Britain's definition of 'anti-Muslim hostility' protects the state, not those being targeted

Britain's definition of 'anti-Muslim hostility' protects the state, not those being targeted

This year marked a quarter of a century since the beginning of the “war on terror”, and in that time, the British state has built one of the most extensive counter-extremism systems in the world. Also this year, Britain produced - for the first time - an official definition of what it calls “anti-Muslim hostility”. It would be easy to treat these as separate stories, one about security and the other about community relations - but a new report from Cage International argues that they are not. The definition has been shaped so precisely around the security state that, read closely, it functions less as a protection for Muslims than as a protection for the institutions that have spent two decades treating them as suspects. The key, as the report sets out, lies in a single word that runs through every part of the definition: intent. Anti-Muslim hostility, as the government defines it, means intentionally engaging in criminal acts against Muslims, or stereotyping them “with the intention of encouraging hatred.” It means discrimination where the conduct “is intended to disadvantage Muslims in public and economic life”. Discrimination rarely announces itself this way. The Islamophobia Response Unit, a charity that handles discrimination casework, has warned that the threshold excludes most of the cases it sees: bias, institutional barriers, and recruitment processes that quietly filter out applicants with Muslim names. New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters Professor Nasar Meer of the University of Glasgow has identified the omission of the systemic and structural as the definition’s central weakness. Amina Easat-Daas, a politics lecturer at De Montfort University in Leicester, has warned that it creates a hierarchy of racism. The intent requirement does more than leave victims of everyday discrimination without recourse; it draws a line around the state itself. Institutions acting under statutory duties do not, in the language of the definition, intend to encourage hatred. They are following policy, and that is exactly where the most consequential Islamophobia in Britain lives. Dominant logic To understand why, the report returns to how anti-Muslim prejudice changed after 2001. Before 9/11, the dominant logic in the West tolerated Islam in principle while treating certain Muslims, the “fundamentalist” or the insufficiently integrated, as the problem. Author Mahmood Mamdani captured this in Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, showing how dividing Muslims into moderates and extremists fed suspicion of all of them. After 9/11, the target moved. Islam itself came to be treated as the threat, an ideology that could be “hijacked” and weaponised. In a political culture where hostility towards Islam as a belief system has been the main vehicle for hostility towards Muslims for 25 years, that separation does not protect anyone In this view, the devout, practising and politically engaged Muslim was suspect not for anything they had done, but for what they believed. Research on this period has shown how even apparently positive portrayals of Islam as a corruptible faith served to legitimise the policing of Muslim-presenting people. The report finds that the new definition fits this logic with remarkable precision. It insists on protecting individuals rather than the religion, and explicitly safeguards the right to ridicule and insult Islam and to portray it in ways its adherents find disrespectful. In a political culture where hostility towards Islam as a belief system has been the main vehicle for hostility towards Muslims for 25 years, that separation does not protect anyone. It leaves the central mechanism of post-9/11 Islamophobia untouched, and lends it official cover. We see this logic become law clearly with Prevent. Since 2015, teachers, doctors and even nursery staff have been under a statutory duty to watch for signs of “radicalisation”. The Cage report highlights that before the Home Office stopped breaking down referrals by religion, 39 percent of children referred were Muslim, in a population where Muslims make up a fraction of that share. The UN special rapporteur on counterterrorism found that Prevent had a discriminatory effect on Muslim communities and was inconsistent with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Not one Prevent referral made in line with the duty can be captured by a definition that demands proof of intent to stir up hatred. Embedded racism The wider context in which the UK’s definition was published confirms the direction of travel Cage has long documented. The “Protecting What Matters” strategy embedded the 2024 extremism definition across government, naming Islamism as a predominant threat. It introduced new surveillance of campuses and speaker events, proposed an annual “State of Extremism” report, and gave the Charity Commission new powers to shut down organisations and remove trustees. A critique from the Ayaan Institute concluded that the government’s strategy embeds Islamophobia in state policy, rather than protecting Muslims from it. These powers follow a familiar pattern. They are justified by exploiting public fears and prejudices about Muslims - and once in place, their reach extends to students, protesters, charities, and civil society as a whole. What is built for one community becomes available for use against everyone. The normalising of Islamophobia in UK public life is fuelling hate and violence Read More » This is also the context in which to understand the long-awaited appointment of a special representative on anti-Muslim hostility. Ministers graciously promised select Muslim individuals at Downing Street in late October that a name would come within the week, and none has yet appeared. Yet the identity of the appointee matters less than the function of the role. The government has maintained a policy of disengagement from the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) since 2009. It barred the MCB from the consultation that produced this definition, and the council declined to endorse the result. A government-appointed representative tasked with implementing a definition the community did not build is not a channel for Muslim concerns. It is a way of supplying the legitimacy that the community itself has withheld. For that reason, the Cage report calls for the role to be abandoned altogether, and for the government to engage instead with organisations that have long records of serving their communities. Seen in this light, the definition is not a failed attempt to protect Muslims. It is a successful attempt to protect the state. It gives the government something to point to whenever anti-Muslim hatred makes headlines, while ensuring that the policies most responsible for institutionalising Islamophobia remain beyond its reach. A serious response would begin where the definition refuses to look, with the counterterrorism architecture itself. Prevent and the powers built alongside it must be abolished. Until then, any definition written by the state will describe the problem in a way that leaves the state out of it. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

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