Ceuta Between a Migration Crisis and a Hybrid Attack: Giorgia Meloni’s Policy and Europe’s Security

As the dead were being counted in Ceuta, as police and troops struggled to regain control of the city, and as residents watched tens of thousands of people cross the European Union’s border within hours, the European Democrats chose to discuss Giorgia Meloni’s clothes. On their social media account, they posted an image of the Italian Prime Minister wearing an EU scarf in 2023 and a red Donald Trump cap in 2026, accusing her of having once demanded European solidarity and now choosing propaganda instead. The party, which belongs to the centrist Renew Europe family, concluded that Meloni stages strength while governing by opinion polls. It is difficult to imagine a more superficial response to what happened.JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. Between 50,000 and 60,000 people attempted to enter Ceuta from Morocco by land and sea. In less than two days, a mass of people large enough to fill a medium-sized city crossed the border. At least 72 people lost their lives, more than a thousand required medical treatment, and the Spanish authorities had to deploy additional police and military forces. More than 48,000 people were returned only after the border had collapsed. Spain then installed a 500-meter floating barrier along part of the maritime frontier. To describe this as an ordinary migration crisis is to refuse to confront the scale of the event. Europe faced a sudden breach of its external border by tens of thousands of people, deaths, mass panic, the temporary loss of territorial control and the mobilization of security forces on an emergency footing. In the consequences it produced, the event in Ceuta was comparable to a major terrorist attack. Other Topics of Interest The War Is Coming Home to Russians Russia’s war is finally hitting ordinary Russians. Mass casualties, drone strikes, fuel shortages, supply‑chain chaos and a looming recession signal that the conflict is coming home. Among those involved in the mass crossing were people who were desperate, deceived, exploited and placed in mortal danger. The circumstances of those people belong to one question; the nature of the operation to another. A person can be a victim of smugglers, disinformation or political manipulation while being used as part of an attack against another state. A border is where a state distinguishes a genuine claim to asylum from the abuse of asylum, legal entry from smuggling, and a person in need of protection from someone who presents a security risk. When tens of thousands breach a border at once, that capacity disappears. Everyone becomes part of the same mass, without identity, screening or established intent. Giorgia Meloni’s policy restores the state’s ability to draw those distinctions. It protects both the citizens of Italy and those who are genuinely entitled to protection. A formal designation of terrorism requires evidence of intent and of an organizer. No such evidence has yet been made public. A security assessment, however, cannot wait for years while every investigation runs its course. European law treats as terrorist acts conduct intended to seriously intimidate a population, compel a government to act or refrain from acting, or gravely destabilize political, economic or social structures. In its effect, Ceuta generated precisely that kind of pressure. Migration as weapon Hybrid attack is the more precise term. The European Union has warned for years that migration can be weaponized. The European External Action Service explicitly includes the instrumentalization of migration among hybrid threats. In 2021, the European Commission described the state-directed movement of migrants towards a border as a particularly cruel form of hybrid threat, intended to destabilize the Union, create a prolonged crisis and test its resolve. NATO likewise lists the instrumentalization of irregular migration among the tools of hybrid action. The decisive questions in Ceuta are: Who enabled tens of thousands of people to gather in almost the same place at almost the same moment? Who spread claims that the crossing would be easy? Who organized the movement? Why were Moroccan forces passive in the opening phase? And: Did anyone calculate that pressure on Ceuta could extract a political concession from Madrid or Brussels? A final judgement on the role of the authorities in Rabat must await further evidence. There are already ample grounds for a serious investigation. In 2021, Morocco allowed a mass crossing into Ceuta during a diplomatic dispute with Spain. The European Parliament then condemned the use of migrants, including minors, as an instrument of political pressure. Europe would have to be extraordinarily naive to dismiss the possibility that, after an even larger breach, it has again been subjected to the same form of coercion. The Spanish government had ample warning. The overall number of irregular arrivals in Spain was lower than a year earlier, but Ceuta had been moving in the opposite direction for months. By July 15, land arrivals in Ceuta had risen by 150 percent compared with the same period in 2025. By the end of June, the increase stood at 164 percent. Pressure on that border did not appear overnight. It mounted in full view of the authorities until 50,000 people were on the other side of the fence. Shifting blame Rather than accept political responsibility for the collapse, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez attacked the European governments that moved to protect their countries. He called the measures taken by Italy selfish and unlawful. His foreign minister, José Manuel Albares, accused Rome of creating “deliberate confusion.” The European Democrats joined them, accusing Meloni of exploiting Ceuta for propaganda and making decisions according to the political mood of the moment. The facts are the problem for their case. Italy kept its borders open to Spanish citizens and other European Union nationals, as well as preserving tourist and commercial links with Spain. It introduced temporary, targeted checks on third-country nationals arriving in Italy from Spain by air and sea. The measure is time-limited and directed at the risk of secondary movement after the largest breach of a European border in recent history. The Schengen rules expressly allow a state facing a serious threat to public order or internal security to restore internal border controls temporarily. Such a measure must be necessary, proportionate and limited to the period required to meet the danger. That is the framework within which Italy acted. To label every check an “attack on Schengen” turns free movement into a dogma that must remain untouched even when the Union’s external border has ceased to function. Schengen’s future depends on trust that every member will protect the external border on behalf of all the others. Once that trust disappears, internal controls become inevitable. Italy’s checks therefore defend freedom of movement far more effectively than politicians who demand that borders remain open even after their complete collapse. The European Union can survive as an area of freedom only while it remains capable of protecting the territory within which that freedom applies. Sánchez and Albares repeat that Ceuta is outside the Schengen Area and that hardly any of the new arrivals reached mainland Europe. That is an argument made with the benefit of hindsight. A government responsible for security cannot base its decisions on what becomes known 48 hours later. It must assess the risk at a moment when it does not know where tens of thousands of people are, who controls them, how many criminals, smugglers or members of extremist organizations may be among them, or whether they will attempt to move onwards. Meloni is right Meloni acted before the first person from Ceuta appeared in Rome, Milan or Naples. Prevention has meaning only before the consequences arrive. Once they have arrived, prevention has failed and only damage control remains. Leadership begins before danger becomes catastrophe. European politics has grown accustomed to reacting only after a border has collapsed, reception centers have overflowed and the police have lost control of the streets. Meloni rejected that sequence. She acted while there was still time to prevent the Ceuta crisis from becoming an Italian crisis. She did not wait for Madrid’s consent, Brussels’ praise or the approval of Europe’s party headquarters. She accepted the responsibility that comes with the office of Prime Minister. The accusation that Italy demanded solidarity on Lampedusa in 2023 and is now denying it to Spain is particularly dishonest. When Meloni stood beside Ursula von der Leyen on Lampedusa, she called for a stronger Frontex, the prevention of departures, faster returns, surveillance of the Mediterranean and action against smuggling networks. The European plan presented there rested on Europe’s right to decide who enters its territory. She holds exactly the same position today. Europe should help Spain protect its border, identify the organizers, establish the role of smuggling networks, engage with Morocco and return those who have no right to remain. That assistance sits alongside Italy’s right to protect its own territory. European solidarity means supporting a state under pressure while every member retains full responsibility for the safety of its own citizens. Italy’s policy has also produced results. By 15 July 2026, 15,323 migrants had reached its shores, compared with 33,116 over the same period in 2025. Arrivals fell by more than half. The number of enforced returns and assisted voluntary returns rose from 3,499 to 4,658. Those figures show that an approach based on border control, cooperation with countries of origin and the return of those without a right to remain has begun to change reality. At the same time, Meloni has opened legal routes for foreign workers. Her government approved a plan allowing the lawful entry of up to 497,550 workers from outside the European Union between 2026 and 2028. The distinction is straightforward. The state decides how many people may enter, for which jobs, under what conditions and after which checks. Irregular entry is determined by smugglers, political circumstances in other countries and an individual’s ability to pay for a dangerous journey. Over recent years, Europe has gradually accepted almost everything Meloni had previously demanded. External borders have been reinforced, return procedures accelerated, the possibility of return centers in third countries opened, and the instrumentalization of migration recognized as a hybrid threat. What was dismissed yesterday as far-right policy is entering European law and decision-making today. The European Democrats’ attack on Meloni is therefore politically dishonest and shows that part of Europe’s center still does not understand the world in which it lives. For them, it apparently matters more whether Meloni wears an EU scarf in one photograph and an American cap in another than that 50,000 people breached the Union’s border, dozens died and a European city lost control of its own streets. Ceuta shows how much Europe needs Giorgia Meloni’s policy and how much time has been lost by refusing to take it seriously. A mass movement of people can be a humanitarian tragedy and, at the same time, a security operation directed against a state. Both realities can exist at once. Those who direct, deceive, organize or release people towards a border may rely precisely on Europe’s inability to accept that a victim can be turned into a weapon. Meloni refuses to accept that weakness. Her decision to check who enters Italy from Spain is a basic duty of the Prime Minister. Sánchez, Albares and those who run the European Democrats’ social media account may object. The Prime Minister’s responsibility remains the protection of Italy. Ceuta was an attack on the European Union’s external border. Giorgia Meloni recognized it before others and acted as a leader who understands that Europe must be defended at the first breach of its frontier, before the consequences reach its cities. The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post. The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.