How Russia prepared for a mobilisation that Putin says won’t happen (Ukraine Battlefield update, Day 1,653)

Every day, the Ukraine Battlefield update newsletter offers a clear look at how the war is unfolding on the ground. Subscribe for free here to get the full text delivered to your inbox. The dictator called mobilisation nonsense and an invention of Russia’s enemies, but his loyal servants had also been preparing for it. Is the 1:60 casualty ratio to the Russians’ detriment entirely fabricated — and why might it not be? The Russians announced the closure of a pocket near Vovchansk — almost certainly, nothing of the sort happened. The 23rd Regiment near Dvorichna liberated further territory and, according to some reports, has already reached the banks of the Oskil. Russia’s bet on jet-powered Gerans makes both military and economic sense. Russian oil and gas revenues fell in August. Sochi was targeted in a major drone attack — what the world looks like according to Russian television and in reality. Maps of the day — Dvorichna Videos of the day — a Kyiv nursery school during an air raid; Bakhmut three years after its occupation; Rosneft is building huge anti-drone cages around its facilities; a Ukrainian helicopter flying extremely low over a motorway. The great dictator called mobilisation nonsense and an invention of Russia’s enemies, but his loyal servants had also been preparing for it. The Russian president this week ruled out the possibility of a mobilisation after the September Duma elections. He and other regime officials claimed it was nonsense and an invention of hostile propaganda seeking to weaken Russia from within. First, it was the authors of various Z-channels and supporters of the war who began discussing the prospect that Russia would face mobilisation in the autumn. This took various forms: from ironic smileys beneath statements by regime officials rejecting mobilisation to explicit declarations that it should be expected. “The situation at the Ukrainian front is such that in the autumn there will either be mobilisation, or we will reach a peace agreement. There is simply no third option,” the well-known Russian Telegram channel Veterans’ Notes predicted as early as 17 May. If the Kremlin now claims this is an invention of the West, it is lying. And since it also lied about not attacking Ukraine, and constantly lies on many other issues, the possibility that president Vladimir Putin and his entourage are doing the same now must be taken seriously. They would have good reasons to do so. Compulsory mobilisation would be extremely unpopular, and if it became known in advance, many men would seek to avoid it. The Russian exile website Meduza therefore recapped all the regime’s steps and their sequence, which can best be interpreted as preparations for mobilisation. The list is so long and revealing that it can at least be concluded that Putin has pre-emptively prepared the country for a mobilisation he can declare at any time. At the same time, however, the process has been gradual, began in 2023, and many of the measures are older. Together, though, they form a system that is almost impossible to evade — and if anyone tries, they will be prevented from functioning within it. Among the first measures, the fine for failing to report to a military enlistment office when summoned was increased tenfold in October 2023, to 30,000 roubles (around €300). Once a mobilisation notice is delivered — the final step before joining the army — a citizen is automatically prohibited from leaving Russia. This applies even if they were unaware of the notice. In Russia, state electronic communications are subject to a legal presumption of delivery: a notice is automatically considered delivered the moment it is sent to an electronic mailbox. Crucially, if a citizen fails to report to the military enlistment office by the specified deadline after receiving a notice, the state will drastically restrict their rights: they will lose the ability to conduct business, register as a taxpayer, retain property rights to real estate, drive motor vehicles or take out loans, and may lose payments and benefits to which they would otherwise be entitled. The laws have also gradually expanded the list of groups that may be subject to mobilisation, including prisoners and even certain categories of foreign nationals. At this point, there is no certainty that mobilisation will take place. What is certain, however, is that the regime has prepared for it and, if it does happen, it will not be as chaotic as it was when it was last carried out in autumn 2022. Is the 1:60 casualty ratio to the Russians’ detriment entirely fabricated — and why might it not be? One Ukrainian unit published the claim that this was the case. It did not refer to the entire front, but to the situation on the section of the battlefield assigned to it. Nevertheless, the disparity is so great that it raises doubts about its credibility. The following video (warning: it shows around a hundred dead Russians in varying states of decomposition, as well as wounded people; consider whether you want to watch it) comes from the Dobropillia direction. It was filmed around an engineering obstacle and published by the Rubizh Brigade. “What for? Why? In whose name? For money that any healthy person with two hands and a conscience could earn through honest work?” Ukrainian journalist Illia Ponomarenko said, commenting on the footage. The video is worth remembering for another reason: the Russian and Ukrainian armies periodically exchange the bodies of those killed. These exchanges always show a huge disparity to Ukraine’s detriment, which is used to question claims that the Russian army has suffered greater losses. The explanation is simple. All the bodies of Russian soldiers in the footage lie in the grey zone, from where Ukrainians have no reason to retrieve them, while the Russians will do so only once they take control of the territory during their slow advance. Conversely, as Ukrainians withdraw, they often leave their dead in lost territory because their bodies cannot be evacuated. The Russians announced the closure of a pocket near Vovchansk — almost certainly, nothing of the sort happened. “The enemy grouping in the north-eastern border area of Kharkiv region has found itself completely encircled. Our troops pushed the enemy out of the villages of Vasyliivka and Blahodatne, and bypassed Nefedivka and Chorne, where the enemy is still putting up resistance, further south via Dolzhanka and Slizneve,” the Russians wrote. Specifically, these words were written by Yuri Kotenok, whose maps are notoriously inaccurate even by Russian standards. However, almost all Z-channels repeat them in various forms. According to them, the situation east of Vovchansk looks like this: The map is very likely a response to Putin’s statement that a group of Ukrainian troops had been encircled in Kharkiv region. Neither the Ukrainians nor independent analysts have confirmed this. It is therefore very likely an entirely fabricated story intended to please the Kremlin. The 23rd Regiment near Dvorichna liberated further territory and, according to some reports, has already reached the banks of the Oskil. As we have repeatedly written, this is an area north of Kupiansk that serves the Russians as a staging ground for an attack on the city, as well as deeper into Kharkiv region to the west and north-west. Any success of this local Ukrainian counteroffensive would reduce the risks in both directions. Colombian members of the unit are also leading the attack here. According to the OSINT account Playfra, the situation looks like this (the upper map is from Thursday, the lower one from Sunday, 30 August): French analyst Clément Molin said that the soldiers had reached the riverbank itself. In his case too, the upper map is from Thursday, while the lower one is from Tuesday, 25 August. Comparing all four maps provides a good indication of the depth and pace of the advance over 10 days. Colombian 🇨🇴 soldiers of Ukraine's 🇺🇦 23rd Assault Regiment continue offensive actions around Dvorichna, where they reached the Oskil river.After clearing 3 forests which were occupied for a long time, they continued to the east and cut the Russian 🇷🇺 presence west of the Oskil… https://t.co/sf7OgQIh7B pic.twitter.com/gnx8bOKA88— Clément Molin (@clement_molin) September 3, 2026 DeepStateUA wrote that, in addition to the aforementioned 23rd Assault Regiment, soldiers from the 35th Marine Brigade also took part in the operation. The result was the clearing of four square kms of territory. Sochi was targeted in a major drone attack — what the world looks like according to Russian television and in reality. The city that once hosted Formula One races and the Olympics — after the end of which Russia began its war against Ukraine — experienced a major combined drone attack. It probably resulted in the destruction of an S-300 or S-400 air-defence battery. A Russian air defense position was destroyed in Sochi today.The footage shows a detonation consistent with the ignition of missile propellant after the strike. pic.twitter.com/7SlzUacIge— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) September 4, 2026 Naval drones also attacked the city’s port. Local residents managed to record the destruction of one of them. It was heading for a ship that had already been damaged. A clearer footage of the moment of destruction of a Ukrainian unmanned surface vessel (USV) in the Russian port of Sochi earlier on Thursday.The USV was on its way to strike the NEFRIT multi-purpose offshore vessel (green hull) but was hit by Russian gunfire before being able… https://t.co/gBiyCWCVo5 pic.twitter.com/Nz5HEhxCEn— Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able) September 3, 2026 The preceding videos are nothing unusual. The reason why today’s Ukraine Battlefield update mentions the attack on Sochi at all is the following footage. It was published by a guest at a local hotel and vividly captures the difference between the country’s actual state during the war and the way Russian state television presents it to ordinary Russians. Russia’s bet on jet-powered Gerans makes both military and economic sense. War is a constant race for innovation. Perceptions of who is “winning” it change according to which side is currently ahead in that race. That is why, until around the middle of the summer, reports were full of burning Russian refineries and lorries in the Russian rear. Not much has changed in this respect: the campaign against Russia’s oil industry and logistics is continuing successfully, but greater attention is now being paid to the Russian innovation of deploying Geran-4 and Geran-5 jet drones. These drones are substantially faster than older versions powered by piston engines and propellers, and they also operate at higher altitudes. The result is a markedly lower Ukrainian air-defence success rate in intercepting them, and thus more serious damage on the ground. The disadvantage of the newer drones is their substantially higher cost. It might therefore appear that the Russians are destroying more, but at a far higher price. However, as The Economist calculated and security analyst Michael Bohnert noted, this is not the case. Assuming a price of $35,000 (€30,000) for a Geran-2 and a 10-percent chance of reaching its target, the Russians spent $350,000 to strike it. A 90-percent air-defence success rate is not fabricated, but a real figure. In practice, Ukrainians were even more successful in intercepting the older Gerans. However, this rate is substantially lower for the jet-powered versions, and assuming that a Geran-4 has a 50-percent chance of reaching its target, it costs Russia only $120,000. One unit costs around $60,000. Naturally, the point about a constant race still applies. It is only a matter of time before Ukrainians find a countermeasure, at which point Russia’s new strategy will once again become substantially more expensive. Russia getting Geran-4 all-up cost into the $50–70k band, if the Economist source holds, is a real cost-exchange shift.Not because $60k is cheap in absolute terms relative to interceptor drones and guns. Because it starts to look like a piston Shahed with a much higher leak… pic.twitter.com/feJ1lNhBB3— Michael Bohnert (@mbohnert) September 3, 2026 Russian oil and gas revenues fell in August. German economist Janis Kluge drew attention to this and also published a graph tracking the development of Russian revenues from these commodities since the start of the invasion. The current level is not a record low. The beginning of 2023 and the turn of 2025/2026 were worse for Russia, but in August the war in Iran, which had pushed up prices and benefited the Russian budget, stopped helping it. When looking at the graph, it should be borne in mind that although revenues are not at their lowest level since the start of the war, Russian state budget expenditure on waging it continues to rise and its reserves are almost exhausted. Russian oil & gas revenues fell in August. The Iran war led to a small revenue bump this year, but no windfall. Domestic gasoline subsidies ate up a big portion of the price effect. pic.twitter.com/SvmYFq5prb— Janis Kluge (@jakluge) September 4, 2026 Videos of the day This is what life looks like for Ukrainian children during Russian air raids. The Battle of Bakhmut ended in a Russian victory in May 2023. This is what the city looks like more than three years after its fall. The front is now around 10 km from the city’s western boundary. A harrowing new video from Bakhmut, filmed in the summer of 2026. The Ukrainian city was captured by the Russians three years ago and has lain in ruins ever since.In this once-vibrant city of 72,000 inhabitants, there are no longer any shops, schools, kindergartens, cafés,… pic.twitter.com/clFfLu5jkq— Jürgen Nauditt 🇩🇪🇺🇦 (@jurgen_nauditt) September 3, 2026 Rosneft is building huge scaffolding around its storage tanks to serve as anti-drone cages. A Ukrainian helicopter is skimming the motorway. This is not the pilot showing off or a breach of safety rules, but the use of the motorway to deceive Russian radars. What are the losses Following the latest update and revision, losses on both sides have been slightly reduced. By Friday (4 September), Russia had demonstrably lost 24,041 pieces of heavy equipment (24,052 on Monday, 31 August). Of these, Ukrainians destroyed 19,009 (19,020), 1,000 (1,000) were damaged, crews abandoned 1,194 (1,194), and the Ukrainian army captured 2,838 (2,838). This includes 4,441 (4,443) tanks, of which 3,346 (3,348) were destroyed in combat. Ukraine lost 12,040 (12,052) pieces of equipment, of which 9,451 (9,462) were destroyed, 697 (697) damaged, 693 (694) abandoned and 1,199 (1,199) captured. This includes 1,459 (1,460) tanks, of which 1,120 (1,121) were destroyed in combat. Note: Neither side regularly reports on its own dead or destroyed equipment. Ukraine publishes daily figures for Russian casualties and destroyed equipment, which cannot be independently verified. In this overview, we use data from the Oryx project, which has compiled a list of equipment losses supported exclusively by photographic evidence since the start of the war.