospitals, schools and the welfare state. They either do not function at all, or only at an absolutely minimal level or thanks to donors. The Lebanese survive despite their state, not because of it. The great fortune of this country is its extensive diaspora: people living abroad send home a large amount of money, the so‑called remittances. On the other hand, in Lebanon – a country of roughly five million – almost two million refugees live. That is enormous pressure. Just think how strongly member states of the European Union feel it when they receive 100,000 refugees. However, when I return to Ukraine – I am thrilled that, despite the fact the state often works against itself - the legacy of communist bureaucracy cannot be cheated - the provision of services that are vital for the local population continues here. Healthcare and education function. When the Russians bomb an energy facility, it is repaired within a few weeks. That would hardly be possible anywhere else. The DNA of resilience among the local population is present in both countries, but the social responsibility expressed in the provision of services even during war is much stronger in Ukraine. How do people in Lebanon view the situation in Ukraine? Many countries of the so‑called global South take a reserved stance towards Ukraine, partly because they see it as an ally of the West, with which they have problems. Back when I was in Lebanon, many people were sincerely convinced that the West would never simply abandon Ukraine – that there was no scenario in which Ukraine would not have Western support in pursuing its goals. Now it is a huge shock for my Lebanese friends when they see what is happening in the United States. They ask what it means for them if the West cannot even support Ukraine, which they saw as first among unequals. What could Ukraine learn from the Lebanese case? In Lebanon, people completely stopped relying on the state and the government, which in a sense led to anarchy. And when anarchy breaks out, everyone only looks out for themselves, at best for their family or religious group. It is as if the idea of a nation gradually ceased to exist, even though in the 1960s Lebanon was an oasis of liberalism in the region. This is exactly what we must not allow to happen in Ukraine. Precisely at a time when a political settlement is being discussed, it is crucial that the idea and identity of Ukraine survive, and that proper reconstruction takes place, in which we at the European Investment Bank will also have a lot of work. I cannot stress enough how important it is that the peace that is agreed is not only just but also sustainable. After all, Lebanese and Ukrainian history alike show that many ceasefires and agreements can be signed that no one then respects. You say that, in order for Ukraine not to follow the “Lebanese scenario”, it is crucial to conclude a just and sustainable peace and then carry out proper reconstruction. But that is not in Ukrainian hands alone. The only way to achieve sustainable peace is security guarantees for Ukraine. Otherwise, even looking at the case of Lebanon, I cannot imagine it. And what if it does not get them? We can look at it on two levels – what it would mean for Ukraine and what it would mean for the EU, because their fates are intertwined. If the peace that was signed were not just, Ukraine, as a huge country, could lose the illusion of unity. That would have very serious consequences. I am thinking about what we can do about it. At this moment we must give Ukraine a credible future perspective – as the European commissioner Marta Kos said, it needs to be able to cling to some long‑term goal, and that goal should now be membership of the EU. Of course, we cannot give Ukrainians certainty of accession, but we should provide them with reasonable certainty. We must show that we mean it seriously. If we do not do that, if we do not stand behind Ukraine as the most important candidate country, we risk the kind of development we have seen over the past 10 years in various parts of our neighbourhood – in Georgia and in Moldova. The EU is going through a pivotal moment – we do not have to call it an identity crisis outright, but the fact is that it is a very important juncture. After the United States elections, the world is changing fundamentally, and if we tell ourselves that this period is only temporary, we will be fooling ourselves. This is the moment when, as Europeans, we should stand up proudly and say it is time for us to do our part. You are right: if we cannot manage it, if we do not have what it takes, then it is fair to say that in the short or medium term we cannot give Ukraine a guarantee that it will become a full member. That would be the most honest approach. I am not sure, however, that we are ready to say that, and at the same time, as a European, I hope we never will be. For me personally, this is one of the Union’s most important foreign policy objectives. So you would not be saying that Ukraine must urgently join the EU if you were not convinced that it was realistic? The Union must offer Ukraine the credible path I have already mentioned and, from what I know about the European institutions, I see that they are making an enormous effort to do so. And what exactly should we understand by such a path? For example, during the first six months of this year, half of the so‑called clusters, including the one on the internal market, are to be opened. We must be ready to open the chapters related to accession negotiations at lightning speed, and then stand by Ukrainians and help them to digest that volume of legislation. To provide Ukraine with technical assistance, to send our experts here and at the same time send Ukrainian experts to the European institutions so that they can learn from Member States whose experience they can identify with. Slovakia can also play a role in this process; it managed it, even though among the countries that were trying to join the EU at that time, it was not the best pupil. The government of Eduard Heger, thanks in part to the prime minister’s advisor Alexander Duleba, was exceptionally active in this, and so far the government of Robert Fico has also expressed support for Ukrainian EU membership, at least on paper. Do you think Slovakia can help Ukraine in this sense even under Fico? Accession negotiations are to a large extent a technocratic process. On the one hand that is a burden, but on the other it is an advantage, because the talks do not necessarily depend on the political colour of the government currently in power. Contacts and ties between experts can continue regardless of what rhetoric the government’s leader is using at the moment. I experienced this myself when I worked for about 18 months at the Slovak finance ministry and, as head of the development aid department, I dealt with technical assistance for candidate and neighbouring countries. At that time it was mainly about the Western Balkans, but partly also about Ukraine. We were passing on a lot of experience from our transition from a communist regime to the market economy of an EU Member State, especially in the area of public finance management. It looked like this: we would come, for example, to Montenegro or Moldova and talk with experts at the local finance ministry or local authorities about how European budgeting works, so that they could make long‑term plans. There is room for similar assistance in Ukraine as well. What has surprised you most in Ukraine so far? I studied the region of Central and Eastern Europe in great academic detail. I wanted to understand how reforms should be implemented and which political constellations help them along. Today, after almost 15 years, I can see with my own eyes, on the example of Ukraine, how difficult it can be in practice. At first sight, everything in Ukraine seems to favour Euro‑Atlantic integration; there is political will for it to happen, but the public administration here is simply not yet sufficiently well adapted. Moreover, the enormous energy with which Ukrainians work in this area cannot last forever if they do not know the concept of rest – and if they do not receive appropriate recognition for their efforts, that is, if the way forward is not credible. That is the biggest surprise for me. I used to think that where there was political will, there had to be a way. What do you mean by that? For example, projects that are so fragmented and have so many people responsible for them that you cannot track down the person who could champion them and take the necessary decisions. On some grant projects we have more than 30 signatures. You are renovating a school, but you cannot move beyond the construction phase because somewhere in the middle of the process someone has still not paid one of the thousands of invoices that have to go through your main partner in the government. We may have around 300 such projects with small communities. Not to mention that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), whose assistance played a key role here, has now frozen its help. There are many projects for which there would be political will and which local communities are already expecting, but they simply “get stuck somewhere in an unidentifiable place”. We, as the Eurocracy, share responsibility for that. What can be done about it?