Dramatic Changes Are Unlikely in Israel, Even if Netanyahu Is Ousted

Long before Israel’s 2023 war in Gaza, the Israeli military formulated an offensive strategy known as the Dahiya Doctrine. The idea was to inflict such massive force against an enemy stronghold, including broad destruction of civilian and economic infrastructure, that the adversary would be deterred from tangling with Israel ever again. The doctrine was implemented in Israel’s 2006 war with Hezbollah in Lebanon—Dahiya is a southern suburb of Beirut and a stronghold of the group. It was coined by Gadi Eisenkot, who served at the time as the head of the military’s operations directorate. I am reminded of this episode because Israel just had its long-awaited election, and early returns suggest Eisenkot might possibly be the country’s next prime minister. According to Israeli television’s Channel 12 exit poll, Eisenkot’s centrist “change bloc” is projected to control 52 seats in the 120-member parliament, compared to 50 seats for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc and 18 for the Arab-led parties. The results are preliminary—it will take days to count all the ballots and weeks or more before a governing coalition comes together. Eisenkot’s path to power is hardly assured. Long before Israel’s 2023 war in Gaza, the Israeli military formulated an offensive strategy known as the Dahiya Doctrine. The idea was to inflict such massive force against an enemy stronghold, including broad destruction of civilian and economic infrastructure, that the adversary would be deterred from tangling with Israel ever again. The doctrine was implemented in Israel’s 2006 war with Hezbollah in Lebanon—Dahiya is a southern suburb of Beirut and a stronghold of the group. It was coined by Gadi Eisenkot, who served at the time as the head of the military’s operations directorate. I am reminded of this episode because Israel just had its long-awaited election, and early returns suggest Eisenkot might possibly be the country’s next prime minister. According to Israeli television’s Channel 12 exit poll, Eisenkot’s centrist “change bloc” is projected to control 52 seats in the 120-member parliament, compared to 50 seats for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc and 18 for the Arab-led parties. The results are preliminary—it will take days to count all the ballots and weeks or more before a governing coalition comes together. Eisenkot’s path to power is hardly assured. If the trend does hold and Netanyahu is ousted, this will please many people in Washington who want to see substantial changes in Israeli policy. But here’s something they should keep in mind. On the issues that journalists, analysts, and some members of Congress care most about—the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and a two-state solution—Eisenkot’s change bloc does not differ all that much from the current coalition. On most of these issues, Netanyahu has been firmly within Israel’s mainstream, just like his opponents. Much of Washington is afflicted with Bibi Derangement Syndrome. They have a hard time discerning between what is actually the fault of the prime minister and facts about Israeli politics that observers happen to not like. This syndrome underlines the inability of both its passionate supporters and its equally passionate critics to treat Israel as a normal country whose leaders confront internal political constraints and incentives. I don’t mean to let Netanyahu off the hook. He has rubbed a fair number of people the wrong way and played partisan politics in Washington. Former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker banned him from the State Department when Netanyahu said U.S. policy in the region was based on “lies and distortions.” President Bill Clinton, after meeting Netanyahu for the first time in 1996, asked: “Who the fuck does he think he is? Who’s the fucking superpower here?” President Barack Obama and Netanyahu clearly could not stand to be in the same room. Jared Kushner relays in his book about the first Trump administration that his father-in-law always expected Netanyahu to undercut him. And President Joe Biden, who thought he knew Israel better than everyone, clearly found dealing with the Israeli leader to be trying. And what Americans who dislike him say about Netanyahu is mild in comparison to his Israeli opponents. And yet, personal tics aside, the prime minister clearly reflects a broader band of the Israeli electorate than many in the policy world want to believe. On Sept. 26, Eisenkot and other leaders of the change bloc—Naftali Bennett, Yair Lapid, Avigdor Lieberman, and Yair Golan—released a document detailing their priorities should they form a government. In it, they announced a government of repair or reconstruction that would prioritize the establishment of a state commission of inquiry into the failures surrounding the Hamas attacks on Oct. 7, 2023, promised to pass term limits for the prime minister, draft a constitution, and oppose Haredi exemption from military service. There was nothing in the document about the Gaza Strip; nothing about the E-1 settlement, which the current government has begun the process of building decades after its approval and which it is feared would make it even harder for Palestinians to travel between the northern and southern West Bank. And, crucially, there was nothing about a two-state solution. One might assume these topics were left out so that the platform could appeal to the widest possible group of Israelis—and that there will be some flexibility once a new government is in place. But after spending almost two weeks in Israel, talking to political figures, analysts, and just everyday Israelis, I am not so sure that’s the case. On a warm Sunday evening, about 30 Israelis and I gathered in the living room of a modest home in central Israel to listen to two members of Beyachad, the joint list of Bennett’s “Bennett 2026” party and Yesh Atid under Lapid’s leadership. Both candidates emphasized the need for political and social reform in an Israel they see as battered and abused by almost two decades of governments suborned to Netanyahu’s parochial and personal interests at the expense of the rest of society. They were just as critical on foreign policy, blasting Netanyahu for Israel’s low international standing and not making the country’s case more forcefully and effectively in important national capitals and international fora like the United Nations. It was at this moment when the conversation took a turn many in Washington would not expect: Both candidates assailed the government for bungling Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran—making the case that for all of the effort Israel had expended across these battle zones, all three remained a threat. This was not a call for diplomatic solutions to the problems of Iran and its proxies, but a more effective military strategy. This position was hardly controversial among people who are wary of American and European demands for agreements that do little more than allow Israel’s enemies to live and fight another day. They also stressed their opposition to a Palestinian state. They offered that after Oct. 7, the Palestinians could expect nothing more from a new Israeli government than autonomy in Area A (of the West Bank)—an artifact of the Oslo era in which the Palestinian Authority manages the affairs of the population. When one member of the small audience asked them about the situation in the West Bank, using the term “West Bank,” Bennett’s representative made sure he emphasized “Judea and Samaria,” the preferred terminology among the settlers for the West Bank that has become normalized among many Israelis. And when asked about their alliance with Yair Golan, whose Democrats party is considered left of center, both candidates reiterated their opposition to Palestinian statehood. Most Israelis agree with this position, according to polls. The concern about Golan among at least one person attending the Beyachad event demonstrates just how opposed Israelis are to a Palestinian state. Golan’s position is hardly dovish. He opposes settlement expansion because he fears it would lead inevitably to annexation and a binational state. Instead, Golan believes that over the long term, a two-state solution is best for Israeli security, but because of Oct. 7, Golan supports “civil separation” and an indefinite security presence in the West Bank until a responsible Palestinian leadership can take over. I dare someone to define “long term” and “responsible” in this context. And even if you could get to this semantic promised land, Golan, like almost all Israeli politicians, believes Israel must hold on to the Jordan Valley, further truncating a Palestinian state. It’s not that nothing would change under a new Israeli government led by the change bloc. Israel would work quickly to establish law and order in the West Bank, where settler violence against Palestinians has surged lately. Of the multiple pressures facing Israel, it is the easiest issue to deal with, but it is not easy. There will be a lot of politics around a crackdown, especially since this issue of settler violence is more complicated than the press, analysts, and members of Congress portray. Ben-Gvir could be out of power, but he is not going away, especially since he commands a loyal following among Israel’s middle and lower classes. He is among a strain on the Israeli right who do not care about sanctions or Israel’s standing in the West. It is possible that Israel will have a new prime minister soon. And while Israel’s tone would likely be less pugnacious under a Prime Minister Eisenkot or Bennett, all the issues that separate the United States and Israel will remain. It is hard to see how a new government papers over the differences. It would be better to respectfully disagree and let the U.S.-Israel relationship change. A little bit of space would be good for everyone.