Guterres’s Successor Will Need Russia’s Blessing

António Guterres is approaching the end of his decade as UN secretary-general with little public trust in Ukraine, a bitter dispute with Israel, and a Security Council that remains vulnerable to obstruction by the governments it is supposed to hold accountable. His tenure produced tangible achievements, including an agreement that reopened Ukrainian ports to grain exports during Russia’s invasion. But his cultivation of Moscow and disputes over his advocacy on Gaza have sharpened questions about how he uses the authority he does possess.JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. The next secretary-general will inherit those disputes and the same institutional constraints as well as please Moscow to avoid a Russian veto. A credibility problem in Ukraine The difficulty of maintaining relations with Moscow without obscuring its responsibility for aggression predates Guterres. In June 2016, his predecessor, Ban Ki-moon, provoked an angry response from Ukraine’s UN ambassador after emphasizing Russia’s role in ending the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria and safeguarding human rights. Ban supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity but continued to court Moscow’s cooperation. Guterres inherited that approach. During a May 2021 visit to Russia, he thanked Putin for Russia’s support for the UN and sought deeper cooperation, including on human rights. Russia had already occupied Crimea for seven years. Guterres maintained the UN’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and reports issued under his name documented abuses in occupied Crimea. His public diplomacy nevertheless continued to present Moscow as a partner whose cooperation should be cultivated. Other Topics of Interest SBU Drones Strike Su-35 and Su-34 Jets at Russian Airfield Alpha operators struck multi-role fighters and an ammunition depot at the Caucasus airfield roughly 500 kilometers from the front line. His October 2024 visit to the BRICS summit in Kazan especially intensified Ukrainian anger. Kyiv contrasted his acceptance of Putin’s invitation with his absence from the Swiss peace summit that June. Putin was already subject to an International Criminal Court arrest warrant. The UN’s account of their meeting said Guterres reiterated that the invasion violated the UN Charter and international law. That objection did not undo the diplomatic recognition conveyed by his attendance. Distrust toward the UN also extends beyond summit appearances. In Kyiv Post’s 2022 reporting on the treatment of Ukrainian staff, a former employee of the UN-related International Organization for Migration alleged that international colleagues left before the invasion while local staff lacked adequate evacuation arrangements. In a separate Kyiv Post interview, Ukraine’s then UN ambassador, Sergiy Kyslytsya, criticized inconsistencies within the Secretariat, saying some officials offered their own interpretations of the aggression rather than following the General Assembly’s position. These were allegations about management and institutional discipline, areas where the Secretariat bears responsibility regardless of Russia’s veto. A November 2025 survey commissioned by the New Europe Center illustrates Guterres’s standing in Ukraine: roughly one in four respondents trusted him, while more than half distrusted him. The telephone survey of 1,000 respondents recorded trust at 25.1% and distrust at 56.7%. Gaza showed he could use the office forcefully Guterres’s response to the Israel-Hamas war demonstrated his willingness to use the office’s formal powers to press for action. On Dec. 6, 2023, he invoked Article 99 of the UN Charter for the first time in his tenure, formally drawing the Security Council’s attention to the danger posed by the war in Gaza. He pressed for a humanitarian ceasefire and warned that civilian protection and aid delivery were collapsing. He had not formally invoked the provision over Ukraine. His language also triggered a confrontation with Israel. At an October 2023 Security Council meeting, Guterres said Hamas’s attacks “did not happen in a vacuum,” citing the Palestinians’ experience of alleged occupation despite their historically documented rejection of proposals for a two-state solution. Questions about his judgment also arose during the controversy surrounding Francesca Albanese, the independent UN special rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories. Albanese has drawn criticism for describing allegations of “mass rape” during Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023 attacks as fabrications and defense of Hamas as “a political force.” Although independent rapporteurs do not report to Guterres, his spokesman defended her against US sanctions in July 2025, calling sanctions on special rapporteurs a dangerous precedent. Still, despite deep investment in the Gaza war, Guterres’s intervention also exposed the limits of his authority: Two days after he invoked Article 99, the US vetoed a resolution calling for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire. His diplomacy did produce results The strongest counterweight to a wholly negative assessment is the Black Sea Grain Initiative, brokered by the UN and Turkey in July 2022. Before Russia withdrew a year later, the agreement enabled exports of more than 32 million metric tons (35 million US tons) of grain and other foodstuffs to 45 countries. It restored an outlet for Ukrainian agriculture and helped stabilize international food markets. The arrangement depended on Russian cooperation. When Moscow withdrew in July 2023, Guterres could not compel it to maintain the agreement. There were administrative reforms, too. In 2019, the UN created new management and operational-support departments and delegated more authority to managers. Those changes did not resolve the Security Council’s central problem: permanent members can block substantive decisions even when their own conduct is at issue. Russia’s seat is a responsibility of member states Russia’s continued occupation of the Soviet Union’s Security Council seat remains disputed by Ukraine. The UN’s membership record states that Boris Yeltsin notified the organization in December 1991 that Russia would continue Soviet membership, including its permanent seat. In his 2022 interview with Kyiv Post, Kyslytsya argued that Moscow had bypassed the necessary admission procedures. He also acknowledged that even Ukraine’s closest allies were not ready to accept that argument. The challenge has not resulted in Russia’s removal. Resolving it is a matter for governments acting through UN institutions, rather than an administrative decision the secretary-general can impose. The same distinction applies to Security Council reform. Under Article 108, Charter amendments require adoption by two-thirds of the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of UN members, including all five permanent Council members. The UN’s 2024 Pact for the Future renewed commitments to Council reform. It did not remove Russia’s veto or the requirement for permanent members to ratify Charter changes. As Kyiv Post argued in 2022, calls for reform have repeatedly collided with Moscow’s ability to obstruct action against itself. What happened to more assertive secretary-generals? In the same 2022 interview, Kyslytsya described the officeholder as “a secretary more than he is a general.” He contrasted that limited role with Dag Hammarskjöld’s willingness to confront Moscow. Hammarskjöld died in a September 1961 plane crash while seeking to negotiate an end to fighting in the Congo. The circumstances remain unresolved. Kyslytsya explicitly declined to claim he had been murdered, as his broader argument concerned the resistance an assertive secretary-general encounters from powerful states. He also credited Kofi Annan, one of the more popular UN chiefs, with effectively carrying out his mandate, while emphasizing that the permanent members constrained even successful officeholders. What the public wants from the next chief A new UN Foundation survey suggests respondents want more than competent administration. Among 5,000 people surveyed across 20 countries, 84% considered the UN necessary. But 52% of all respondents chose the assessment that it remained necessary while struggling to deliver. Preventing and ending armed conflicts was the leading priority, selected by 58%. Respondents were more likely to want a diplomat, crisis manager, or moral voice than a leader primarily focused on internal reform. Among those skeptical of international institutions, weak enforcement and domination by powerful countries were leading concerns. Both involve the authority governments are willing to give the organization. The survey used nonprobability samples of 250 people per country and did not include Ukraine. Its findings describe those surveyed, rather than a representative verdict from the world’s population. The candidates inherit the same constraints The seven candidates in the race bring different experiences and approaches to Moscow. Argentina’s Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), presents his management of nuclear crises as preparation for the job. But his handling of Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia has drawn criticism. In April, Greenpeace Ukraine challenged his suggestion that joint Ukrainian-Russian use of the plant was technically possible, arguing it risked legitimizing the occupier’s role. The IAEA did document Russian military personnel and equipment at the site. However, the dispute concerns whether Grossi’s pursuit of practical arrangements sufficiently challenges Moscow’s control, rather than whether he acknowledged the military presence at all. Costa Rica’s Rebeca Grynspan, who leads UN Trade and Development, combines economic expertise with experience as a national vice president. Her negotiations to remove obstacles to Russian food and fertilizer exports formed part of the UN’s grain diplomacy, giving her experience with the bargaining that characterized Guterres’s approach. Guyana’s UN ambassador, Carolyn Rodrigues Birkett, has taken a clearer public position on withdrawal. In a January 2025 Security Council statement, she demanded that Russia immediately remove its forces from Ukraine’s internationally recognized territory. The other contenders are former General Assembly President María Fernanda Espinosa, former Senegalese President Macky Sall, former Ecuadorian diplomat Ivonne A-Baki, and Uganda’s Olara Otunnu, a former UN special representative for children and armed conflict. Former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet withdrew in September. A-Baki is particularly concerned given her Moscow agenda sympathies. During her UN candidate hearing, she suggested Russia could stop the war and Ukraine could decide against joining NATO. She also said borders should be respected. That places her approach at a different point from Rodrigues Birkett’s explicit demand for Russian withdrawal. Regardless, any successful candidate will need at least nine Security Council votes and no permanent-member veto, meaning that whoever gets elected will have to be Kremlin-blessed.