EU Membership for Ukraine Is Key to Europe’s Security

EU membership for Ukraine is seen as one of the sweeteners for Ukraine to accept a peace deal with Russia that perhaps includes major concessions elsewhere – for example no NATO membership. Indeed, EU membership for Ukraine was included in the 18-point peace “plan” which emerged from the Anchorage summit between Presidents Trump and Putin. However, while its notable that high level European political leaders give lip service to Ukraine’s EU accession bid, in private EC officials highlight the still enormous task in aligning Ukraine with the volumenous set of EU acquis. Things like Ukraine’s failings around corruption and the rule of law are continually brought up as things likely to delay membership.JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. But at the national government level also numerous difficulties are expected from Hungary focusing on protection of minority rights in Ukraine, to Poland and France with concerns over the impact on the CAP, to a broad concern from current net beneficiaries in the EU budget – mostly those in Central and Eastern Europe, that the shear scale of the financial challenge in supporting Ukraine would see them suffer financially in the next MFF. Note here that current plans are to budget €100 billion ($114 billion) in support to Ukraine over the seven year EU budget cycle from 2028, and this assumes an end to the war, with the actual cost likely increasingly significantly (€40-50 billion a year) if the war is on-going. Other Topics of Interest Can Trump and Xi Turn Leverage Into a Russia Deal – and What Are the Stakes for Ukraine? As Trump and Xi hold high-stakes talks in Washington, Putin envoy Kirill Dmitriev heads to the US with a parallel economic pitch to Trump’s team. So the assumption is that Ukraine has huge hurdles to jump before a green light for EU accession. There has been talk from Ukraine of EU membership in 2027, and this has not been significantly countered by the leadership of the EU. However, the message from the EC bureaucracy, and at national government level the message seems to be that full EU membership for Ukraine is not likely until some years ahead, perhaps as late as the end of the next decade. That also appears a little unrealistic as in the end EU membership for Ukraine will be a political decision. Imagine a scenario (I know, somewhat imaginary at this stage, given Trump’s constant appeasement of Putin) where Trump forces Putin to the negotiating table, and with Trump wanting the kudos of a big peace deal, the Nobel prize even, if what it takes is EU membership for Ukraine, would European countries be really willing to say no to Trump, when Europe is still significantly dependent on the US for its defense? Is Ireland, or Hungary, or Belgium really going to say no? And would they say no to an end of this brutal war which continues to test European security if the quid pro quo was only EU accession for Ukraine? I can’t see that. There is an issue of whether Trump would want Ukraine in the EU, or for the EU to enlarge for that matter given he seems to be going out of his way to weaken and undermine the EU in a range of other efforts. But as is, EU accession for Ukraine has been included in various Witkoff-Kushner peace PowerPoint presentations – so maybe we should take them at their word. I would argue that early Ukrainian EU accession is possible, with the political will in the West – from the US, and the EU, and I think on areas of concern like the roll out of CAP, and, application of rule of law, corruption issues, then long transition periods could imagined. Political will and imagination are needed. There are solutions. But if such a compromise brings an end to the war, anchors Ukrainian reform, investment and development, and ties Ukraine’s security prowess into the European fold, it could do more for Europe in assuring its security than NATO membership could do for Ukraine. Corruption and rule of law issues are significant in Ukraine – I am not underplaying these. They have perhaps been the biggest impediment to economic development in Ukraine over the entire period since independence. But the EU accession anchor will be key to reining them in. Note here that in the early 1990s, at the outset of the transition in Ukraine, its rule of law and corruption issues were no worse than say Poland, Bulgaria or Romania. I know, as I spent a lot of time in the region. But whereas those other countries benefitted from the EU accession process, with carrot and stick to reform, Ukraine never had a real EU accession perspective until perhaps 2013, and the signing of the DCFTA, and after that Euromaidan and war. Many of those same EU countries noted above still struggle with rule of law and corruption issues. Bulgaria and Romania were in a similar position I would argue to Ukraine now – Ukraine is perhaps better actually – as compared to Bulgaria and Romania back in 2007 when the political decision was taken to allow them to join the Union. Notable here that Bulgaria is rated 94 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, only 20 rankings above Ukraine, at 114. And for Bulgaria that is after almost 20 years of EU membership. So double standards? But Ukraine seems to be on a more positive tract on the rule of law/corruption front, and it has a vibrant civil society movement, calling out corruption and driving the reform process forward. It’s various state anti corruption agencies are making progress, again identifying and acting on high level corruption – perhaps the direction of travel is better in Ukraine now than in many existing EU member states. Look at the backtracking in Hungary under the former Orban regime. What did the EC really do to counter that? And importantly, we have seen in this war how Ukraine can make remarkable strides when it faces the wall, or a trigger event. So if the choice is sort out rule of law/corruption issues or no EU accession, I think Ukraine moves forward apace with reform. And this is actually what happened with the other EU accession states in Eastern Europe. I cannot state how important it is that Ukraine be given a clear EU accession perspective, and a road map of reforms it needs to undertake to ensure membership. I think it is critical for an accession date to be set. This could be relatively long distance for full membership, or a shorter timeframe with transition arrangements. But for potential investors into Ukraine they need the assurance of a date, as was the case in the remarkable economic transformation in Emerging Europe which came through the accession process. What we know from the EC is that, as with the Copenhagen Treaty in 1994 which set 2004 for the accession of Poland, et al., the EC is a bureaucratic machine that delivers on targets set, like a metronome. Ukraine needs a date as much as it needs EU accession. What should be absolutely clear now to European states is a) Russia is an existential threat; b) the US backstop to NATO in Europe is no longer there or reliable – as evidenced by the Trump administration’s failing to hold the Putin regime to account for its continued malign actions against Europe, but instead gladhanding the Putin regime; c) Ukraine is now the most effective European military power, able to stop Russia, and now far advanced compared to Europe in terms of military technology, and in the future shape of warfare. Ukraine is hence critical to Europe’s future defense. And Europe should have an interest in the successful economic development of Ukraine, and its social and political stability. What is the best guarantee of that? EU accession. No ifs, no buts, that is just the harsh reality, the fact. Now either European leaders are a bunch of muppets, or they can see the clear strategic vision of what needs to be done to assure European defense against the Russian threat which will not go away as long as Putin is in power. And that assurance can only be provided by Ukraine in the EU. And perhaps imagine if Ukraine is not brought into the EU in a speedy fashion? In my mind that will mean failed economic development, resulting social and political instability. And this will be in a militarized state with a huge arsenal and a ballistic missile and near nuclear capability and likely eventually aspiration. And Russia will continue to act to destabilize Ukraine to then undermine the security, political stability and prosperity of Europe. Does the EU want that? And who is saying all this? Well I have covered Ukraine as an analyst for close to 40 years, first visiting Kyiv in 1987, having lived there, and in Russia, and visited Ukraine hundreds of times, writing thousands of articles on its political economy. Ukraine failed previously as it was this bridge between east and west, not in either camp, but pulled apart by both camps, and exploited by rent-seeking oligarchs who milked their own ties to Russia. It failed to develop over this period. And in 2013-14, and arguably 2004-05, and now in defending Ukraine, and Europe in this war, Ukrainians have shown clearly that they do not want to be a Russian sphere of influence but want a European perspective. We owe them through the blood they have shed to deliver on that. And if it means breaking a few EU rules, and norms, well so be it. The EU does remarkable things in times of crisis – and this is an existential security crisis for Europe, and Ukraine provides the solutions. Are there real leaders in Europe who can actually figure this out. See the original in the author’s @tashecon blog here. The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.