FCC Confronts Chinese-Produced Power Inverters and Robots

The United States is pushing China out of its domestic critical infrastructure, one bolt at a time. On July 28, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced the addition of all foreign-produced power inverters and advanced robotic systems to its Covered List — which collates communications equipment and services deemed to pose a serious security threat — effectively barring new models from entering the United States. These moves will protect U.S. critical infrastructure and secure these supply chains from adversarial interference, particularly as both markets are expected to expand rapidly due to the power demands and diffusion of artificial intelligence (AI). The action will apply to both foreign-produced power inverters and advanced robotic systems currently seeking authorization to enter the United States, rather than retroactively applying to all systems currently present within the domestic market. This near-term concession is particularly critical within the inverter market, with Chinese firms accounting for two-thirds of all global inverter exports. Moreover, the new rules include a waiver provision allowing systems cleared by the Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security to receive conditional approval from the FCC. The addition of inverters and robots to the Covered List follows the FCC’s recent listing of several other classes of foreign-produced products. In December 2025, the commission placed all foreign-produced drones on the Covered List, and later, in March 2026, added all foreign-produced routers. In response, Chinese drone-maker DJI filed suit against the FCC in February to challenge its designation; its case is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit. Chinese-Produced Inverters and Robots Pose National Security Risk Chinese-produced power inverters pose a clear national security threat to the United States, representing an avenue for foreign adversarial intrusion during a period of high demand for power. Modern power inverters are increasingly digitally connected, allowing remote access to regulate voltage and adjust output across the grid, including via embedded Chinese-produced cellular radios and other communication devices. These features, coupled with Beijing’s long-standing cyber intrusions into U.S. networks and its broader market presence, highlight the risk of foreign inverters being manipulated to cause potential blackouts or remotely disable connected devices. This risk was previously demonstrated by Norwegian officials in November 2025 when they successfully usedpower components embedded within Chinese-produced electric buses to remotely disable the vehicles. Chinese advanced robotic platforms also pose a severe national security risk to the United States. While Chinese robotics firms currently have a limited foothold within the American market, Beijing has invested heavily in both autonomous humanoid and quadruped robotics to seize early global market share. Along with the platforms’ integrated sensor arrays posing a surveillance risk, Chinese robotics manufacturers are deeply integrated within China’s defense industrial base. The largest of these firms, Unitree, has publicly documented ties to its military. In a filing with the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the company’s executives noted that it had received funds from military-linked programs and could remain subject to U.S. export controls. Moreover, Beijing has invested heavily in autonomous ground-based military robots equipped to operate alongside infantry, particularly in amphibious landing scenarios that would likely be necessary in a Taiwan contingency. FCC Should Strengthen Scrutiny of Chinese Emerging Technologies The FCC’s actions are a critical first step in securing U.S. critical infrastructure by both halting the importation of new dangerous devices and preventing Chinese firms from consolidating a hold over a key emerging technology sector. Rather than wait until rip-and-replace becomes the only viable solution to addressing a dangerous dependency, the commission is seeking to shape market dynamics to promote secure reindustrialization. Going forward, the commission should consider applying its regulatory model for vulnerable telecommunications products to both inverters and robots. Along with preventing new sales, this would include revoking approval for previously authorized equipment produced by foreign adversaries. Doing so would slowly remove older, but functionally identical and equally dangerous, equipment from the American market. Jack Burnham is a senior research analyst in the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Jack and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Jack on X @JackBurnham802. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.