I warned the FBI about Iran’s sleeper cells in 2017. Nobody listened — now Washington is panicking

On Oct. 23, 2026, Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned Secretary of State Marco Rubio that Iranian plots to kill Americans abroad had reached advanced stages. The Axios warning raises a larger counterterrorism question: How much does Washington understand about the clandestine networks capable of turning Tehran’s threats into operational violence?In counterterrorism, a consequential intelligence failure is not merely missing an imminent attack, but failing to understand an adversary’s doctrine, operational networks, strategic patience, and capacity to strike before the threat becomes visible.After 23 years of researching Islamic terrorism, I believe the threat extends beyond the assassination plots disclosed in the memorandum. It concerns the infrastructure, relationships, and operational capabilities enabling Iranian-directed violence beyond the Middle East, including inside the United States. Apparently, U.S. intelligence agencies have discovered that the regime of the Shiite mullahs’ Islamic caliphate in Iran has “substantially increased” its efforts to target American diplomats and officials beyond the Middle East, and that its lethal plots have reached “advanced stages.” Under the Shiite principle of taqiyya — which I characterize as deception and deceit — the regime considers every form of brutality permissible when its survival is at stake.American officials are reducing personnel at several U.S. embassies across the Middle East amid fears of a broader regional confrontation. But the problem is not confined to the Middle East. Since March 2017, I have repeatedly warned the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI that the real danger lies in the Iranian regime’s sleeper cells on American soil, their mafia-like networks within transnational terrorist networks, and their connections with transnational criminal organizations across the U.S. But who is willing to listen? For its survival, this regime is even prepared to resort to biological and chemical weapons. Does that make sense? The fundamental question is whether American counterterrorism agencies have identified the networks, intermediaries, and operational infrastructure through which Tehran’s intentions could become attacks on U.S. soil.American officials also fear that the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen may expand their attacks beyond Saudi Arabia. But this is only part of the picture. During my field research in Iraq, investigating Islamic terrorism affiliated with Tehran, I came to understand that the organic relationship between ISIS and the Islamic Republic extends far beyond the Popular Mobilization Forces — a relationship Washington has shown little willingness to recognize. In intelligence analysis, ideological hostility does not prove operational cooperation impossible; the question is whether documented contacts, intermediaries, or shared logistical channels reveal overlooked connections.What is intensifying regional insecurity is not the prospect of renewed American and Israeli military operations against Iran following the U.S. midterm elections. Rather, it is the destructive activity of Tehran’s sleeper cells inside the U.S.The gravest mistake in counterterrorism is to mistake the absence of an attack for the absence of a threat. A clandestine network becomes dangerous when its infrastructure is established, its operatives are positioned, and its capabilities remain undetected — not merely when it strikes.A warning about an advanced assassination plot is not a comprehensive assessment of the network behind it. Counterterrorism analysis must distinguish between identifying immediate threats, mapping supporting organizations, assessing criminal intermediaries, and determining whether other capabilities remain undetected. These tasks require distinct intelligence priorities, investigations, and domestic-foreign coordination. Without that distinction, tactical successes can coexist with dangerous gaps in strategic understanding. For American national security, the decisive question is whether intelligence agencies can intercept the next plot and dismantle the clandestine infrastructure capable of generating the next ten.President Donald Trump said at a rally in Florida on Friday: “We may do another little Operation Epic Fury, or [the Iranians] will agree [to a deal].” He continued: “If they’re smart, they will just say, ‘Let’s get down to business,’ but I doubt they will do that because perhaps they’re not smart.”Trump’s words offer no remedy for the problem. He lacks the genuine determination and political will to pursue regime change. He prefers to keep this festering wound open, preserving the Islamic Republic as a constant source of torment before the eyes of America’s regional allies. He pays absolutely no attention to the demands, needs, or will of the Iranian people.In the one-page, unclassified memorandum published by Axios, Clayton warned Rubio that intelligence concerning Iranian assassination plots must reach more American personnel. But how can one explain to Clayton, the secretary of homeland security, and the directors of the FBI and CIA that the threat runs far deeper than this superficial understanding suggests? Military threats and diplomatic negotiations may dominate Washington’s debate, but neither can substitute for a counterterrorism strategy capable of identifying, penetrating, and dismantling clandestine networks threatening American lives.Although the memorandum, copied to CIA Director John Ratcliffe, does not identify targets, countries outside the Middle East, or the nature of the assassination plots, it emphasizes that the underlying intelligence has reached senior State Department officials. Clayton proposed downgrading the classification of sensitive intelligence where possible, allowing Rubio to share it more broadly with personnel at risk.Earlier this week, the State Department ordered family members and nonessential personnel to leave the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh and consulates in Jeddah and Dhahran. A U.S. official confirmed personnel reductions at embassies in the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Qatar, and Jordan. The official stated: “We decided that due to the threat of Houthi attacks and Iranian terror plots, we need to reduce our footprint and keep only essential staff.” Evacuating diplomatic personnel is a defensive response; it does not establish that the networks generating the threat have been identified, penetrated, or neutralized.On Oct. 23, 2026, Clayton addressed a memorandum to Rubio, secretary of state and national security adviser, concerning the downgrading of intelligence information related to lethal plotting against Americans in the Middle East and elsewhere. Clayton wrote that protecting U.S. government personnel abroad remains a priority for the State Department, intelligence community, and Trump administration, and that intelligence concerning Iranian efforts to target American officials is relevant to more individuals than are presently cleared to receive it.The Iranian regime has substantially increased its efforts to target American personnel and American soldiers. The Shiite Islamic caliphate regime in Iran has advanced its lethal plots against U.S. citizens to sophisticated stages, both in the Middle East and in certain other countries. Regardless of the classification levels and intelligence-processing procedures within the U.S., the objective is to reduce restrictions on the dissemination of this information so that it can be shared, at the secretary’s discretion, with State Department personnel. Declassifying intelligence may improve the protection of American personnel, but the effectiveness of counterterrorism ultimately depends on whether intelligence agencies can translate warnings into the identification, disruption, and dismantling of the networks responsible for the threat.An important national security consideration must be emphasized: This document warns of a serious escalation in assassination threats against Americans abroad, but it does not disclose the identities of potential targets, operational details, specific countries outside the Middle East, or the Iranian institutions responsible for carrying out these plots. Consequently, the document alone does not establish precisely who has been targeted or how imminent the execution of these assassination operations may be.But the warning must be understood on several levels. As someone who has spent 23 years researching Islamic terrorism, I am issuing this warning once again — in the hope that, this time, someone may finally listen.TRUMP CRUSHED THE MULLAHS. WHY IS HE ABOUT TO SAVE THEM?The regime of the Shiite mullahs’ Islamic caliphate considers every conceivable act of savagery permissible in the name of its own survival. It feels no shame in committing any crime. This is a regime that, within 48 hours, shut down the internet, electricity, and telephone communications, and slaughtered between 50,000 and 75,000 people in what I characterize as genocide. Its foreign policy is founded upon hostility toward the U.S. and Israel. The central national security question, therefore, is not merely what Tehran has threatened to do, but what operational capabilities it may already have established beyond the immediate reach of American intelligence collection and counterterrorism investigations.After 23 years of studying Islamic terrorism, my warning to the FBI, DHS, CIA, and the wider U.S. intelligence community remains unchanged: identifying a terrorist plot is an intelligence success, but understanding the infrastructure, doctrine, and operational relationships behind it is an entirely different responsibility. In counterterrorism, the ultimate measure of intelligence is not simply how many plots are discovered, but whether the networks capable of producing them are understood and disrupted before Americans become their victims.Erfan Fard is a counterterrorism analyst and Middle East studies researcher based in Washington, with a particular focus on Iran, Islamic terrorism, and ethnic conflicts in the region.