KYIV—By 4:00 p.m., Kyiv is dark. Many of Ukraine’s cities are struggling to meet energy demand, and residents without generators are left with as little as two hours a day of power under rotating outages. In the city’s high-rises, the pumps that push water to higher floors stop during power outages, cutting off the water supply, too. I spent last week visiting Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Pavlohrad, where I met with Ukraine’s corps commanders, soldiers, and business leaders keeping the country’s industries running. The front line is steady, and the commanders maintaining it are confident in their ability to defend and even regain ground. Recent successful Ukrainian operations support this confidence. East of Kharkiv, Ukraine’s Khartiia Corps moved troops underground for over fifteen kilometers through natural gas pipelines and hand-dug tunnels in order to penetrate Russia’s rear near Kupiansk. Operation Veles took more than thirty Russian prisoners. Near Lyman, the 3rd Army Corps used a combination of heavy drones and ground robots deployed over ten kilometers into Russian territory. Operation Vivaldi regained a reported 277 square kilometers of territory. A few windows glow during a power cut in the Holosiivskyi district of Kyiv, Ukraine, on October 16, 2026, amid large-scale Russian strikes on critical energy infrastructure. (Danylo Antoniuk/Ukrinform via Reuters Connect) The state of the battlefield Russia is currently concentrating some of its heaviest pressure around the city of Dobropillia, where the Azov Corps is outnumbered but holding steady. Winter fog provides some cover from drones overhead, which Russia exploits to send armored vehicles forward. Ukrainian forces have anticipated these pushes and adapted to counter Russia’s latest attempts to flank a stretch of the Donbas that Moscow has failed to capture for years but continues to demand as territorial concessions in peace talks. Many Ukrainian soldiers continue to experience speed limitations affecting Starshield, the military version of SpaceX’s Starlink on which Ukrainian drones depend. Working normally, Starshield terminals hold a stable link at speeds exceeding four hundred kilometers per hour, by the Ukrainian defense ministry’s measurements. But Kyiv says that, since October 14, terminals on Ukrainian drones suddenly began dropping connectivity at speeds above 161 kilometers per hour, roughly half the speed of the jet-powered Shaheds that interceptor drones must chase. Service was restored on October 24, but only over Ukrainian government-held territory. Ukrainian military tests on November 10–12 found that the speed cap remained in effect beyond the line of contact, and Zelenskyy has reported significant disruptions along the entire front line and in temporarily occupied territories. SpaceX denies the connectivity problems. Ukrainian soldiers have learned to compensate for some of these restrictions by taking advantage of favorable winds. Meanwhile, Russia is also attempting to jam Starlink. Denys Prokopenko, commander of the Azov’s grouping of forces, showed me a map highlighting areas affected by Starlink jamming. Russia’s jammers degrade Starlink over limited areas without shutting it down completely, and soldiers have learned to hunt the jammers themselves with Starlink-guided drones. As one officer told me, “The jammer cannot protect its target, or even itself.” Despite these countermeasures, Russia’s capacity to disrupt Starlink coverage across swaths of the battlefield is concerning. Yet the commanders in these areas worry less about their own positions and more about the cities behind them, which are terrorized nightly by Russian ballistic missiles and Shahed jet drones. On the night of November 7, while I was there, Russia fired thirty-six ballistic missiles at Kyiv and the surrounding region. Ukraine shot down four. Why can’t Ukrainian forces shoot more of them down? They are short of Patriot interceptors, Ukrainian officials say, and the math of it should give pause to every country in the world. Ukraine’s military intelligence estimates that Russia can build over two hundred cruise and ballistic missiles a month, with another seven hundred ballistic missiles in reserve. Russia’s monthly output alone is enough to repeat a night like November 7 three times over without even drawing on the country’s reserves. For comparison, the United States produces roughly fifty PAC-3 interceptors per month, and plans to more than triple production will take until the end of 2030. Standard practice is to fire roughly two interceptors at each incoming ballistic missile, with no guarantee of success, so even the tripled output would fall short of what Russia can build today. Russia has also reportedly reprogrammed its Iskander missiles to maneuver in the final seconds of attack, which has further reduced Ukraine’s interception rates. Jet-powered Shahed drones are another problem. Ukraine has yet to field a reliable defense to counter them at scale. I met with some F-16 pilots who fly nightly to hunt the drones down. They told me that the latest jet drones, which increasingly resemble cruise missiles, now can climb to altitudes of 20,000 feet, well beyond the reach of many existing Ukrainian interceptors. They also maneuver to evade defenses and hide in cloud cover. F-16 jets have become the main defense until other solutions are scaled. When Ukrainian pilots got better at catching them up high, Russia began programming them to fly low. In all, Ukrainian officials credit F-16s with approximately 4,700 drone kills. But the number of operational planes is limited, and the flight hours are long and hard. What Ukrainian forces need this winter Three US decisions would help Ukrainians better defend themselves against Russia’s onslaught this winter. First, the US should lift the Starshield speed cap over occupied Ukraine. Second, it should approve Ukraine’s use of Starshield up to three hundred kilometers inside Russia to strike the launchers behind these attacks. Third, Washington should press allies to transfer existing Patriot interceptors to Kyiv now. Civilians living on a few hours of power a day cannot wait for a long-term answer. It is critical to start with Starshield. Though Washington and SpaceX each say the other holds the switch, either way, the decision to reduce connectivity is American. These limitations should end, because the only force they constrain is that of Ukraine. With connectivity disrupted, interceptor drones cannot engage jet-powered Shaheds until they have crossed into government-held territory, closer to the cities they target. Strikes on Russian supply lines in occupied territory have also become harder to carry out. These restrictions have also rightly raised bipartisan concerns about the national security implications of the slowdown decision, and should concern militaries around the world. The Pentagon is Starshield’s biggest customer. As Ukrainian units reportedly got no warning before their links dropped mid-mission, the overarching question for US commanders is now whether their communications are stable for the long term or rest on a single failure point. The consequences of throttling Starshield in Ukraine are already affecting allies’ confidence. Earlier this week, for example, the British Ministry of Defence was questioned in Parliament about its reliance on SpaceX. With Ukraine and its allies unable to procure or produce enough interceptors to keep up with Russian missile production, preventing attacks before they occur is increasingly important. The bigger short-term challenge concerns Starshield access over Russian territory, where SpaceX does not currently permit service. Russia fires its Iskanders and North Korean KN-23s ballistic missiles at Kyiv and Dnipro from mobile launchers in Bryansk, Oryol, Kursk, and Voronezh oblasts. Ukrainian officers estimate there are about sixty-five of them, and each sits at its firing point for only minutes before moving. Ukraine has been hunting them since May, with modest results by its officers’ own account: one launcher destroyed near Fatezh on October 30 and two struck in Bryansk on November 6 and 7. Officers say finding the launchers is largely solved. Reaching them is the problem. The drones that can fly that deep carry warheads that damage a launcher but rarely destroy it, and the larger drones that could destroy it depend on Starshield. Other satellite services cost more, carry less, and cannot hold a link on a fast drone, according to the officers, and European alternatives are years away. Access to Starshield over Russia would allow operators to steer a larger drone through Russian jamming and onto a mobile launcher before it fires, allowing Ukraine to take out the missile launchers used to attack its civilians and critical infrastructure. Officers assess that with Starshield working in a band about three hundred kilometers deep, their forces could destroy or push back most of the launchers, which they say Russia cannot quickly rebuild. That would put Kyiv, Dnipro, and central Ukraine’s power plants out of range, though probably not those of Kharkiv, and would expose the sites that launch waves of Shahed-type drones. It would not stop Russia’s air-launched missiles, and any advantage may be temporary: Russia already jams satellite links around some fixed sites, Ukrainian officers expect mobile jammers within months, and Russia is building its own satellite constellation. Washington’s debates with Kyiv this autumn have centered on Ukrainian attacks against Russian oil refineries and fuel prices. The proposed band would shift Ukraine’s focus from economic targets such as refineries to military ones, officers report. Such an agreement could also take refineries off the table entirely. In exchange, Washington should authorize Ukraine’s use of Starshield up to three hundred kilometers inside Russia to strike a jointly approved list of launchers and launch sites for the ballistic missiles that routinely target civilians in Ukraine. Senators Roger Wicker (R-MS) and Kevin Cramer (R-ND) floated a similar proposal to expand Ukraine’s access to Starlink up to three hundred kilometers into Russian territory in exchange for a hundred-day pause on Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy assets. Kyiv has signaled its willingness to accept joint oversight and terminal whitelisting requirements. SpaceX has been authorizing specific Ukrainian terminals since February 2026 and already applies geographic restrictions on speed, demonstrating the technical ability to manage access. For a United States that wants to negotiate peace, approval would be a win. It costs nothing. It requires no new engineering, only a geographic adjustment of the kind SpaceX has made before. And it could push Russia to negotiate in good faith. Ukraine also needs more Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptors to defend itself. On October 30, Washington approved a sale of five hundred PAC-3 MSE interceptors for $2.1 billion, but deliveries are years away. Kyiv has asked European partners to send interceptors from their existing stocks in the meantime and take Ukraine’s future deliveries in return. Those transfers need US approval, and Washington should give it now. Every interceptor that arrives this winter is another chance to stop a ballistic missile before it strikes another apartment block. This is not only Ukraine’s problem. It is the United States’ problem too: Washington does not have sufficient interceptor capacity to defend against the threat of large-scale missile attacks, either. The war in Iran has depleted US Patriot interceptor stocks. In May, the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated that US forces fired between 1,060 and 1,430 Patriot interceptors in thirty-nine days against Iran, roughly half the prewar inventory. US bases in the Indo-Pacific face the same threat, and no military has yet shown it can hunt mobile launchers at scale. What Ukraine learns doing so could offer lessons for the United States. For its own security and that of its partners—as well as to keep pace with Russia—the United States should co-develop cheap, scalable defenses against ballistic missiles, glide bombs, and jet-powered drones with Ukraine. It’s important to start as soon as possible, as developing these defenses could take time, all the while Russia’s missile manufacturers will continue producing their deadly output.
Dispatch from Kyiv: Let Ukraine strike Russia’s missile launchers at the source
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