Are Türkiye’s shipbuilding capabilities opportunity for US?

In a recent statement, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signaled a new era in Türkiye’s developing relations with the U.S. In this new phase, which could be described as “strategic cooperation” in the defense industry, the goal is to take new steps in the defense sector between Türkiye and the U.S. A key aspect of these steps is cooperation in the shipbuilding sector. In remarks made during the NATO summit held in Ankara, President Erdoğan stated that Türkiye could produce platforms such as frigates, corvettes and submarines for the U.S. in its own shipyards. While this vision has the potential to offer solutions to the U.S.’s current industrial crises, it faces various obstacles stemming from U.S. laws. Crises in shipbuilding industry The challenges facing the U.S. Navy and the shipbuilding industry have been the focus of serious debate in recent years. Despite increasing competition with China on the world’s oceans, the U.S. is struggling to build new ships and maintain its existing fleets. Efforts are underway to overcome these problems, which are described as serious and chronic. Many warships and nuclear submarines operated by both the U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps are not operational and are idling in ports because they have not received timely maintenance. Changes in the deployment schedules of naval platforms have disrupted planned maintenance and led to complex scheduling issues. Additionally, a significant shortage of engineers and technicians at relevant shipyards in the U.S. is a major factor. This situation leads to overwork among current personnel and, over time, their departure from the system. Another issue concerning shipyards is inadequate physical infrastructure. The equipment at existing shipyards is outdated and unable to meet the Navy’s growing demands. Finally, new submarine and ship projects are exceeding their planned budgets and falling years behind delivery schedules due to supply chain issues. As a result, various projects have been canceled without reaching the planned production numbers. Similarly, some projects have been canceled due to rising costs. This situation, which is also a result of the U.S.’s “best is the most expensive” approach, is currently the subject of serious debate and scrutiny. Co-op with Türkiye International cooperation is a strong option for the U.S. Navy to rapidly rebuild its fleet. A potential partnership with Türkiye would provide the U.S. with significant strategic advantages. Türkiye’s most prominent capability at present is its production capacity and speed. Through the MILGEM project, Türkiye has significantly enhanced its military shipbuilding capacity in the shipbuilding industry, which it has established as its backbone, utilizing both military and private shipyards. Türkiye has successful companies engaged in military shipbuilding activities, such as ASFAT, TAIS, DEARSAN and STM. I believe that STM, which has recently successfully managed warship projects of varying specifications for Ukraine, Portugal and Malaysia in parallel with the Turkish Navy, will play an active role in a potential collaboration. In this context, such a collaboration would provide significant benefits for the U.S., which faces scheduling, cost and management challenges in its military shipbuilding processes. In general, Turkish shipyards are currently producing warships of various types not only for the Turkish Navy but also for countries such as Portugal, Ukraine, Pakistan, Nigeria, Indonesia and Malaysia. As of July 2026, the construction and outfitting of more than 50 high-tonnage warships of various types are being carried out simultaneously in these shipyards. While no European country can carry out a shipbuilding operation on this scale, Turkish shipyards are able to do so in accordance with NATO standards and on schedule. In short, Türkiye can provide a solution to the U.S.’s long-standing production speed problem. The U.S.’s high-budget shipbuilding approaches can be made more manageable and cost-effective through the project management capabilities of the Turkish defense industry. Compared to the high costs and budget overruns at U.S. shipyards, labor and production costs in Türkiye are significantly more economical. NATO standards are followed for the construction and maintenance of military ships at Türkiye’s shipyards. As one aspect of potential cooperation, U.S. ships operating in the region could have their maintenance and repairs carried out in Türkiye, allowing them to return to their duty stations quickly. This would eliminate the need for the ships to cross the ocean and return to the U.S. for repairs. Legal obstacles, challenges Even though Türkiye has significant shipbuilding capacity, the U.S. has very strict laws governing the construction of military vessels. This situation is the greatest legal obstacle to direct cooperation. First, U.S. federal law 10 USC 8679 explicitly prohibits the construction of warships intended for the U.S. military at foreign shipyards. Major components, such as the hull and superstructure, are also subject to this prohibition. The law grants the U.S. president the authority to waive this rule (grant an exemption) on national security grounds. However, invoking such an exemption requires congressional approval and is quite difficult to obtain. Today, various debates are taking place within this framework. Furthermore, under the relevant law, it is also prohibited for U.S. warships to undergo scheduled major maintenance at foreign shipyards. Exceptions are limited solely to war damage or emergency repairs. An exceptional application for emergency repairs was observed during the U.S.-Israel–Iran war. In short, all these rules serve to protect the domestic industry within U.S. domestic politics while also demonstrating the power of industry lobbies during elections. There are no commercial barriers to establishing an international joint venture between U.S. and Turkish companies. The U.S. administration generally supports defense industry companies forming partnerships with their allies. However, the main issue is the geographic location of the new shipyard to be established. U.S. laws focus not on the ownership of the manufacturing company but on the location of the shipyard. Even if all shares of a shipyard are owned by an American company, if that shipyard is located within Turkish borders, it is classified as a “foreign shipyard” under U.S. law. Therefore, establishing a joint venture is not a solution. Directly producing warships for the U.S. Navy at a facility in Türkiye conflicts with current laws. Moreover, the U.S. Congress is debating the introduction of stricter rules in the 2027 defense budget draft that would completely prohibit the construction of combat ships abroad. Scenarios Given the current legal obstacles and pressure from Congress, there are alternative scenarios under which a Turkish-American joint venture based in Türkiye could operate in compliance with the law. The first prominent option is the production of subsystems. The ship would not be built entirely in Türkiye. Submodules, mechanical systems or electronic components that do not run afoul of legal restrictions would be produced in Türkiye and shipped to U.S. shipyards for final assembly. Another option is the construction of non-combatant vessels that would not be subject to legal restrictions. Instead of combat platforms such as frigates or submarines, logistics, fuel or cargo ships (auxiliary vessels) could be built. The final and most reasonable scenario involves adapting Türkiye’s military ship project management capabilities to U.S. standards. At a shipyard to be established in the U.S., military ship projects of various types can be implemented much more quickly and at a lower cost using the “Turkish-style construction model.” Another scenario involves exports to third countries. The joint shipyard could produce military ships in Türkiye not for the U.S. Navy directly, but for other regional countries that receive financial support from the U.S. Erdoğan’s statements highlight significant potential, indicating that both countries are evaluating this issue. In conclusion, the U.S. needs the capabilities of its allies to overcome its current shipyard crisis, and Türkiye is one of the strongest candidates to meet this need. However, for this vision to become a reality, efforts must go beyond commercial agreements. Creative production models compliant with U.S. domestic laws must be developed, and protectionist barriers in American politics must be overcome. Given that the U.S. is holding talks with South Korea and Japan, a cooperation formula compliant with the legal framework could be developed by utilizing presidential waivers, producing only “sub-modules/blocks,” or securing maintenance contracts for ships stationed abroad. The acquisition of a U.S. shipyard by a Turkish company could also lay the groundwork for potential projects within the legal framework.