Donbas Is More Than a Line on a Map: Lessons From Gettysburg, Normandy, Iwo Jima

The Donbas is often discussed as though it were primarily a territorial question: a section of the map that might be exchanged, conceded or divided as part of a negotiated settlement. That framing misses a fundamental military reality. Terrain is not interchangeable. Some terrain provides such an advantage to the force that controls it that military professionals have a specific term for it: key terrain. That concept is among the fundamentals of military art taught to young officers. A hill, ridgeline, river crossing or fortified city can matter far beyond its physical size because control of it determines what an army can observe, defend, attack or protect. The US has learned this lesson repeatedly in its own military history, from Gettysburg to Normandy to Iwo Jima. Americans considering the future of Ukraine should remember those lessons before treating the Donbas as simply another line on a map.JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. Little Round Top, 1863. Credit: Library of Congress At Gettysburg, Little Round Top was a relatively small piece of ground on the Union Army’s extreme left. On the afternoon of July 2, 1863, Brigadier General Gouverneur K. Warren recognized that the hill was dangerously exposed as Confederate forces moved against the Union flank. Union troops were hurried to the position, including Colonel Strong Vincent’s brigade, with Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain and the 20th Maine occupying its extreme left. The National Park Service describes Little Round Top as ideally suited for observation, artillery and defense; Union forces ultimately repelled repeated Confederate attacks and retained control of it. Other Topics of Interest Russia Enlists Yemeni Citizens for War in Ukraine, Ukraine Intel Says Ukraine’s foreign intelligence has identified 27 Yemeni citizens recruited by Russian military bodies for combat operations in Ukraine. Credit: The National Guard Chamberlain and the 20th Maine became famous for their defense of the flank and their downhill bayonet charge after ammunition ran low. Their achievement has endured in American military culture not because Little Round Top represented valuable real estate, but because losing the position could have exposed the Union flank and altered the tactical situation across the battlefield. The significance of the ground came from what possession of it allowed one army to do to the other. The same logic was evident on June 6, 1944, when US Army Rangers assaulted Pointe du Hoc during the Normandy invasion. The Rangers scaled cliffs approximately 100 feet high to attack a German artillery position overlooking the invasion area. They were not risking their lives for the intrinsic value of a few acres of Norman coastline. They were attacking terrain from which German forces could threaten the larger Allied operation. Rangers from the 2nd Battalion display the rope ladders they used to scale Pointe du Hoc. Credit: Official U.S. Navy The Marines who fought on Iwo Jima understood the principle as well. Mount Suribachi dominated the southern portion of the island and the exposed ground beneath it. Marine Corps histories describe the mountain as a major tactical obstacle whose capture was necessary before the advance north could proceed securely. The raising of the American flag on its summit became one of the most recognizable images of the Second World War, but the fight for Suribachi began as a military problem: an enemy-held dominant terrain feature overlooking American forces. Credit: Joe Rosenthal Gettysburg, Normandy and Iwo Jima were different battles in different wars, and historical analogies should not be pushed beyond what they can support. The Donbas is not Little Round Top, and Kramatorsk is not Pointe du Hoc. The enduring lesson is more basic: military terrain has value because of what it enables. That is the lens through which the debate over the Donbas should be viewed. Russia continues to press toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, which sit at the center of Ukraine’s remaining defenses in Donetsk Oblast. Reuters recently described control of Donetsk as critical to both sides as Russian forces continue their offensive and Ukraine concentrates major defensive efforts there. A negotiated territorial concession in such an area therefore cannot be evaluated simply by calculating how many square kilometers would change hands. The relevant question is what military position each side would occupy afterward. Kramatorsk Fortifications, urban terrain, transportation networks, observation, maneuver corridors and the geography behind a defensive line all affect the answer. A defensive position built and improved over years cannot necessarily be recreated by drawing another line farther west. Surrendering key terrain can give an adversary through negotiation an operational advantage it has been unable to secure through combat. This distinction becomes especially important when negotiations are described in the vocabulary of real estate transactions or commercial bargaining. Wars are not commercial transactions, and territory in war is not fungible property. A company negotiating the sale of an asset can often substitute money for ownership. An army surrendering commanding terrain cannot necessarily purchase equivalent geography somewhere else. There is also a human dimension that makes the analogy to a real estate transaction particularly inadequate. The United Nations has documented increased pressure on residents of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory to obtain Russian citizenship, restrictions imposed on people without it, penalties for expressions of Ukrainian cultural identity and continuing expropriation of private property. The disposition of occupied territory therefore determines not only where armies stand but also the political and legal conditions under which civilians will live. None of this means military history dictates a particular diplomatic formula. Political leaders must weigh military realities alongside human costs, economic constraints, alliance considerations and the prospects for a durable peace. But any negotiation that contemplates territorial concessions should begin with an accurate understanding of what is being conceded and what advantage it may provide. American military history provides a useful way to explain that distinction to an American public. Little Round Top was not important because Abraham Lincoln coveted a hill in Pennsylvania. Pointe du Hoc was not important because Franklin Roosevelt wanted cliffs in France. Mount Suribachi was not important because the United States wanted possession of a volcanic peak. In each case, Americans fought for terrain because of the military consequences of allowing the enemy to control it. That is the lesson worth remembering as policymakers discuss the Donbas. Before asking whether Ukraine should surrender a piece of territory in exchange for a diplomatic agreement, they should first ask the question an officer would ask while studying a battlefield: What does control of that ground enable? The answer may determine not merely where this war ends, but the conditions under which another one could begin. The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.