An investigation into suspicious activity within a Russian software developer's network has uncovered a months-long compromise of its development infrastructure and a software code-signing server. The activity, documented by Kaspersky's ICS CERT team after it was contacted by the affected developer in June 2025, has been attributed to a threat actor named BO Team (aka Black Owl, Hoody Hyena, and Lifting Zmiy). The name of the targeted company was not disclosed, but it operates from within Russia and develops software that has a "customer base in the Russian Federation," according to Kaspersky. Over the course of several months, the intrusion resulted in the theft of confidential information and the compromise of all components of the organization's IT infrastructure, including Windows and Linux servers, workstations, hypervisors, backup servers, security solution management servers, and network equipment. Active since at least 2023, BO Team focuses on cyber espionage and hacktivism, and has a history of targeting Russian entities to steal valuable data and break into compromised infrastructure using tools like Mythic and Cobalt Strike, along with its own malware such as BrockenDoor and ZeronetKit. The group is assessed to be of Ukrainian origin. "Their primary motivation is to degrade the Russian military-industrial complex to weaken Moscow's operational capabilities on the battlefield," Orange Cyberdefense said in an analysis of the group. "They also engage in cognitive warfare aimed at humiliating Russian institutions and demonstrating their vulnerability to Ukrainian digital resistance." While BO Team is known to deploy ransomware and publicize its activities on a dedicated Telegram channel, the attack targeting the unspecified software developer did not involve any data destruction or public posts claiming responsibility for it. "Instead, the attackers worked to entrench themselves in the victim's network by setting up convenient command channels and planting backdoors to restore access in case it was lost," Kaspersky said. "The compromise of the software development (CI/CD) infrastructure and the software code-signing server indicated that the attack would likely develop into a supply chain scenario." The attack, per the Russian cybersecurity company, involved the threat actors compromising the organization's Linux terminal server by taking advantage of an exposed SSH service, and using it to conduct reconnaissance of the internal network to flag systems with accessible SMB, Kerberos, SSH, Telnet, FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, WinRM, and LDAP services. The adversary has also been found unsuccessfully attempting to access internal portals, along with websites like proxy-sale[.]com, start.duckduckgo[.]com, vcsa.vmware[.]com, and vulners[.]com, among others. Event logs show that the attackers further attempted to connect from the compromised terminal server to the virtualization system servers, including logging in to the VMware vCenter web interface. These sign-in efforts ended in failure. However, the threat actor managed to successfully target a VMware vCenter server (version 7.0.3) vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228 (aka Log4Shell and LogJam), obtain a remote command line with root privileges, connect to the hypervisor over SSH, and identify accessible hosts. This phase also involved the deployment of a backdoor on the hypervisor that was run every hour by planting a shell script in the "/etc/cron.hourly/" directory. The script carried the name "pgcache" in a likely attempt to disguise it as a legitimate PostgreSQL component. The primary responsibility of the backdoor is to download and run a secondary shell script from "lo1yaizaeghaevarooD1ahtaichootae.nofrillsdns[.]com." The shell script is designed to download and run the Global Socket (GSocket) utility, enabling the attacker to gain remote control of the compromised host. Select variants of the script have been found to point to a hostname-specific payload staged on "lo1yaizaeghaevarood1ahtaichootaz.nofrillsdns[.]com" to deliver an as-yet-undetermined next-stage payload. "The attackers used the nofrillsdns[.]com service, which allows domain names to be created for free by calling the curl utility," Kaspersky said. "By default, when the malware's command-and-control server is not operating, the attackers set the corresponding DNS record to 127.0.0.1, which is what the script checks. Activating the backdoor requires only a change to the DNS record -- the script will then download and run the malware." Some of the other post-exploitation actions undertaken by the BO Team following the backdoor deployment are listed below - Gaining access to the corporate proxy server. Abusing the certificate of the compromised hypervisor to connect to servers associated with a second virtualization cluster and place a similar backdoor. Collecting information about virtual machines and firewall rules, accessing some of them via a command-line interpreter in the guest OS from the hypervisor. Running an obfuscated bash script to decrypt and run an ELF binary designed to provide remote control over SSH. Searching for secrets on the compromised virtual machines, allowing the attackers to breach the virtual machine of the GitLab software development platform, as well as gain access to some of the repositories containing source code and seize the server's private key. Using the private key of the GitLab virtual machine to connect to the organization's Ansible orchestration system. Using access to the Linux terminal server to locate credentials of several domain accounts and connect to the domain controller using the account of one of the system administrators after likely accessing the memory of virtual machines running on the compromised hypervisors. Changing the security attributes of the user's Windows Downloads directory. Using legitimate binaries like tasklist.exe, findstr.exe, taskmgr.exe, and ipconfig.exe to identify which security solutions were running on the system and to gather details about network interfaces. Attempting to take a dump of the lsass.exe process using the Nanodump utility and obtain the credentials of domain administrators and other privileged users with access to the domain controller. The attackers deleted the event logs after the activity was detected and blocked by a security solution. Using system utilities such as comsvcs.dll rather than established utilities like Mimikatz and Nanodump to create a memory dump of the lsass.exe process. Dumping the system registry using the regedit.exe utility, and using it to decrypt the Active Directory domain database ("ntds.dit") to extract the credentials of all domain users. Launching the OpenSSH scp.exe utility to transfer the collected information to the terminal server. Logging in to the domain controller using the Kerberos ticket of one of the domain administrators and ultimately compromising the organization's entire Windows infrastructure by taking advantage of the fact that the same password was used for system administrator accounts in different domains. Connecting to the terminal server over SSH using root account credentials after possibly stealing them from a system administrator's computer post obtaining domain administrator privileges. Modifying "/usr/bin/nxnode-login" to intercept and write user credentials to a shared-memory file at "/dev/shm/pulse-shm-3088612174." Successfully brute-forcing the password of the administrator's terminal server after about 2,500 failed attempts to place the private key of the Ansible system. Complicating detection efforts by timestomping, obfuscation of malware code, usage of living-off-the-land (LotL) techniques, systematic deletion of event logs, and dressing up malware files as legitimate software. "We found numerous traces of BO Team connecting to various Windows servers, though the attackers only used malware in one case," Kaspersky explained. "The server which apparently held particular interest for hackers, was used to sign compiled builds of the commercial software developed by the attacked organization." "Attackers may be interested in such a server for two reasons. First, they may try to carry out a supply chain attack by injecting malicious code into a product build right before it is signed. Second, the attackers may try to steal the organization's digital signature to use later to sign malware." It's suspected that the attackers likely attempted to execute a malicious WMI script and install a backdoor similar to the Linux variant in the temporary files directory. But after the incident was detected and countermeasures were enacted, the attackers, after having lost access to the compromised infrastructure, orchestrated a phishing campaign towards the end of July in an attempt to collect employee credentials. The phishing email contained the "Account disconnected from the mail server" subject line and sought to trick the recipient into clicking on a link to change their password. What's more, the email managed to bypass SPF and DKIM checks, indicating the attackers had in their possession a private key that was obtained after gaining control of the organization's mail server. The phishing attack was detected and prevented. "The attackers used a service that automatically generates phishing pages," Kaspersky said. "The service loads the content of a targeted organization's official website and displays a password entry form on top of the official site's layout. After entering the password, the user sees an error message. However, the information is actually sent to the attacker." "We repeatedly noted that the attackers tried not to use malware and hacking utilities in order to evade detection," Kaspersky said. "Instead, they actively used system tools such as RDP, SSH, and SCP, as well as system utilities to steal user credentials. This enabled them to develop the attack using legitimate accounts, which also matches the BO Team profile." The activity has been found to originate from IP addresses 193.3.23[.]236 and 80.76.42[.]139, both of which belong to a provider in Ukraine. Further analysis into the malicious activity has revealed that the attackers followed a standard work schedule and operated in a time zone that differed "only slightly" from that of the victim Russian entity. "Based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence, such as the attackers' interest in the source code repository and software build signing server, as well as their use of a software composition analysis (dependency analysis) platform, we believe that BO Team may have set out to inject malicious code into a solution released by the attacked organization in order to subsequently compromise its customers, i.e., carry out a so-called supply chain attack," Kaspersky concluded. "Thanks to the rapid response measures applied after the incident was discovered, the attackers lost access to the compromised infrastructure and were apparently unable to bring the attack to its intended conclusion." Found this article interesting? Follow us on Google News, Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.
BO Team Exploits Log4Shell in VMware vCenter, Compromises Russian Firm's Code-Signing Server
Full Article
Original Source
Read the full article at Thehackernews →KhanList aggregates and links to publicly available news content. We do not host full articles from third-party sources. Always verify important information with original sources.