EXPLAINER: Russia’s Gulag Imperative

EXPLAINER: Russia’s Gulag Imperative

On paper, Russia’s penal system is shrinking fast. According to Arkady Gostev, director of the Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN), there were 465,000 people in custody at the end of 2021 and about 282,000 by May this year. More than 180,000 prisoners have left Russian prisons in under five years – mostly because Moscow has recruited prisoners for active combat on the front lines in Ukraine. Yet the Kremlin is now launching its biggest prison-building program since the late Soviet era. In mid-October 2026 FSIN’s Moscow regional branch launched a tender for building what would be Russia’s largest pre-trial detention center (SIZO) in the Solnechnogorsk district outside Moscow – it would cover 42.7 hectares (almost one and half times the area of the Kremlin) and hold up to 4,000 detainees.JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. It is the centerpiece of a federal program running through 2035 that calls for 11 new pre-trial detention centers and seven large “multi-regime” prison complexes – the first new correctional colonies built in Russia since 1984. Spending billions of rubles on new detention capacity as prisoner numbers are at historic lows seems contradictory but in practice it means Moscow is preparing for more domestic dissent, further mobilization and tighter control over occupied Ukrainian territory. Pre-trial detention as a wartime funnel Two parts of the system need to be told apart: remote correctional colonies (IKs) and urban pre-trial detention centers (SIZOs). Military recruiters have hollowed out the rural colonies, but SIZOs in big cities such as Moscow remain chronically overcrowded. Other Topics of Interest National security advisors from France, Germany, and the UK may visit Moscow in November after a proposal by Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov. Under wartime policing, SIZOs hold people accused of treason, extremism, “discrediting” the armed forces, draft evasion or desertion, often for lengthy periods before trial. They have also become a recruitment channel. Rather than offering a pardon for frontline service after conviction, the authorities now force detainees to sign Ministry of Defense contracts before they get to court. More SIZO capacity means more room for this coercive recruitment. Preparing for mobilization and dissent Western and Ukrainian intelligence assessments link the building push to domestic stability and a possible future draft. The September 2022 “partial mobilization” sparked street protests, arson attacks on enlistment offices and an exodus of hundreds of thousands of men of fighting age. Since then, the Kremlin has worked to remove obstacles to another call-up, with digital draft notices, closed borders for conscripts and harsher penalties for evasion. Detention space is the last piece. Large SIZOs away from population centers would let the state quickly hold protesters, draft evaders and deserters without overloading local police stations. The location matters politically too. Downtown Moscow facilities such as Butyrka and Matrosskaya Tishina are visible reminders of repression and draw relatives, independent journalists and rights observers. A site on the periphery keeps detention out of public view and cuts detainees off from lawyers and support networks. The FSB’s private prisons return Control over the cells is also shifting. After Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe in 2022, Moscow began dismantling post-Soviet reforms that had put pre-trial detention under the civilian Ministry of Justice. Under legislation that took effect in 2026, the Federal Security Service (FSB) can again run its own pre-trial detention centers. In March 2026, seven centrally managed SIZOs were moved from FSIN to the FSB. They include Moscow’s Lefortovo prison and facilities in St. Petersburg, Rostov-on-Don, Krasnodar, Vladikavkaz, Chelyabinsk and occupied Simferopol. Human rights lawyers warn that this creates a closed loop. The agency that arrests suspects and builds treason or espionage cases now also guards their cells, controls their medical care and decides whether their lawyers get through the gate. Exporting the system to occupied Ukraine The expansion extends beyond Russia’s internationally recognized borders. One of the seven multi-regime complexes in the Ministry of Justice program, each expected to cost 13 to 20 billion rubles ($154 million to $238 million), is planned for occupied Kherson region on Ukraine. Since 2022, occupation authorities have held thousands of Ukrainian civilians, local officials, activists and prisoners of war in an improvised network of basements, police stations and other makeshift sites across occupied Ukraine and southern Russia. A permanent prison in Kherson suggests Moscow plans to replace these with lasting infrastructure meant to suppress resistance and draw local people into the Russian prison system for years. The limits of the plan Turning plans into concrete is proving harder in a strained wartime economy. Security spending is being prioritized over healthcare and social programs, but cost and logistics are already slowing the rollout. In early November 2026, less than a month after the Solnechnogorsk tender was announced, authorities declared it invalid because no contractor submitted a bid. The Federal Antimonopoly Service then found violations in the procurement documents and ordered officials to rewrite them and rerun the auction. These delays are unlikely to change the broader direction. Russia may have fewer people behind bars than at any point in its modern history, but, for whatever reason, it wants to ensure that it has the capacity to detain and imprison more if its leadership so decides. Bohdan Nahaylo, Chief Editor of Kyiv Post since December 2021, is a British-Ukrainian journalist, author and veteran Ukraine watcher based between Kyiv and Barcelona. He was formerly head of Amnesty International's Soviet Union unit, a senior United Nations official and policy adviser, and Director of Radio Liberty’s Ukrainian Service.

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