Daigou: the gray market that moves Nvidia’s chips to China

Daigou: the gray market that moves Nvidia’s chips to China

Jensen Huang’s affair with Alice Huang has cost him the top job at Nvidia. But the bigger scandal is that Alice Huang appears to have pulled off what investigators believe was one of the largest-ever smuggling operations of US-restricted chips out of Singapore and wider Southeast Asia into China. Records show her company, Megaspeed, arranged nearly US$12 billion in Nvidia chip orders for Chinese companies in 15 months, and a large share of the chips reportedly reached mainland China. Megaspeed says Alice Huang left in August 2025 and that it conducts lawful business. On November 16, Washington responded with new rules meant to stop Chinese companies from receiving advanced chips through Southeast Asia. For the region’s legitimate businesses, the rules will mean slower approvals and wary investors. But few likely realize how simple her method was, and why new export licenses and restrictions will be hard-pressed to stop it. Singapore was a logical base. As a bridge between East and West with a sound legal system and a balanced international position, Singapore offers Chinese companies a trusted address abroad. However, the island-state’s reputation was exploited, putting its credibility and reliability to the test. The fallout has already reached Southeast Asian governments. Singapore has barred Alice Huang from re-entering the country after police determined she had misled them about her role at Megaspeed. Singapore has said US authorities have given only limited help with its probe. Meanwhile, Malaysia is investigating whether chips brought in by Megaspeed’s local unit were shipped on to third countries, although Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim says there is no sign so far that they left. What began as a US-China chip dispute has become an international investigation, with Southeast Asia at its center. A network tied to Alice Huang helped move roughly 240,000 advanced chips worth $7.5 billion into China, The Information reported. Will DePue, a former OpenAI researcher, recently analyzed the published weights of leading Chinese AI models and concluded DeepSeek V4 and Moonshot’s Kimi K3 show signs of having been trained on Nvidia’s Blackwell chips, which cannot legally be sold to China. Depue said some of the smuggled Nvidia chips may have been used in that training. The likeliest answer to how the chips got to mainland China, and how they could leave Southeast Asian data centers unnoticed, is “diagou”, China’s large and finely tuned gray market. Diagou, which literally means “buying on behalf of”, moves anything in demand on the mainland but hard to bring in legally, from baby formula to cosmetics to luxury goods. American-made chips have long been part of that trade, which follows a consistent playbook that works well for moving many types of goods. Organizers unbox the goods, relabel them and break shipments into smaller lots, then move them across the border disguised as small, legitimate consignments. Chinese financial media have reported that early in the chip restrictions, students, tourists and daigou shoppers carried chip boards in their luggage one at a time. The Wall Street Journal once reported on a Chinese student in Singapore who earned about $100 for every chip he brought home. Megaspeed did not buy chips directly from Nvidia. It bought complete servers through Nvidia’s partners for data centers in Malaysia and Indonesia. Roughly 240,000 chips would fill about 30,000 servers. Shipping that many into China as commercial cargo would be nearly impossible now that Beijing inspects Nvidia shipments at its ports to push for Chinese companies to use and develop homegrown chips. But Beijing’s inspections target cargo containers, not travelers’ suitcases, leaving a big loophole. All smugglers need to do is dismantle the servers, pull out the chip boards, split them into small lots and hire individual couriers to carry them in as personal luggage. Spread across thousands of couriers, tens of thousands of trips and dozens of airports with direct flights to Southeast Asia, no single trip would draw attention. Larger loads are known to take another route. Smugglers strip off the Nvidia logos, relabel the boards as ordinary computer parts and send them by truck across remote stretches of China’s land borders with Southeast Asia. The infrastructure for this trade was pre-existing. Bonded warehouses dot Southeast Asia, Hong Kong and Shanghai. Because cargo in a bonded zone has not officially cleared customs, operators can consolidate, repackage and relabel shipments in private before re-exporting them. When Malaysian authorities seized 72 AI servers at Kuala Lumpur’s airport earlier this year, the machines had been flown into the airport’s free-trade zone, mislabeled as “computer parts” and queued for re-export. Even if every chip traveled by courier, the labor would be cheap. Using the WSJ’s reported $ 100-per-chip figure as a benchmark, moving 240,000 chips would cost Alice Huang’s Megaspeed about $24 million, a rounding error compared to the $7.5 billion they were worth as smuggled goods into China. Nvidia says it inspected Megaspeed’s warehouses and saw the hardware there. But an inspection can miss a great deal, as the recent Super Micro case suggests. In March, US fderal prosecutors charged a co-founder of the server maker and two others with smuggling about $2.5 billion worth of servers containing restricted Nvidia chips to China through a middleman in Thailand. According to the charges, the servers arrived in Southeast Asia, were stripped of their original packaging and were sent on to China in unmarked boxes. To deceive inspectors, the scheme left thousands of dummy servers sitting in the warehouse. That meant seeing a server in Alice Huang’s warehouse was not the same as seeing a chip, making the absence of evidence that chips left Malaysia less reassuring than it sounds. Federal prosecutors in Manhattan are investigating whether entities tied to Alice Huang also helped smuggle Super Micro equipment used in AI data centers. If they did, it would surprise no one who knows this trade, in which different groups routinely share couriers, warehouses and routes and move one another’s goods when their own channels are blocked. Washington and Southeast Asian governments need to realize that chip smuggling is not new, and that a vast daigou network has long operated unhindered in the region. If one network tied to one person, Alice Huang, could move this many chips, the total smuggled into China is probably far larger than assumed. Even if Alice Huang is prosecuted and Megaspeed is shut down, the diagou system they piggybacked on will inevitably keep moving restricted chips. As long as China’s AI companies want US-made chips, someone will carry them to China. The couriers, the warehouses and the routes will remain intact, ready for the next buyer. Washington’s new licensing rules will burden and vex the region’s legitimate businesses but do little to stop chip smuggling. The obstacle to chip restrictions is less a handful of smuggling rings than a mature gray-market system that no border can fully seal. Southeast Asian governments cannot stop every suitcase or truck, but they can scrutinize every data center and every large order of advanced chips. Singapore, and perhaps less so some of its Southeast Asian neighbors, built their appeal on being trusted places to do data center-related business, and that trust will last only as long as they can show where the restricted chips they receive actually end up. Jane Li is an independent political analyst drawing on two decades of international business experience. She is a contributor to the Washington Examiner and RealClearDefense.

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