Constitutional Reform as the Lee Jae-myung Administration’s Political Watershed

On September 18, President Lee Jae-myung convened a press conference. Unlike his other public appearances, this one was devoid of smiles. There were no pleasantries floated. He just trudged to the podium in his crisp dark navy suit, his presence and the ambience made heavier by the royal blue of the presidential office draped in the backdrop. “I have been lacking fear and humility,” he said. “I shall revive the fear for the people and tackle every task more meticulously and fiercely, from a lower position of service.” The administration’s poor performance in opinion polls prompted this sense of crisis and humble words. Lee’s approval ratings have been taking a steady dive since the June local elections. Until late August, the two main factors behind the slide had been the government’s controversial housing policy and the Democratic Party’s much more controversial judicial reform, which entrusts all investigative powers to the police. That change seems premature, or even inappropriate, given the recent barrage of anecdotes of police corruption and incompetence. In September, Lee’s approval ratings plummeted still more following his ill-fated Cabinet nominations. Back in 2021, Kim Seung-won, Lee’s pick for the justice minister, allegedly streamlined the drug approval process for a pharmaceutical company on behalf of his friend. This allegation resurfaced during nomination hearings. Meanwhile, Lee picked Yong Hye-in, the only parliamentarian from the Basic Income Party, to lead the gender equality ministry. Yong’s insistence on holding both positions, however, garnered opprobrium. As opposed to constituency legislators – those who won the most votes from their districts – proportional representatives like Yong owe their positions to their parties. South Korea’s proportional representation ballot, designed to give minor parties a chance at lawmaking, accounts for 46 out of the National Assembly’s 300 total seats. Legislators in these seats are expected to resign when they take up another government job since someone else from their party can replace them without tarnishing the voters’ mandate. It seemed apparent that Yong had no other reason to retain her legislative seat than to enjoy the perks of being a lawmaker. Kim and Yong both withdrew from their ministerial nominations after much damage to the Lee administration. And now they are both under investigation, the former for alleged sexual harassment of his former staff and the latter for allegedly funneling her political funds to her husband. The public smarts all the more to questionable behavior by liberal figures. Lee’s approval ratings in major polls hit a nadir in mid-September, dropping to 33.8 percent in a poll by Realmeter and 37 percent in another by Gallup. So, Lee’s press conference was a revolving door of apology and resolution to do better on all the factors shaving his approval ratings. But the most emphatic point he made – and the one that received the most headlines – was his assertion that “I have no intention whatsoever for a second presidential term.” The Problematic Presidency The current South Korean constitution allows the president to serve a single five-year term. In 2025, when Lee was running for the snap presidential election following Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment, one of his campaign policies was to amend the constitution so that the president can serve two four-year consecutive terms. At the time, almost two thirds of the voters approved of such reform. South Korea’s system of a single five-year term for the president has come under much flak. The populace has to wait too long until they can pass judgment on the president through ballots. Besides, without the prospect of another term, the incumbent president has no incentive to behave responsibly when it comes to their government. How frequently the people can make their voices heard through voting and how much accountability with which the president leads the country determine the soundness of democracy. And South Korea has been poor in this aspect. On top of that, the strong, centralized nature of South Korea’s presidency – often called an “imperial presidency” – has exacerbated the problem. Consider the president’s monopoly on administrative decisions; the government’s monopoly on funding for the rest of the country; the president’s power to appoint some 10,000 top government agency and QUANGO posts; the president’s authority to wield some $400 billion through their budgetary decisions; their decrees overriding local government ordinances; and the National Assembly’s inability to monitor and check the president’s executive arms. Yoon’s presidency manifested everything that could go wrong, from rampant corruption due to lack of auditory mechanisms to toxic control over law enforcement. South Korea’s presidency depends too much on the good will of that one person at the top. Naturally, constitutional reform to trim down the imperial presidency and beef up the parliament and local government has been expected to materialize sometime soon. But the speaker of the National Assembly sparked an intense controversy in late July when he said that “the question of allowing the incumbent president to serve consecutively is ultimately up to the public.” The opposition People Power Party (PPP) immediately raised the possibility that Lee could be plotting “treason” by assuming another term. In fact, the current constitution bars any constitutional reform – whether that’s to prolong the presidential tenure or introduce multiple terms – from applying to the incumbent president. Immediately after, the speaker admitted his error in legal interpretation. The presidential office also clarified to the press that, when it comes to Lee running for re-election, “our constitution doesn’t allow it, the people won’t condone it, and it’s realistically impossible.” Lee, while visiting France on September 10, mentioned again that “the constitution clearly confines my term.” Still, the controversy had gained enough traction to drag down his approval ratings ever since. Hence Lee’s forceful, articulate reminder during the September 18 press conference that the notion of him serving consecutive terms “is not only constitutionally impossible but also never have I thought of it.” Lee then proposed to collaborate with the National Assembly to amend the constitution to allow for consecutive presidential terms – for future presidents, not for himself – and more even distribution of powers among the parliament and the central and local governments. He also didn’t fail to point out that this would require “bipartisan discussion and public opinion and ideas.” Political Opposition Despite Lee’s fairly categorical stance, the PPP is deliberately incredulous. “Lee says he has ‘no intention’ of serving another term. Why is it so hard for him to say ‘I will not serve another term?’” wrote Jang Dong-hyuk, the PPP leader, on his social media. To him, Lee didn’t promise anything, therefore “he hasn’t given up the dream of a second consecutive term.” The PPP floor leader, Jeong Jeom-sig, also made it clear that the PPP wouldn’t partake in any discussion for constitutional reform during the Lee administration. “The PPP is telling you now: There will be no constitutional reform during this administration,” he said to much applause among fellow PPP legislators. Like Jang, Jeong suspects that Lee has an ulterior motive to amend the constitution and run for a second term. (The president is immune from indictment, which is why the trials in various legal cases against Lee are currently on hold.) But the real reason behind the PPP’s refusal to hash out a constitutional reform could be that it can’t take the lead in remolding the constitution to its taste. Constitutional amendment requires 200 votes in favor. The PPP only commands 109 out of 300 parliamentary seats. Meanwhile, the liberal camp comprises more than 180 seats, with the DP holding the parliamentary majority alone with its 161 seats. The PPP would manage to eke out only a piecemeal compromise at the negotiating table. Besides, history would only remember the Lee administration, not the PPP, for having reformed the constitution. The PPP is loathe to serve Lee and the DP such an enormous political cachet on a silver platter. In spite of the PPP’s intransigence, the DP is plowing ahead. On September 20, the DP launched a constitutional amendment committee. “It’s time to stop picking at diction but start discussing constitutional reform,” said Kim Min-seok, the DP’s new leader. Granted, the timing is convenient for the Lee administration. Public discourse and political haggling over constitutional amendment could overshadow any other agenda. In the process, the government’s sore spots could be covered and even forgotten. Plus, constitutional reform is not a distant possibility. Although the PPP opposes talk for tweaking the constitution, the conservative bloc is fractious anyways. Quite a sizable pocket despises Jang and the PPP leadership. Breakaway participation and votes are possible for constitutional amendment. Hearsay has it that some in the PPP are already stirring to join the discussion for constitutional amendment. Notably, Kim Tae-ho, a four-term PPP legislator, sounded the bugle of reason this time after Lee’s press conference. “We should end this war of attrition over this consecutive terms controversy,” he said on his social media, alluding to the PPP’s pathological distrust of Lee. He then underlined the need to reform the constitution “in order to disperse the authority channeled into the president and overcome the political polarization.” But in the end, it is this “political polarization” that will be hindering the very first step needed to heal this polarization. According to Realmeter’s September 22 survey, 5 out of 10 South Koreans were still dubious about Lee’s true intentions for wanting to introduce a consecutive presidential tenure. No matter how well-meaning and earnest the government may be about reforming the constitution and the polity, if the public isn’t convinced and comforted, no talk of constitutional reform, nor any resulting constitution, would be viable.