Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has reasons to be upset about the outcome of the US midterm elections and their impact on his policy agenda for Turkey. His pessimism showed in his initial reflection, where he said it was “too early” to draw firm conclusions. Erdogan is accustomed to driving Ankara’s bilateral relationship with Washington on a leader-to-leader basis. This is especially true in Erdogan’s dealings with US President Donald Trump, where the two enjoy a close, friendly dialogue. However, that strategy may face new challenges when Democrats take control of Congress in January. The US midterm elections on November 3 delivered a sweeping victory for the Democratic Party, ensuring a Democratic led Congress for the next two years. During the first half of Trump’s second term, congressional republicans ensured Trump’s personal affection for Erdogan remained unchallenged, allowing Ankara to escape Congressional scrutiny on a range of issues that could have had steep political and economic consequences for Erdogan. Such a comfortable relationship is no longer assured as Democrats prepare to exercise their congressional oversight powers in the second Trump presidency, fielding over 250 seats in the House of Representatives and 55 seats in the Senate. Although this is not an outcome Erdogan wanted, he has pledged to maintain close dialogue with both the Trump administration and Congress. But the shift to a Democratic majority raises important questions and potential difficulties for Ankara on several policy fronts: its beleaguered desire to acquire the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, engines for Ankara’s indigenous fifth-generation KAAN fighter jet, its desire to see the lifting of US sanctions, and avoidance of holding Turkey accountable for its hostile stance toward Greece and Cyprus, and its atrocious human rights record. A Democratic-led Congress will have a commanding opinion on all of these issues and will not be eager to humor Erdogan’s desired outcomes. Lifting US sanctions on its defense industry remains one of Turkey’s top priorities. Imposed in 2020 under CAATSA (Countering of Adversaries through Sanctions Act) over Turkey’s purchase of the S-400, the sanctions target the country’s defense procurement agency. The S-400 is a Russian-manufactured missile defense system – an alternative to the US-made Patriot system. Despite numerous warnings from Washington and a chorus of NATO allies, Ankara purchased the S-400 system in 2019, resulting in its removal from the F-35 program and being hit with CAATSA sanctions, owing to a simple rationale: the Russian-made S-400s would have compromised the stealth capabilities of the F-35 and shared the fighter jet’s stealth secrets with America’s adversaries. Trump said in July that he would lift these sanctions and would also consider selling F-35s to Turkey. However, members of Congress from both parties pushed back, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that existing law still blocks the sale. The main obstacle remains the S-400: US law, as defined under section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2020, prohibits transferring F-35s to Turkey as long as Ankara retains the S-400 system. Reports indicate that Turkey is interested in transferring its S-400 stockpile to the United Arab Emirates. If this happened before January 2027, when Democrats took over Congress, it would satisfy the letter of the law and technically allow the Republican-led lame-duck Congress to lift sanctions. On the other hand, if the S-400 divestment occurred after January, it is unclear whether Democrats would be keen to provision Turkey with F-35s, given their lack of trust in Erdogan and his increasingly authoritarian rule at home, and his hostile stance toward US allies, especially Greece. Turkey’s domestic fighter prototype On KAAN, Turkey’s domestic fifth-generation fighter prototype, Ankara got in under the wire. In July, a $700 million sale of 80 GE F110 engines cleared congressional review after a resolution to block it failed to advance. But KAAN will rely on US engines until Turkey’s own engine is ready, expected around 2032 at the very earliest. Every future license and export approval will go before a Congress in which the lawmakers who tried to stop the July sale now chair the committees. Syria could also return to the agenda. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Kurdish-led force that long divided Washington and Ankara, dissolved in August, absorbed into the Syrian army after Damascus retook most of the territory it held. Democrats have broadly supported the Trump administration’s Syria policy. But Turkey’s roughly 20,000 troops in northern Syria and its role in the Syrian army could draw new questions, especially about the treatment of Kurds and other minorities. The Syria file could also draw further scrutiny under a Democratic Congress, owing to Turkey’s increasingly escalatory militarist stance that threatens war with Israel. Both Ankara and Jerusalem maintain a significant military presence inside Syria, citing concerns over national security in the post-Assad era, and both want each other out. Turkey may also face more pressure over its increasingly escalatory posture in the Eastern Mediterranean that threatens US and NATO ally Greece and European Union partner, Cyprus. Ankara is preparing legislation, widely associated with its “Blue Homeland” maritime doctrine, which Athens and Nicosia see as a challenge to their rights in disputed waters. Blue Homeland is a maritime doctrine that expresses a minimalist interpretation of Turkey’s maritime borders that violates those of Greece and Cyprus recognized under international law. Congress, meanwhile, has deepened US ties with Greece and Cyprus through bipartisan bills such as the Eastern Mediterranean Gateway Act. US positionality toward the Eastern Mediterranean will likely be shaped largely by the bipartisan Congressional Hellenic caucus, which will have between 80 and 130 members. Most worryingly for Erdogan will be Turkey’s domestic political record, which may come under greater scrutiny. Erdogan has all but ended the rule of law in Turkey and is widely acknowledged to be the only NATO leader who is building an autocracy. The jailing and trial of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, along with a sharp rise in online censorship, drew little reaction from the Trump administration. Democratic lawmakers, however, have long criticized Ankara. In July, Senator Ed Markey and Representative Dina Titus introduced the Turkey Human Rights Promotion Act, which would condition US security assistance on the release of political prisoners and an end to transnational repression. With Democrats chairing the relevant committees, such measures are now more likely to receive a hearing. Finally, one should pay attention to Democrats’ desire to go after the Trump administration on the Halkbank case. Halkbank is Turkey’s second-largest public lender, prosecuted by the Southern District of New York in 2019 for its role in violating US sanctions in Iran, in a brazen scheme that implicated the Erdogan regime in defrauding the US Treasury by $20 billion. After Erdogan’s visit to the White House in September 2025, Trump recently instructed the Department of Justice to abandon imposing punitive damages on Halkbank without an explanation. This is low-hanging fruit that Democrats will demand an answer for: if the US is serious about weakening the Iranian regime, why did the Trump administration offer such a sweetheart deal to a state and its leader that is potentially the largest violator of US sanctions on Iran? Do these issues mean Erdogan’s foreign policy agenda will face severe headwinds? Perhaps, but it’s worth bearing in mind that Trump will still be president until January 2029 and will maintain a commanding position to prosecute US foreign policy. Congress can and will likely hold hearings that could prove embarrassing to Erdogan. Congress can also legislate in ways unfavorable to Ankara, but a presidential veto can block them. Even though Democrats will hold a sizable majority, they will lack the two-thirds needed to override a presidential veto, and Turkey’s strategic importance has grown amid the wars in Ukraine and Iran. Maintaining a balanced relationship with the Trump administration and Congress will prove challenging for Ankara, given Democratic lawmakers’ concerns about Turkish policies. Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow and director of the Turkey Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, DC, where Helin Unal is a research fellow in the Turkey program.
Erdogan’s Washington strategy faces a new test under a Democratic Congress
Full Article
Original Source
Read the full article at Fdd →KhanList aggregates and links to publicly available news content. We do not host full articles from third-party sources. Always verify important information with original sources.