From Shaheds to Sabotage: How Iran Could Retaliate Against Ukraine

As Russia’s war against Ukraine and the US-Israeli war against Iran continue, tensions between Kyiv and Tehran have reached a new level.On Sunday, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi accused Ukraine of attacking an Iranian commercial vessel in the Caspian Sea.JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official.“Zelensky has attacked an Iranian commercial vessel, killing a sailor,” Araghchi wrote, calling it a “blatant UN Charter violation done at Israel’s behest to drag Europe into its war.”Araghchi said that, during calls with EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, he had made clear that what “the freeloader in Kyiv” had done “cannot go unanswered.”Meanwhile, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar spoke with his Ukrainian counterpart, Andrii Sybiha, and invited him to visit Israel.“We discussed the challenges facing our nations, including the threat posed by Iran,” Sa’ar wrote, pointing to Tehran’s supply of drones and missiles to Russia’s war machine.The two messages placed Ukraine in an increasingly direct confrontation with Tehran. Yet the most likely Iranian response is not a missile launched directly at Ukraine.Experts who spoke to Kyiv Post said Tehran has cheaper and less attributable options: increasing military support for Russia, mounting cyber operations, targeting Ukrainian interests abroad, and disrupting regional supply routes.Relations were already at a low pointUkraine’s relations with Iran had deteriorated long before the latest confrontation. Other Topics of Interest Trump’s ‘Change of Heart’ on Ukraine Driven by Kyiv’s Successes, Veteran Top US Diplomat Says Daniel Fried says bipartisan US support for Ukraine will remain strong regardless of the outcome of November’s midterm elections. On Jan. 8, 2020, Iranian air defenses shot down Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752 shortly after takeoff from Tehran, killing all 176 people aboard. Ukraine, together with Canada, Sweden, and the UK, has continued to demand transparency, justice, and accountability.Russia’s full-scale invasion turned an already damaged relationship into an openly hostile one.In 2022, Kyiv revoked the accreditation of Iran’s ambassador and reduced the number of Iranian diplomatic personnel in Ukraine. Iran’s embassy in Kyiv nevertheless remains open.Iranian-designed Shahed drones subsequently became one of Moscow’s main tools for attacking Ukrainian cities, energy infrastructure, and civilians. Kyiv imposed sanctions and repeatedly accused Tehran of enabling Russia’s war.Iran has denied direct involvement in Russian attacks despite extensive evidence that Moscow has used Iranian-designed systems and received Iranian technology, components, and production support.Relations deteriorated further following Ukraine’s broadly favorable response to Israel’s strikes against Iran in June 2025 and Kyiv’s growing engagement with opponents of the Iranian regime.Zelensky met exiled Iranian Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi in Munich in February 2026 and again in Paris the following month. Pahlavi later attended the Black Sea Security Forum in Odesa, where he described the Moscow-Tehran partnership as an “Axis of Chaos.”Ukraine has also recognized the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization.For Tehran, those moves likely reinforced the perception that Kyiv was no longer simply fighting an Iranian-armed Russia but was aligning itself politically with Israel and the Iranian opposition.Dr. Omar Ashour, a security and military studies expert at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, told Kyiv Post that Araghchi’s warning should be taken seriously.“That is a very clear sign,” Ashour said. “Some retaliation is likely, but a direct attack on Ukraine remains less likely.”Ashour said Tehran generally prefers asymmetric, indirect, and deniable action.The first likely scenario is an informational and diplomatic escalation involving threats, diplomatic summons, propaganda, and efforts to portray Ukraine as acting on Israel’s behalf.The second is indirect military escalation through Russia. This could include additional drone components, technical assistance, production inputs and training.Russia already produces Shahed-derived systems at scale. Iran’s most consequential contribution may therefore be not simply sending more drones, but helping Moscow improve their technology, production, and strike coordination.Another risk is deeper ballistic missile cooperation.The US has said that Iran transferred Fath-360 close-range ballistic missiles to Russia, while Reuters reported that Russian personnel had trained in Iran to operate the system and that Tehran was preparing to deliver launchers.Further escalation could involve more missiles, additional launchers, new variants, components, or expanded production cooperation.Such assistance would strengthen Russia’s existing attack pattern: Shahed-type drones and decoys used to exhaust Ukrainian air defenses, followed by ballistic and cruise missiles in larger combined strike packages.Ashour also identified cyber operations, covert action against Ukrainian interests abroad, and pressure on Caspian supply routes as possible forms of retaliation.A direct Iranian ballistic missile strike on Ukraine remains the least likely scenario, he said. Even if one occurred, it would probably be limited and largely symbolic, since Iran lacks the capacity to inflict more damage on Ukraine than Russia already does.Ukraine’s air-defense problemThe prospect of deeper Iranian support for Russia is especially serious because Ukraine already faces an acute shortage of air-defense interceptors.During Zelensky’s Tuesday meeting with US President Donald Trump in Washington, the two discussed granting Ukraine licenses to produce Patriot missile interceptors. The meeting also marked a significant improvement in tone from their public confrontation at the White House in February 2025.Dr. Ariel Cohen, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, told Kyiv Post that improved political relations and a commitment to licensing would not resolve Ukraine’s immediate shortage.No final contract, production schedule, or delivery timeline has been publicly announced.“Licensing alone does not close the gap,” Cohen said.He estimated that Patriot interceptors cost between $3 million and $5 million each and that Ukraine needs at least 300 before winter.Cohen said Poland had offered technology transfer, while Germany – which has the necessary industrial capacity and is less exposed to Russian strikes – had been discussed as a possible production base.Germany is already expected to host production of Raytheon’s PAC-2 GEM-T interceptors through a partnership with European missile manufacturer MBDA. The first deliveries are not expected before 2027, while discussions over producing the more advanced PAC-3 in Germany have not produced a final agreement.Raytheon has separately expressed interest in jointly producing Patriot interceptors with Ukraine. Zelensky also met representatives of Lockheed Martin, which manufactures PAC-3 interceptors, during his Washington visit.Industrial interest, however, is not the same as an operational production line.On July 29, the US Army awarded Lockheed Martin a seven-year Patriot missile contract worth up to $58.6 billion amid growing pressure on American stockpiles from the wars in Ukraine and Iran. Lockheed plans to triple production capacity by 2030.The scale of the contract reflects the urgency of the shortage and illustrates why it cannot solve Ukraine’s immediate problem.Any expansion of Iranian assistance could help Russia increase the scale and complexity of its combined attacks long before domestic or European Patriot production begins. Ukraine would be forced to consume scarce and expensive interceptors against growing numbers of drones, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and decoys.Cohen said Zelensky was attempting to reduce Ukraine’s dependence on the US executive branch alone by working simultaneously with Congress, defense manufacturers, and allied governments.During his Washington visit, Zelensky met US senators and representatives of major defense companies. With Zelensky watching from the Senate gallery, lawmakers voted 86-12 to advance the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act.The approach may produce longer-term results, but it does not eliminate Ukraine’s immediate vulnerability before winter.Tehran softens its tone – for nowFollowing a subsequent call with Sybiha, on Tuesday, Araghchi moderated his rhetoric without withdrawing Iran’s demand for compensation.He said Sybiha had assured him that the strike on the Iranian vessel was unintentional and that Ukraine did not seek escalation.“Iran does not seek escalation either, but made clear any attack on our citizens or interests is unacceptable,” Araghchi wrote. “There must be restitution for losses.”Sybiha described the conversation as frank. He said Ukraine’s actions were intended solely to defend the country from Russian aggression and were never intended to target civilian vessels or people.He also warned Tehran against escalation and called on it to end all support for Russia’s illegal war.The exchange reduced the immediate likelihood of direct confrontation. However, it did not resolve the broader conflict, Iran’s capacity to make Russia’s attacks more dangerous, or the thaw in Ukraine and Israel relations, which appear to be moving past a recent dispute over suspected shipments of grain stolen from Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory to Haifa, toward cooperation in countering Iranian drones.