I worked for the CIA. Russia is waging a new kind of war and we’re not ready

I worked for the CIA. Russia is waging a new kind of war and we’re not ready

For several unsettling days, the systems on which many of us rely began to fail. Microsoft Outlook went dark, flights were grounded across the US, banks experienced disruptions, Apple’s iCloud faltered and even the US National Security Agency suffered a glitch in its classified internal communications network. So far, there is no evidence that shows these incidents were connected or caused by hostile actors. But the disruptions expose a disturbing reality: modern Western societies are extraordinarily vulnerable, and our adversaries know it. Certainly, some of these or similar disruptions can be caused by Russian, Chinese or Iranian hackers. Every day hundreds of thousands of attempted attacks from America’s enemies are thwarted, and many millions more are stopped against other Nato countries. I used to work for the CIA. For Vladimir Putin, exploiting those vulnerabilities is not simply a matter of hacking computers – it is part of a much broader approach to warfare which combines espionage, sabotage, disinformation, political subversion and, when necessary, military force. The West calls it hybrid warfare. Moscow has been practising variations of it for decades, and the Russian intelligence services are central to its execution. However, in the West, we are mostly disorganised and disjointed in countering it. To disrupt this threat and effectively thwart Putin’s secret war, we have to first understand its origins. Russia’s contemporary approach to conflict is still based on Soviet concepts of political warfare and strategic deception. But it has evolved significantly in response to technological and geopolitical change.Russian strategists watched the US and its allies demonstrate overwhelming military superiority during the Gulf War and subsequent conflicts. Precision-guided weapons, satellite intelligence and networked command structures transformed the battlefield in the 1990s. At the time, many Russian analysts believed that the character of war itself was changing. If information and precision could determine outcomes on the battlefield, then information and perception might also determine outcomes before a battlefield ever emerged. President Vladimir Putin has pushed for the return of Russia’s military greatness (Photo: Alexander Kazakov/Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP) This thinking contributed to theories surrounding what Russians call bezkontaktnaya voina or “non-contact warfare”. The concept appeared in Russian military books and journal discussions during the 1990s and early 2000s. The idea was that strategic effects could be achieved without the massed industrial warfare that had characterised much of the twentieth century. Rather than destroying an opponent’s armed forces through attrition, Russia thought it might be possible to paralyse decision-making, disrupt critical systems, manipulate public opinion and weaken political cohesion to shape the strategic environment. This was designed to pre-stage conventional military force. Information became a weapon. Perception became a weapon. Political division became a necessary precursor for it all to work. Western discussions have sometimes oversimplified these ideas, often loosely calling it all the grey zone. For Russians, the central principle is straightforward: modern conflict is not defined by a neat separation between peace and war. Instead, the Kremlin believes that states compete continuously across multiple domains using military and non-military tools simultaneously. The implications of this approach became visible to the world during Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014. That operation remains one of the clearest examples of this new generation warfare in practice. Military force was present, but it was only one element of a broader campaign. Russian intelligence services had spent years preparing the ground. Information operations shaped narratives inside Crimea and internationally. This was an art the Russians had practised and refined since Georgia in 2008. Local proxies and political actors created the appearance of indigenous support. Ambiguity was carefully cultivated with the appearance of the so-called “little green men”, a term used to describe unmarked soldiers who began appearing in Crimea. The implications of hybrid warfare became visible to the world during Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 (Photo: Alexei Pavlishak/TASS via Getty) By the time Western leaders fully understood what was happening, the strategic objective had been achieved. The same tactics were used in the run-up to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and since then across Europe and increasingly in cyberspace. The objective is to achieve incremental strategic gains while remaining below the threshold likely to trigger all-out war with Nato. The West struggles to respond because our governments are organised around bureaucratic categories that hybrid warfare deliberately ignores. Cyber security is handled by one agency, counterintelligence another. Criminal investigations fall under law enforcement, and strategic communications are managed elsewhere. This form of warfare exploits the seams between these institutions, but what appears to be a series of disconnected incidents may in fact represent a co-ordinated campaign. The current and growing wave of cyber incidents in the US, Europe and around the world is made more dangerous by the accelerating use of AI. As computing power increases, so do the vulnerabilities identified. They are being found faster than any specialised tech company or software fixes can emerge. Cyber attacks are particularly attractive because they combine strategic effect with plausible deniability. Meanwhile, deepfake videos and automated social media influence networks provide our adversaries – including China and Iran – with new opportunities to manipulate information environments and exploit divisions. For Europe and the US, the strategic implications are profound. Deterrence can no longer be defined exclusively in military terms. Aircraft carriers cannot prevent disinformation campaigns, armoured brigades cannot stop foreign influence operations and nuclear weapons do not deter sabotage conducted through criminal intermediaries. The challenges require a broader concept of national security that recognises the interconnected nature of modern conflict. We also need to adapt. That means integrating our counterintelligence, cyber security and law enforcement capabilities far more effectively, hardening critical infrastructure and giving our intelligence services the authorities and resources to fight back. The effort doesn’t stop at the borders of the UK or US – we need a whole-of-alliance approach. When Russia is clearly behind an attack, we should impose costs, including through sanctions, exposure of intelligence networks, disruption of hostile operations and, where justified, proportional offensive cyber measures. We can also arm our Ukrainian allies better to hit back at Russia with long-range weapons, in retaliation for Russian attacks against the alliance. Deterrence requires more than simply identifying the next attack after it already happened. Dictatorships rarely stop because they are persuaded. They stop when they encounter strength, unity and resolve. The lesson of the 20th century is that democracies ultimately prevail when they recognise the nature of the challenge before them – and act before the cost becomes far greater. We risk being caught in an escalating wave of shutdowns, outages and disruptions, all the while naively asking: are we under attack? Yes, of course we are.

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