Explainer: Why Kyiv’s Shelters Fail Civilians Under Russian Attack

Russian attacks on Kyiv are becoming more frequent and destructive. They do little to change the situation on the front line, but they kill civilians—including women and children – and sometimes bring entire sections of apartment buildings crashing down on residents. In 2025, Ukraine recorded its highest civilian death toll since 2022. Every mass-casualty strike on a residential building revives the same questions: Why were the residents not in a shelter? Was there one they could reach? And after years of shelter renovations, why does the death toll continue to rise?JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. These questions became particularly urgent during Russia’s overnight attack on Kyiv on July 30. Large-scale attacks can often be anticipated several hours in advance through official intelligence and Air Force announcements, as well as reports from independent monitoring groups. So many residents headed to the metro that night that some stations became overcrowded. People sheltering there said access to several stations was restricted during the night. But does Kyiv – the most heavily bombarded major Ukrainian city outside the front-line regions—have enough shelters in the first place? Kyiv Post examined the capital’s shelter system to determine what protection its facilities actually provide, what can serve as an alternative when a proper shelter is unavailable, and why many residents remain at home even when shelter spaces exist. Other Topics of Interest General Staff of AFU Reports 207 Combat Clashes in 24 Hours Russian forces struck Ukraine with 168 guided bombs and over 6,400 kamikaze drones as fighting intensified across multiple eastern axes. We also asked what can be done when an attack begins and no shelter is within reach – and what other Western cities can learn from Kyiv’s experience. Why are the strikes so deadly? Russia’s attacks on Ukraine are not limited to missiles. They are combined assaults involving multiple types of missiles, attack drones and decoys. Depending on the target and scale of the attack, Russia may deploy Iskander ballistic missiles; S-300 and S-400 missiles repurposed for ground strikes; Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles; Oniks supersonic missiles; Kh-22, Kh-101 and Kh-555 air-launched cruise missiles; Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles; guided aerial bombs; and Shahed-type attack drones. Russia also uses Gerbera decoy drones, some of which can carry FPV drones, as well as loitering munitions such as the Molniya and Banderol. These weapons are launched in different combinations and successive waves to overwhelm Ukraine’s air defenses. The difficulty of countering such attacks has also been demonstrated in the Middle East, where allied forces have used costly Patriot interceptors against dozens of Shahed drones, even when they were not accompanied by missiles. Incursions into Polish and Romanian airspace have likewise exposed how difficult it can be for NATO countries to detect and intercept even isolated Russian drones and missiles – let alone a large-scale combined attack. Ukraine nevertheless intercepts up to 90% of incoming cruise missiles and more than 50% of ballistic missiles during some attacks, although the rate varies considerably depending on the weapons used and the scale of the barrage. The accuracy of Russian missiles also varies by system, with some capable of deviating from their intended targets by as much as a kilometer. Falling debris from missiles intercepted or damaged by Ukrainian air defenses can cause further destruction. Whether through direct impacts or falling debris, Russian weapons frequently strike densely populated neighborhoods, increasing the number of civilians killed and injured. The UN recorded 2,514 civilian deaths in Ukraine in 2025—around one-third more than in 2024. During the first six months of 2026 alone, it recorded another 1,396 deaths. If that pace continues, the 2026 toll will exceed last year’s by more than 10%. Yet Ukraine’s existing shelter system is struggling to keep pace with the growing threat. During the July 30 attack alone, a record 56,000 people sought refuge in the Kyiv metro, according to the city’s metro authority. That was still only around 2% of the capital’s population. Shelters – how many and where? Kyiv has several thousand facilities designated for civilian shelter. According to data provided to Kyiv Post by the Municipal Security Department of the Kyiv City State Administration, the capital has 4,358 shelters and dual-use facilities, with a combined capacity of more than 2.1 million people. With Kyiv’s population estimated at around 3 million, the system could accommodate roughly two-thirds of the city’s residents. Nearly all these facilities are marked in the Kyiv Digital app and on the City Council’s online shelter map. The exceptions include classified and departmental shelters, as well as those located at defense facilities and enterprises. Kyiv shelter map showing addresses and facility types, including parking garages, apartment-building cellars and metro stations. (Screenshot from the Municipal Security Department map) Although the map appears densely covered with shelter locations, the facilities are distributed extremely unevenly across the city. The number in each district is as follows: Holosiivskyi District – 484 facilities Darnytskyi District – 591 facilities Desnianskyi District – 287 facilities Dniprovskyi District – 536 facilities Obolonskyi District – 446 facilities Pecherskyi District – 337 facilities Podilskyi District – 277 facilities Sviatoshynskyi District – 528 facilities Solomianskyi District – 492 facilities Shevchenkivskyi District – 380 facilities Podilskyi and Desnianskyi districts have the fewest shelters. Yet Desnianskyi is Kyiv’s most populous district, with around 360,000 residents, many of them living in the sprawling Troieshchyna residential area. By contrast, Pecherskyi District – which includes the city center and government quarter – has more shelters than Desnianskyi despite being Kyiv’s least populous district, with fewer than 150,000 permanent residents. Another problem is that most of the listed facilities are not purpose-built shelters but dual-use spaces. Consider one densely populated section of Troieshchyna in Desnianskyi District. Each of the apartment buildings marked below contains between 120 and 240 apartments, with hundreds of people living in each one. Desnianskyi District view. (Image via Sergii Kostezh/Kyiv Post) There are only two shelters within close walking distance of these buildings. Here they are Desnianskyi District shelters. (Screenshot from the Municipal Security Department map) What’s more, these are not actual shelters. They’re above-ground parking garages with concrete walls. Desnianskyi District view with shelters marked. (Image via Sergii Kostezh/Kyiv Post) According to security guards, they can accommodate only a few dozen people. Desnianskyi District shelters. (Image via Sergii Kostezh/Kyiv Post) Although these facilities are safer than the upper floors of a Soviet-era panel apartment building, they would not withstand a direct hit and provide protection mainly against flying debris. More substantial shelters are located beneath nearby schools. However, they can accommodate only a few hundred people while serving neighborhoods with several thousand residents. They are also several hundred meters from the nearest apartment buildings, making them difficult – if not impossible – to reach in time during a ballistic-missile attack. Underground pedestrian crossings are another type of facility officially designated as a shelter. In Desnianskyi District, they account for almost half the shelter locations shown on the city’s map. One such facility is marked below. Desnianskyi District shelters. (Screenshot from the Municipal Security Department map) And this is what those same “shelters” actually look like. An underground pedestrian crossing in Desnianskyi District. (Image via Sergii Kostezh/Kyiv Post) That does not mean an underground pedestrian crossing is a poor shelter during a ballistic-missile attack. An underground pedestrian crossing in Desnianskyi District. (Image via Sergii Kostezh/Kyiv Post) Architect Dmytro Makahon says underground pedestrian crossings are among the safest places to wait out such an attack. “Underground pedestrian crossings are among the best basic shelters. They are several meters below ground, with reinforced-concrete ceilings covered by soil and asphalt, and are designed to support vehicles weighing up to 40 tonnes. This makes them highly effective. They are not intended for comfortable, long-term stays, but they provide strong basic protection,” Makahon says. The drawback is that remaining in an underground crossing for an extended period can be difficult, particularly in winter. Many are exposed to outside air and strong drafts, making them unsuitable as full-fledged shelters. Accessibility is another problem. Shelters are frequently locked, particularly those located on the grounds of Soviet-era schools and kindergartens, which were required to incorporate shelters into their designs. Today, access may be restricted at night if the institution cannot afford to employ a security guard. One such case can be found across the city in the Nyvky neighborhood. A shelter located inside a preschool is the only facility serving the surrounding area. Nyvky shelters. (Screenshot from the Municipal Security Department map) According to local residents, however, it is inaccessible because the kindergarten’s gates are locked in the evening. Closed Nyvky kindergarten with a shelter inside. (Image via Sergii Kostezh/Kyiv Post) The problem is not the complete absence of shelters, but the age of the existing network and the slow pace of its expansion. Ninety-nine percent of Kyiv’s shelters were built before 2022, most of them during the Soviet period. According to the Kyiv City State Administration, only four new shelters have been built in the capital since the full-scale invasion began. The city’s efforts have otherwise focused on renovating existing facilities. “Since 2022, the city budget has allocated funding annually for repairs to civil-protection facilities. Specifically, funding was provided for: 593 facilities in 2022 468 facilities in 2023 761 facilities in 2024 413 facilities in 2025,” the administration said in a statement. The administration says approximately Hr.9 billion ($200 million) has been allocated for shelter repairs in recent years. Spending, however, has consistently lagged behind these allocations. Annual budget execution averaged between 70% and 80%, while less than 10% of the funding allocated for 2026 has been used so far. What goes wrong - and why? City authorities say shelter construction is complicated by the extensive network of underground utilities on Kyiv’s right bank and the high groundwater levels on its left bank. Nevertheless, the slow pace of construction and renovation has drawn widespread criticism. The completion of only four new shelters during the full-scale war suggests that expanding the network has not been a priority for the city authorities. Makahon describes this as one of wartime Kyiv’s strangest paradoxes: major construction projects continue across the capital, but they rarely include shelters. “Kyiv has undertaken a great deal of unnecessary construction in recent years, including the reconstruction of road interchanges at a cost of billions of hryvnias,” he says. “These are extremely expensive projects, yet they do nothing to improve public safety. Shelters, by contrast, would make an enormous difference. “This cannot be explained by corruption alone. Shelters are also construction projects, and money could just as easily be stolen from them. It is therefore more a matter of ineffective management than corruption.” Kyiv does have high-quality shelters, including renovated and modernized facilities. Most are located beneath schools and administrative buildings, although some can also be found beneath residential apartment blocks. One example is located beneath an apartment building near Nyvky metro station. The underground civil-defense facility was constructed beneath a five-story residential building in the 1960s. It has a long corridor with a reinforced-concrete ceiling leading to a second exit – an essential feature of a proper shelter. Several rooms have been modernized to accommodate dozens of people. The shelter is dry and comfortable. Shelter in the Nyvky underground passage. (Image via Sergii Kostezh/Kyiv Post) It is equipped with Wi-Fi, sleeping areas, benches, heaters and everything necessary to make extended stays as comfortable as possible. Shelter in the Nyvky underground passage. (Image via Sergii Kostezh/Kyiv Post) Yet even shelters like this are not used by everyone. “I have work tomorrow, and I need sleep” City officials, including members of the Kyiv City Council’s ruling majority, argue that the capital has sufficient shelter capacity but that residents do not always use the facilities available to them. “The problem is that people do not always know where the shelters near their homes are, while many others choose not to use them,” one official said. “According to our Department of Municipal Security and Emergency Situations, there are enough shelter spaces. Their maintenance is another issue. Over the past four years, many facilities have been modernized, built or restored, although the results have varied,” says Alla Shlapak, a Kyiv City Council member from the Batkivshchyna party. Shlapak was heavily criticized on social media for these remarks. Yet her central point is supported by the behavior of many residents: a significant number of people do not go to shelters during air-raid alerts. The reasons include the following: Shelters are often too far away. If a ballistic missile can reach Kyiv in around 90 seconds—or a jet-powered Shahed drone in roughly three minutes – residents have little time to get out of bed, get dressed, leave a high-rise apartment building and reach a shelter. “Let’s be honest. Roughly the same number of people die in traffic accidents in Kyiv each month as in Russian attacks,” says Oleksii, a civil servant. “Yes, it is a lottery with death, but many people do not consider the risk high enough to interrupt their sleep and run to a shelter. Besides, during a ballistic-missile attack, you may simply not make it. The missile could catch you outside, which may be even more dangerous than remaining in your apartment.” Spending the night in the metro or a well-equipped shelter means losing an entire night’s sleep. After getting little or no rest, people are still expected to function normally the following day. Meanwhile, large-scale attacks can occur every two or three nights. “I work at a university, and after a night of air raids, both faculty and students are still expected to attend the first class at 8:30 a.m.,” Viktoriia, who holds a PhD and teaches at a Kyiv university, told Kyiv Post. “That is why I don’t go to a shelter. I risk my life to get enough sleep because no one at work is going to ask how I feel. The expectations remain the same, but there is no willingness to accommodate the reality we are living in.” “When we conduct civilian training sessions in Kyiv on responding to air raids and providing first aid, we often hear people say, ‘I don’t go to shelters because I have work tomorrow,’” humanitarian worker Alyona Sidletska told Kyiv Post. “These people may work in a café or beauty salon, not in critical infrastructure. I believe employers who make such demands become part of the chain of responsibility that ultimately leads to people being killed. This issue should be addressed through legislation, with clear accountability and financial penalties. Businesses outside critical infrastructure should either remain closed after nights of mass attacks or open only in the afternoon. People need to sleep.” At present, however, it is unclear which government body should be responsible for addressing the issue – the labor authorities, the Ministry of Infrastructure or the Ministry of Social Policy. The situation is not straightforward. For businesses struggling to survive during wartime, every hour of operation matters. “We always open on schedule, even during air raids, because otherwise we will lose the few customers we still have,” the owner of a Kyiv coffee-shop chain told Kyiv Post. “Our resilience is not heroic – it is a harsh necessity if we want to keep the business alive.” What is the alternative? For decades, the main alternative to a purpose-built shelter has been the basement of a residential building. Its principal advantage is that it is located below ground level and separated from the rest of the structure. A hiding place in the cellar of a Kyiv apartment building, used as an alternative to a shelter. (Image via Sergii Kostezh/Kyiv Post) However, several incidents in which people were killed while sheltering in basements have made many residents reluctant to use them. There are two main risks: An apartment building in Borodianka, Kyiv region, destroyed by an airstrike. People sheltering in its cellar were trapped. (Image via Sergii Kostezh/Kyiv Post) Newer residential buildings often have safer basement structures. Buildings constructed with monolithic reinforced-concrete frames typically have solid concrete ceilings, underground parking garages and multiple exits leading to different sections of the building. Such buildings, however, account for less than 10% of Ukraine’s housing stock. Many Kyiv residents living in older buildings therefore avoid basements and remain in their apartments, relying instead on the “two-wall rule” – placing two interior walls between themselves and the outside. This will not protect residents if the building suffers a direct hit and collapses. It can, however, reduce the risk of injury from shattered glass and fragments of brick or concrete propelled into an apartment by a nearby explosion. A hallway or bathroom is typically the safest place that meets the two-wall rule. Military personnel with experience of missile, drone and artillery attacks on residential buildings in frontline cities argue that moving to a basement – or at least to the building’s lowest floor – still offers a better chance of survival than remaining on an upper floor. “From my experience in the frontline cities where I served and lived, the upper floors were almost always the first to be destroyed or collapse,” says Volodymyr Vasylenko, a former Territorial Defense Forces sergeant who spent two years fighting on the eastern front. “A lower floor gives you a better chance of escaping alive, while a basement provides at least some protection from a direct strike. Even if the building collapses above you, rescuers may still be able to dig you out. If an upper floor takes a direct hit – or a missile strikes directly beneath it – you have virtually no chance of survival.” Basements in older buildings are not beyond improvement, Makahon argues. He says existing basements could be reinforced to withstand the collapse of the building above, increasing the chances of survival for those sheltering inside. “One option is to renovate the basements of older apartment buildings,” Makahon says. “They should be cleared of clutter, provided with additional exits and structurally reinforced to withstand the collapse of the building above. “This could be done using reinforced concrete, although that would be expensive and time-consuming. A more practical solution would be to install heavy steel supports. I am convinced that funding could be found if Kyiv introduced such a program. Paris or one of Kyiv’s other sister cities would almost certainly contribute to a project aimed at protecting civilians.” Upgrading thousands of apartment buildings would be a slow process. For such a program to have produced meaningful results by now, it would have needed to begin at the start of the full-scale invasion. For future buildings, however, the issue has already been addressed. In 2023, Ukraine adopted a new national building code requiring newly constructed buildings to include either a reinforced-concrete shelter or a dual-use facility capable of functioning as one. The requirement is already being implemented. Newly built supermarkets, for example, commonly have underground parking garages with reinforced-concrete sections designated as shelters. These areas are equipped for emergency use, clearly marked at the parking-garage entrance and accessible around the clock. New-built underground parking and shelter in the new trade center in Kyiv. (Image via Sergii Kostezh/Kyiv Post) However, the requirement applies only to buildings constructed after the new code came into force. It does not cover Ukraine’s more than 150,000 existing apartment buildings, none of which were required to meet this standard. For their residents, the options remain the same: find a nearby shelter, head to the metro or hope that luck will be on their side when the sirens next go off.