Senior research fellow, head of economics at NEST Centre. He is former deputy finance minister of Russia Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries this year have produced spectacular images of raging fires – and some breathtaking estimates of the damage done. The Wall Street Journal recently put the affected capacity of Russia’s output at 59 per cent, while Bloomberg reported 40 per cent and Reuters roughly 30 per cent. Russia, one of the world’s largest fuel exporters, is now having to import significant amounts. According to Kpler, a maritime-tracking platform, Russia imported a record volume of petrol by sea in October, hitting 390,000 tonnes, more than 10 per cent of national consumption. Due to subsidised domestic prices, import petrol is far more costly, pushing prices upward and forcing the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, to spend hundreds of millions of dollars of Russia’s federal budget. In the summer, we saw long queues at petrol stations in some regions of the country, and public opinion polls run by Levada Centre show that two thirds of Russians have, to varying degrees, been affected by Ukrainian strikes. Alexander Novak, Russia’s deputy prime minister, acknowledged shortages last month, estimating it at about 5 per cent of consumption. Oil companies have also taken a meaningful financial hit, and have been forced to finance costly repairs, which can amount to billions of dollars. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has responded with a series of escalating concessions – each one an admission that its previous measures weren’t enough. Petrol exports were restricted in February and diesel exports since August. Russia is guarding its domestic supply. Moscow has also forced the largest oil companies to guarantee supplies to major consumers. As a result, the market has split: some consumers get petrol through direct contracts, others buy at independent stations and pay far more. As a result, ordinary Russians are beginning to see with their own eyes the impact of the war, which is changing their everyday lives. The desire to end the war is no longer an abstract concept for them; it has taken on a very concrete meaning. My colleagues and I looked at daily gasoline and diesel sales of the 12 biggest Russian refineries – representing 75 per cent of Russia’s capacity – on the St Petersburg International Mercantile Exchange, where refiners must sell part of their output. Satellite imagery shows the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries, in Novokuybyshevsk, Samara region in October (Photo: Pléiades Neo Airbus DS 2026 vi Reuters) Between April and late September, we recorded 63 drone and missile strikes on oil facilities. Some strikes had virtually no impact on production levels, others caused brief disruptions. In 20 per cent of cases, sales stopped, and 10 per cent of attacks led to stoppages lasting three weeks or more. In 40 per cent of cases, sales decreased by less than half, and in the same amount of cases a successful Ukrainian attack – judging by photographs – had no effect on sales volumes at all. By early July, the situation in Russia’s oil refining sector was dire, with about 30 per cent of total capacity shut down simultaneously, as demand increased. From August onwards, the intensity of Ukraine’s drone attacks decreased while repair work accelerated. By early September, the most acute phase of Ukraine’s campaign was over. A larger shutdown of Russian industries and exports hasn’t happened. That doesn’t mean Ukraine’s attacks are ineffective – especially psychologically – but a refinery being hit by a drone is not the same as the long-term shutdown of its operations. This has become the new normal. Putin’s regime has made it clear that it’s willing to absorb this level of discomfort. Almost a quarter of Russians cited the impact of petrol shortages as significant in their lives at the end of June, but that figure dropped to 11 per cent by the end of August. Ukraine’s campaign of drone strikes on oil refineries has been one of the few ways for it to take the war directly to Russia. It’s clearly had an impact – especially on ordinary Russians who have spent most of the war just trying to get on with their lives – but if Ukraine wants to hurt Russia it will need to do far more. The attack on the critical Kerch bridge to Crimea last week was a notable development demonstrating the capabilities of Ukrainian strikes. For all the fiery imagery, previous Ukrainian attacks have lacked sufficient destructive power, and Russia’s economy has shown it can adapt. Kyiv needs to go further if it wants to change Putin’s calculations. Only time will tell whether Ukraine will be able to increase the frequency and intensity of its strikes on Russian oil refineries enough to make them a constant headache for Putin. It’s not enough to find Achilles’ heel — you also have to hit it with an arrow.
I saw Russian power from the inside. This is how Ukraine’s drones are really hurting Putin
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