Erdoğan’s Veiled Message to Aliyev as Kazakhstan Proposes Inviting Russia Into Turkic Bloc

“May Almighty Allah never leave you at the mercy of the treacherous.” With those words attributed to the legendary Dede Qorqud, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan concluded Friday’s summit of Turkic leaders in Ankara – a gathering marked by the absence of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev amid growing tensions between two countries traditionally described as “one nation, two states.”JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. Erdoğan, known for using public speeches to convey political messages, chose a traditional blessing from a figure deeply respected in both Turkey and Azerbaijan. He wished that mountains would never collapse, trees would never be cut down, rivers would never run dry and swords would never break in battle. But it was the prayer’s final line, invoking protection from the treacherous, that carried particular resonance amid the growing rift between Ankara and Baku. Was Erdoğan indirectly warning Aliyev about the partners on whom Azerbaijan has chosen to rely? One possible reading points to Israel, whose close military, security and energy relationship with Azerbaijan contrasts sharply with Erdoğan’s position toward the Israeli government. Erdoğan had personally invited Aliyev to the 13th summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Instead, the Azerbaijani president remained in Baku to attend a FIFA youth football awards ceremony, sending Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov in his place. Other Topics of Interest Ukraine Allocates $7.8M to Repair Shelters in Maternity Hospitals With Hr. 59.8 million ($1.3 million), Ukraine will fund gabions, metal shutters and impact-resistant window film for operating rooms and intensive care units. In his opening remarks, Erdoğan appealed for unity, declaring that there was no room for division or discord within the Turkic family. A dialogue without naming names The apparent exchange of messages began weeks earlier. Speaking at the ruling New Azerbaijan Party’s congress on Oct. 2, Aliyev declared that his country needed no patronage and would not tolerate outside interference. “We need no one’s help or patronage,” he said, insisting that no country had helped Azerbaijan when it needed assistance. He also claimed that Azerbaijan had purchased every weapon it used, sometimes paying several times the market price. Aliyev did not name Turkey. But the remarks came amid growing criticism from Turkish political and religious circles over Azerbaijan’s restrictions on headscarves in schools. The dispute escalated when Azerbaijan declared 31 Turkish nationals persona non grata over criticism posted on social media. Erdoğan reportedly attempted to contain the controversy, including by dismissing an adviser who had publicly criticized Baku. Nevertheless, Aliyev skipped the summit despite Erdoğan’s invitation. His absence became particularly significant because Turkey was taking over the organization’s rotating chairmanship from Azerbaijan. A victory Aliyev does not want to share The headscarf controversy may have dominated headlines, but another source of resentment lies in competing narratives surrounding Azerbaijan’s victory in Karabakh. For Aliyev, the military victory has become the defining achievement of his presidency. Yet Turkey’s support was crucial. Ankara provided military training, defense equipment, political backing and diplomatic support during Azerbaijan’s confrontation with Armenia. In July 2024, Erdoğan sparked anger in Baku by invoking Turkey’s involvement in Karabakh and Libya while discussing possible action against Israel. “Just as we entered Karabakh, just as we entered Libya,” Erdoğan said. Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry responded by insisting that no foreign military personnel had participated in its combat operations. The exchange exposed an uncomfortable disagreement over who could claim credit for the victory. Azerbaijani troops fought the war, but Turkey’s contribution went well beyond commercial arms sales. In his Oct. 2 speech, Aliyev reinforced his preferred narrative. “We stood alone,” he declared, adding that Azerbaijan had purchased its weapons “down to the last bullet.” He also claimed that suppliers had sometimes charged prices several times higher than international rates. There is, however, a difference between paying for military equipment and having an ally willing to provide it, alongside training, political backing and diplomatic support. For many Azerbaijanis, recognizing Turkey’s role does not diminish their country’s victory. But Aliyev’s insistence that Azerbaijan accomplished everything alone raises a political question: Is he reluctant to share the defining achievement of his presidency with Erdoğan? A victory acknowledged as a joint strategic achievement would inevitably give Turkey a place in the historical narrative – something Aliyev’s increasingly personalized portrayal of Karabakh leaves little room for. Why distancing Azerbaijan from Turkey is difficult Aliyev faces a particular challenge in diminishing Turkey’s contribution: the relationship between the two peoples is older and deeper than either president. Turkey was the first country to recognize Azerbaijan’s independence in 1991. It closed its border with Armenia in 1993 in solidarity with Baku during the first Karabakh war and maintained that position for more than three decades. For many Azerbaijanis, Turkey’s importance is rooted in shared language, culture, history and a longstanding sense of brotherhood. That attachment cannot easily be redefined by government messaging. Pro-government arguments that Azerbaijan paid for Turkish weapons do not erase Ankara’s political and military support. Nor does criticism of Aliyev from Turkey necessarily amount to hostility toward Azerbaijan. Attempts to minimize Ankara’s contribution risk deepening the divide between the government’s narrative and Azerbaijanis who remain grateful for Turkey’s historical support. The Karabakh victory can be both an Azerbaijani military achievement and a success made possible, in part, by Turkey’s strategic partnership. The two are not mutually exclusive. Armenia moves closer to Turkey as Baku looks elsewhere The growing friction comes as Armenia, Azerbaijan’s longtime adversary, is pursuing closer relations with Ankara. Turkey and Armenia have been negotiating the reopening of their shared border, closed in 1993. Turkey has linked normalization to progress in Armenian-Azerbaijani peace efforts. Yet the diplomatic contrast is striking: Armenia is seeking closer engagement with Turkey while Aliyev publicly distances himself from Erdoğan. Another unexpected development came on Oct. 23, when Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar visited Baku – the first such visit in eight years. Aliyev personally received Jaishankar, whose country has supplied weapons to Armenia and has historically had strained relations with Azerbaijan because of Baku’s close ties with Pakistan. The talks on expanded cooperation raise questions about Aliyev’s priorities as relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan’s closest strategic ally, grow strained. Israel adds another layer of tension Azerbaijan’s close partnership with Israel remains another sensitive issue. Erdoğan has emerged as one of Israel’s fiercest critics over the war in Gaza, while Aliyev maintains extensive defense, intelligence and energy ties with Israel. Baku insists it has the right to choose its strategic partners, regardless of Ankara’s objections. In a Jan. 5 interview, Aliyev defended his government’s position, arguing that Palestine had failed to support Azerbaijan during its conflict with Armenia. “With all due respect and sympathy for Palestine, Palestine did not particularly protect us either,” he said. His remarks echoed accusations in Azerbaijani political circles that Palestinian leaders had sided with Armenia. The partnership has also given Aliyev influential allies in Washington, where pro-Israel advocacy groups have backed his government despite concerns about its human rights record. Israeli military technology has played an important role in Azerbaijan’s military development. Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR has also faced repeated protests in Turkey over Azerbaijani oil reaching Israel through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, despite Ankara’s ban on direct trade with Israel. Putin’s Russia enters the picture Friday’s summit produced another unexpected development. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed inviting Russia to participate in the Organization of Turkic States through its OTS+ format or as an observer. Tokayev cited Russia’s historical ties with Turkic peoples and argued that cooperation with Moscow could strengthen the organization. No agreement was announced, and Putin received no formal invitation. The proposal was particularly notable given Russia’s continuing invasion of Ukraine and Moscow’s longstanding efforts to preserve its influence across the former Soviet space. As Turkey ties cool, Aliyev moves closer to Moscow The growing distance between Baku and Ankara comes as Aliyev’s government appears to be rebuilding its relationship with the Kremlin, following a period of tensions over the downing of an Azerbaijani passenger aircraft by Russian air defenses on Dec. 25, 2024. On April 15, 2026, Azerbaijan and Russia issued a joint statement declaring that they had reached a settlement over the consequences of the crash, including compensation. The two governments pledged to deepen cooperation within what they described as their allied relationship. A more revealing development followed on Oct. 16. Speaking at Russian Energy Week in Moscow, an event attended by President Vladimir Putin, Elshad Nasirov, vice president of Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR, announced that Baku intended to resume purchasing natural gas from Russia’s Gazprom. “We can proudly say that our cooperation with such a giant company as Gazprom is a very good example,” Nasirov said, according to Russia’s state-run TASS news agency. The announcement coincided with a significant shift in Washington’s Russia sanctions policy. On the same day, President Donald Trump signed an executive order waiving sanctions and tariffs under the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. For years, Azerbaijan has sought to establish itself as an alternative energy supplier to Europe, helping reduce the continent’s dependence on Russian gas. The political implications extend beyond energy. For years, Azerbaijan’s participation in the Turkic world provided Aliyev with a diplomatic alternative to Russian-led integration projects, including the Eurasian Economic Union and its customs arrangements. Baku could cultivate strong relations with Moscow without formally joining Russia-dominated economic structures. The Organization of Turkic States offered another political center of gravity, with Turkey as Azerbaijan’s principal strategic partner. Now, as Aliyev’s relationship with Erdoğan cools and cooperation with Moscow gains renewed momentum, that balance appears to be shifting.