How to reset US-Gulf security partnerships

WASHINGTON—For over a quarter century, the US role as a security guarantor in the Gulf has rested on deliberate ambiguity—an approach that has created persistent tension among regional partners and within Washington. But with the Iran war, even the most basic assumptions about this security arrangement have been challenged. Unprecedented Iranian attacks on the Gulf this year and the absence of US consultation in the lead up to the war have left Gulf leaders deeply frustrated with the country that has served as their main security partner since the First Gulf War. Gulf countries are now fundamentally reassessing their security strategies, including how they partner with the United States. Amid political backlash to the war in the United States, Washington is also likely to recalibrate its presence in the region. Against this backdrop, it is imperative for the US to reassure its Gulf partners that it can be a more reliable security partner, even if the terms of that partnership must change. To achieve this, the Trump administration should articulate and implement a new vision for its security commitments in the region. This vision—which must be rooted in sufficient bipartisan support—should focus on transitioning the US from a security guarantor to a security integrator, reducing the US military presence in the region while helping Gulf countries strengthen their capabilities, and returning to a strategy of building stronger like-minded coalitions. If the US fails to articulate a credible new approach to its Gulf security partnerships, its partners in the region will likely seek to establish a new political and security apparatus that can stand without Washington, further eroding US influence in an economically vital region. The unraveling of the Gulf security bargain The idea of the US as a security guarantor in the Gulf has long relied on a combination of strategic ambiguity and implicit assumptions rather than formal security guarantees. Even in the absence of a NATO-like Article 5 guarantee, the decisive US response to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait convinced many Gulf countries that Washington was committed to defending the region under the Carter Doctrine. The expansion of a permanent US military presence in the Gulf following Operation Desert Storm further reinforced this perception, as did US leadership in galvanizing a coalition of like-minded countries to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). This arrangement provided the United States with basing, access, and support from Gulf partners that has played a critical role in US military operations in recent decades, including the Global Coalition to defeat ISIS. It afforded Washington significant diplomatic leverage with Gulf countries that have emerged as major regional players shaping the stability of the Middle East and beyond. It laid the foundation for important economic partnerships across the Gulf. And arguably most importantly, this arrangement prevented other major powers from asserting hegemony in a region of geopolitical significance. Over the past three decades, however, Gulf leaders’ confidence in the durability of the implied US commitment gradually eroded. Unpopular US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with shifting US strategic priorities, fueled Gulf anxiety about Washington’s willingness to serve as the region’s security backstop and concerns over what that backstop might entail. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates felt sidelined by President Barack Obama’s nuclear negotiations with Iran, which they viewed as insufficiently focused on addressing the broader security threat that Tehran posed to the Gulf. As Obama and his predecessors signaled a “pivot to Asia,” Gulf countries worried that the US was deprioritizing Gulf security. These concerns intensified after Iran appeared behind an attack on a major Saudi oil facility in September 2019, causing the largest—albeit short-lived—disruption to global oil production in modern history. The first Trump administration responded by deploying additional troops and equipment to Saudi Arabia, but its reluctance to take more forceful action after the attack left Riyadh deeply disappointed. Amid uncertainty over the strength and durability of the US security commitment and concerns about Washington’s Iran policy, some Gulf countries adopted hedging strategies, while others sought explicit US security guarantees. In general, Gulf states in the region have remained reluctant to abandon the idea of a US guarantor. This reluctance reflects, in part, the difficulty Gulf countries have faced in developing the kind of collective defense capabilities necessary to reduce their dependence on Washington. Despite their commitments to regional defense cooperation and efforts to build combined military capabilities, persistent distrust and strategic competition among Gulf countries have continued to constrain independent regional security integration. From guarantor to integrator The Iran war this year has exposed the limitations of a security framework built on ambiguity. And it has reinforced the need for Washington to clarify the scope and purpose of its role in the Middle East. For years, the United States has embraced the idea of transforming from a security guarantor to an integrator, including in US Central Command’s 2023 theater strategy. Yet policymakers have done little to articulate what this shift would mean in practice—or, equally important, what it would not entail. In the absence of such clarity, the US has continued to operate largely as a guarantor, reinforcing expectations it may no longer be willing to meet. US defense officials typically point to regional air defense integration efforts as an example of the evolving role they are envisioning: the United States supplies Gulf partners with premier air defense equipment, embeds US personnel in partner units, and recently established a regional hub that integrates its network of combined air operations centers across the region. While these initiatives represent important elements of an integrator approach, they do not yet amount to a broader strategy for the region. Moreover, they are not necessarily incompatible with a traditional guarantor role. Without a clearer articulation of what integration means, the underlying assumptions of the Carter Doctrine continue to shape expectations of US involvement in the region. What would a stronger US integrator approach to the Gulf look like instead? To begin with, it should be based on the principle that the US role is not to independently guarantee the security of the region or any specific country. Instead, Washington should strengthen its partners’ ability to defend themselves against external threats, while coordinating with them to address challenges that could destabilize the broader region. In this sense, the US and Israeli campaign against Iran departed from two core principles of an integrator role. First, the US assumed the leading role in a campaign to address what was—at least at the time—a primarily regional threat, rather than a direct threat to the US. Although a nuclear Iran combined with long-range missiles could pose a broader global threat, the June 2025 US airstrikes during Operation Midnight Hammer had effectively contained the Iranian nuclear threat in the near to medium term. Second, the US failed to coordinate with key Gulf partners on the frontlines of the conflict or even traditional NATO allies before launching the campaign against Iran or negotiating its subsequent ceasefire. If the US is going to stop short of providing explicit security guarantees to its closest Arab Gulf partners, it must recognize that it is no longer able to impose its will, assets, or strategic approach. Instead, it must adopt a more collaborative approach that preserves US influence in the region by demonstrating its continued value through collective security arrangements, enabling infrastructure, and integrated networks. The Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) proposed during the first Trump administration failed in part because Washington had yet to fully embrace this shift, in addition to continued distrust among Gulf partners. The building blocks of security integration The US brings at least three important assets as a security integrator in the Middle East: the convening power necessary to mobilize collective action among countries pursuing diverse and at times competing approaches to regional security challenges, the ability to connect partners who would not otherwise cooperate or share intelligence directly, and cutting-edge expertise and advanced capabilities. Maintaining its role as the region’s preferred partner will require Washington to invest across all three dimensions. This means the United States must continue to innovate to ensure that it can offer technologically advanced solutions to evolving threats in an efficient manner, without allowing the security partnership to be defined solely by equipment. In particular, Washington should bolster its diplomatic engagement on security issues, building on the strong relationships that US Central Command already enjoys in the region and beyond. Rather than a formal, comprehensive structure like MESA, a US integrator approach should be capability-based and modular, meaning that the level of involvement can vary by country. Integrated air defense, combined maritime operations, and intelligence sharing will be the three most important arenas for US integrator functions. By focusing on these capabilities, the United States can demonstrate the value of its role as an integrator while advancing broader regional security integration, thereby building buy-in and expanding purpose-fit networks over time. As challenging as it will be, Israel also has a role to play in this cooperation. However, such cooperation must be based on a shared understanding that strengthening Israeli security cannot come at the expense of the security interests of other US partners in the region. The United States must not cede its influence in a region as strategically important to the global economy and geopolitics as the Gulf. By truly embracing a security-integrator strategy, the US can preserve its influence and reinforce its security relationships while also rightsizing its military commitments in the region to better align with its strategic interests. For Gulf countries, working with the United States to define and operationalize this approach could provide a platform for implementing the kinds of consultative partnerships they have long sought, while complementing their efforts to build up their domestic and collective capabilities. Such an arrangement would allow Gulf states to continue benefiting from US expertise and convening power without relying exclusively on Washington as their security provider. The Iran war has underscored painful lessons for both the United States and the Gulf. Now, they should learn from those lessons to help usher in a new era for US-Gulf security partnerships.