EU Clusters for Dummies: Where Ukraine Stands

Following the opening of the Fundamentals cluster on June 15, 2026, and the External Relations cluster on July 14, Ukraine’s path toward EU membership has moved from planned talks to actual negotiations. The latest government reshuffle has also created uncertainty over who will lead the process, with Vsevolod Chentsov, Ukraine’s permanent representative to the EU, and Taras Kachka, deputy prime minister of Ukraine for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, swapping their roles.JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. Kyiv Post spoke to its diplomatic sources in Brussels to understand what EU clusters are, what the latest government reshuffle means, where Ukraine currently stands, and what could slow the process down. What are EU clusters? In simple terms, an EU accession cluster is a folder. Inside that folder are several policy areas, known as chapters, in which a candidate country must bring its laws, institutions, and state practices closer to EU standards. Clusters are not symbolic prizes, and opening one does not mean that a country is about to join the EU. Rather, it means that the EU has agreed to begin formal negotiations on that group of issues. The candidate country must still pass laws, implement reforms, prove that they work, and convince all EU member states that the required work has actually been completed. The EU accession process is divided into six negotiation clusters. Here’s what they are and what they cover: Other Topics of Interest Russian Window to Attack Europe: NATO Won’t Be Ready Until 2035 Failure to respond adequately to an Article 5 threat could create a false perception of weakness, encouraging further escalation rather than preventing it. Fundamentals – rule of law, judiciary, anti-corruption, democratic institutions, public administration, public procurement, statistics, and financial control. It is opened first and closed last. Internal Market – free movement of goods, workers, services, and capital; competition, consumer protection, company law, and intellectual property. Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth – economic policy, taxation, education, science, digital policy, social policy, enterprise policy, and customs. Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity – environment, climate, energy, transport, and trans-European networks. Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion – agriculture, rural development, food safety, fisheries, regional policy, cohesion funding, and financial and budgetary provisions. External Relations – foreign, security, and defense policy; external trade; and relations with third countries. Why does the Fundamentals cluster matter most? The most important cluster is the first one: Fundamentals. It covers democracy, the rule of law, the judiciary, fundamental rights, public administration, public procurement, statistics, financial control, and economic criteria. In practice, it asks several basic questions: Does the country have institutions that work? Can its courts be trusted? Is public money properly controlled? Can the state function without collapsing into political bargaining every five minutes? That is why the Fundamentals cluster is opened first and closed last. Progress in this area determines the pace of the entire accession process. A country may advance on foreign policy, trade, agriculture, or energy, but if its courts remain dysfunctional and its anti-corruption system is being weakened, its chances of becoming an EU member state diminish. Where does Ukraine stands now? Ukraine has moved unusually quickly in political terms. It applied for EU membership shortly after Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022 and received candidate status later that year. Formal accession negotiations began in June 2024. By mid-2026, Ukraine had opened its first negotiation cluster, Fundamentals, together with Moldova. In July, Kyiv also opened the External Relations cluster, which covers foreign, security, and defense policy, among other areas. Ukraine is now seeking to move forward with clusters 2 and 3: Internal Market, and Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth. On July 22, the Council of the EU’s Working Party on Enlargement, known as COELA, made a second attempt to persuade Hungary to approve the screening results for the two clusters for Ukraine and Moldova, but it was ultimately postponed to Sept. 1. Approval would allow technical preparations for formally opening them to begin. Who is in charge of the process? Alongside Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the government office coordinating European integration headed by the deputy prime minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, one of the key institutions is Ukraine’s Permanent Representation to the European Union in Brussels. Kyiv Post learned from its sources that all three Ukrainian permanent representatives to the EU over the past decade – Kostiantyn Yelisieiev, Mykola Tochytskyi, and the incumbent Vsevolod Chentsov – were well suited to the position. “Chentsov is very effective. He is calm, but not soft, and he can be quite tough with colleagues. He sometimes puts forward ideas that are not easy to implement and does not accept ‘no’ as the end of the discussion. In the EU, this works, because this is exactly the kind of person needed,” the source said. “He has pushed through a great deal. In fact, much of what the EU provides to Ukraine – including social assistance, funding for the Armed Forces, and other support – was secured partly with his help.” Despite the recent government reshuffle, Chentsov remains in the position while the formation of the new government and the relevant appointment procedures are completed. The reshuffle problem Chentsov’s expected successor, Taras Kachka, is widely regarded as competent and respected in EU circles. However, frequent government reshuffles weaken Ukraine’s negotiating capacity. According to civil society estimates, last year’s change in government led to the replacement of 31% of the heads of Ukraine’s accession negotiation working groups. The full impact of the latest reshuffle is still difficult to assess because appointments across the ministries have not yet been completed. At present, it is estimated that roughly half of the working-group heads will retain their positions. For a country attempting to move through accession talks at record speed, this level of institutional instability is problematic. Still, Kyiv Post’s source described Kachka as highly energetic – an important quality for a position with an exceptionally heavy workload. “However, it is still unclear how he will combine the roles of ambassador and trade representative. The trade representative has separate responsibilities and travels frequently. When there is no ambassador physically present, there may be no one available to sign documents and handle certain formalities,” the source said. The uncomfortable reform math Ukraine’s declared ambitions are grand, but its delivery is repeatedly questioned not only by the EU, but also by pro-European reform advocates inside Ukraine. According to independent assessments by civil society organizations, the Kachka-Kos plan – a priority reform roadmap developed by Taras Kachka and EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos – has been implemented by roughly 15%. Measured against the full set of interim obligations under Chapters 23 and 24, which cover the judiciary, fundamental rights, justice, freedom, and security, this amounts to no more than around 3% of the overall work. Comparisons matter, particularly because Ukraine has joined a competitive group of candidate countries, many of them from the Western Balkans and highly protective of their own interests. Compared with the Western Balkan frontrunners, Montenegro and Albania, Ukraine remains near the beginning of the formal accession process. Montenegro has opened all 33 negotiating chapters and provisionally closed 16. Albania has opened all 33 chapters and met the interim benchmarks under the Fundamentals cluster, allowing it to begin closing chapters. Ukraine, by contrast, has only begun the process and still needs to prove that it can deliver on the most difficult reforms. Why this matters? Ukraine will probably move quickly through some parts of the accession process. External Relations is the clearest example. Ukraine already aligns closely with EU foreign policy, sanctions, security priorities, and strategic thinking because Russia’s invasion made neutrality impossible. In some areas, Kyiv now directly influences European policy. The Fundamentals cluster is different. Judicial reform remains unfinished. The Supreme Court remains deeply controversial. Anti-corruption institutions function, but political pressure against them remains real. Some reforms have produced results where institutions were genuinely rebuilt. Other sectors remain largely untouched. The possibility of Ukraine “joining” the EU in 2027 remains on the agenda. The real takeaway EU clusters are not magical gates to membership. They are the EU’s way of assessing whether a candidate country is becoming compatible with the bloc in practice rather than merely in speeches. This leaves Ukraine with a somewhat paradoxical task. On the one hand, it is clearly in Kyiv’s interest to open all six clusters so that negotiations can proceed across every policy area. On the other hand, opening all of them would shift the process away from symbolic political victories and into years of intensive, highly technical work. “If all of them are opened, this will become routine work. In some ways, there is not even a desire to open all of them at once, because then everything will turn into full-scale bureaucracy – delegations, procedures, and so on,” Kyiv Post’s source said. The source was alluding to the fact that, once every cluster is open, Ukraine’s EU path will stop being a single official’s “achievement” or a recurring public event. It will become the work of hundreds of civil servants, negotiators, experts, and ministries. Asked about post-Orbán Hungary and its attitude toward Kyiv, the source said that it “has become better, but, as you can see for yourself, it is still resisting.” The source added that the much more uncomfortable fact is that right-wing parties are on a conspicuous rise to power across Europe, namely due to subpar immigration policies – but their Ukraine-skeptic position also plays a role. The looming presidential elections in France in 2027, which would lead to the end of Kyiv-friendly Emmanuel Macron’s rule, only serve to add to the worry.