How Congress Is Pressing the U.S. Space Force To Mature

“Space is no longer a sanctuary. Adversaries, particularly the People’s Republic of China, are rapidly fielding counterspace weapons that threaten critical joint force capabilities,” the House Appropriations Committee (HAC) warned in its report accompanying the fiscal year (FY) 2027 defense appropriations bill. In response, the committee recommended roughly $55.6 billion in discretionary funding for the U.S. Space Force, a 113 percent increase from FY 2026 but approximately $3.6 billion below the administration’s discretionary request. However, HAC provided more than just funds; its report reads like a maturity test for Washington’s newest military service: Congress wants faster acquisition, more maneuverable spacecraft, stronger industrial competition, smarter classification standards, and evidence that America’s space architecture can survive in a contested domain. Acquisition Efficiency Congress wants the Space Force to acquire and field capabilities at the speed the threat environment demands. The HAC praised the Department of the Air Force’s decision to reorganize Space Force acquisition around Portfolio Acquisition Executives (PAEs), a structure intended to bring decision-making authority closer to individual mission areas. Although the Space Force is a separate military service, it is organized within the Department of the Air Force, whose secretary retains key budgetary and acquisition responsibilities. The new structure should make acquisition leaders more accountable for delivering resilient satellites, ground systems, command-and-control networks, space domain awareness tools, and other critical capabilities. Yet the HAC warns that Space Force programs still face cost growth, delays, and execution problems despite previous efforts to streamline acquisition and increase funding. Beginning with the FY 2028 budget request, the secretary of the Air Force must submit a companion budget document organizing all Space Force programs by PAE mission area. It must aggregate research, development, test, evaluation, and procurement funding; compare spending year-over-year; explain each mission area in plain language; and identify investment by program. This should help Congress understand how spending maps to missions and whether it produces measurable progress. Congress is willing to fund the Space Force’s growth, but it expects the service to turn requirements into fielded capabilities quickly, transparently, and affordably. Dynamic Space Operations Lawmakers also want Dynamic Space Operations (DSO) to move from prototypes to operational capability. DSO is the concept where spacecraft maneuver frequently and quickly as mission requirements and threats change, rather than operating spacecraft under the traditional model of minimizing maneuvers to conserve finite propellant. In their report, the HAC is “alarmed” that U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) has repeatedly identified DSO as essential to achieving and maintaining space superiority, yet the FY 2027 budget request does not reflect the urgency of that need. In this context, Department of Defense (DOD) division of responsibility is key. SPACECOM, as the combatant command that plans and employs military space forces, is identifying the operational requirement. The Space Force — operating within the Department of the Air Force — is responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and fielding the forces and systems needed to meet that requirement. The issue, then, is not that SPACECOM has failed to define the need; it is that the service and department have not yet translated that need into sufficient budget priorities or operational capabilities. The committee further notes that current Space Force prototypes are valuable but insufficient. That mismatch is becoming increasingly dangerous as China fields counterspace weapons that threaten U.S. communications, positioning-navigation-timing, missile warning, and intelligence capabilities. Without sustained maneuverability, commanders may be forced to ration propellant, limiting their ability to evade threats, complicate tracking, reposition spacecraft, or preserve services during an attack. The committee directs SPACECOM to report on the resources, timelines, risks of underinvestment, capability gaps with China, and acquisition, programmatic, doctrinal, and organizational changes needed for DSO. SPACECOM must articulate the operational requirements and the Space Force must then translate those requirements into adequately resourced and fielded capabilities. A mature warfighting service needs not only resilient satellites but also the capacity to maneuver and sustain them through conflict. Industry Competition Congress is pushing the Space Force to avoid overreliance on non-competitive, sole-source procurements. The HAC supports open competition in the design, development, and production of space systems to ensure that Washington gets the “right system at the right price.” It warns that some communications programs across the national security space ecosystem, including the Space Force, rely on sole-source contracts that can increase costs. By contrast, the committee praises recurring procurement tranches — repeated rounds of satellite or space-system-related contracts awarded to multiple vendors — because they foster continuous competition, create opportunities for new entrants, broaden the industrial base, and control costs. This matters as Space Systems Command has stated that space acquisition is moving to a “wartime footing” and asking industry to expand production and rapidly deliver minimally viable capabilities that can be upgraded over time. Yet speed without competition would only replace one problem with another. If only a few contractors can deliver critical capabilities, the Space Force may become dependent on limited production lines, constrained supply chains, and space architectures that are difficult to adapt during a crisis. Simultaneously, the HAC commends the Space Force’s protected tactical satellite communications — links that allow military forces to communicate in the field, including in contested or jammed environments — as a positive model where multiple vendors are competing, and new contractors can join regularly. A mature Space Force needs both an acquisition system and an industrial base that can move quickly, scale production, and overcome disruptions. Classification Standards Lawmakers want the Department of Defense to confront excessive classification, a persistent barrier to effective space operations. The HAC argues that unnecessary classification can undermine deterrence and directs the secretary of defense, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to “aggressively reduce unnecessary classification” on Space Force capabilities and operations. Overclassification also limits information sharing inside the DOD, slows cooperation with allies and commercial partners, and makes it harder for industry to provide timely solutions to problems that remain hidden. SPACECOM leaders have warned that excessive secrecy inhibits the “right conversations” with allies and across the joint force regarding space-based capabilities that Washington can bring to bear. The HAC directs the secretary of defense to submit a classified report, with an unclassified summary, identifying space programs, systems, and operational concepts recommended for full or partial declassification, along with expected deterrence benefits and an implementation timeline. This is not a call for reckless disclosure. It asks the Pentagon to distinguish secrecy that protects an advantage from secrecy that prevents that advantage from being operationally useful. To mature, the Space Force must be able to signal capability, share information with partners, and integrate across the joint force without unnecessary barriers slowing it down. Hybrid Space Architectures Moving forward, Congress should use future Space Force budget reviews to examine whether the service is effectively protecting the hybrid commercial-government architectures on which it increasingly relies. The HAC’s recommendations already point in this direction, including additional funding for commercial services and a commercial collaborative sensor network. The Space Force’s Objective Force 2040 similarly envisions interconnected architectures that integrate U.S. government, commercial, allied, and partner systems and move data through secure space-to-space crosslinks and resilient ground connections. That approach could improve resilience, flexibility, and battlefield awareness, but it also expands the attack surface. As commercial and allied satellites become more integrated into U.S. military operations, adversaries will have stronger incentives to target those systems through cyberattacks, electronic warfare, supply-chain vulnerabilities, and data manipulation. Commercial integration can strengthen and expand U.S. space architecture, but only if those systems are built and tested to survive hostile action. Congress should therefore require the Pentagon to report on the cybersecurity and resilience standards applied to commercial providers integrated into Space Force missions. That report should identify which mission areas depend on commercial systems, what minimum cyber and engineering standards contractors must meet, how those standards are verified, and whether commercial systems can continue supporting military operations in degraded or contested environments. Lawmakers should also consider directing the Department of Defense, intelligence community, and relevant civil space agencies, including NASA, to explore a joint space-cyber test range or recurring wargaming environment. Such exercises should simulate a range of attacks against government and commercial satellite systems — including cyber, electronic, physical in-orbit grappling, jamming, spoofing, etc. — and test whether Washington can defend, recover, and maintain operations while under attack. Steadfast allies and key commercial partners should be included as well to strengthen interoperability, coordinate responses, and ensure a shared understanding of threats across the space domain. The HAC is right to demand faster acquisition, more dynamic maneuvers, stronger industrial competition, and smarter classification practices. As the service becomes more dependent on hybrid commercial-government systems, Congress should also ensure those systems are secure enough to survive conflicts and crises. A mature Space Force cannot simply field more satellites; it must integrate, protect, and sustain the architecture on which modern U.S. and allied military operations depend. Emmerson Overell is a project coordinator at the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where she focuses on threats to U.S. national security in the Arctic, space, and cyberspace. For more analysis from Emmerson and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_CCTI. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.