America is finally firing itself as the world’s policeman

In September 1990, President George H.W. Bush stood before Congress and spoke of a “new world order” — a system in which American power could bring countries together to enforce rules, contain aggression, and expand collective security. Within months, he had built a coalition of some thirty-five nations that drove Iraq out of Kuwait. American power remained central, but it worked through a “new partnership of nations.”Last month, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said the world is “clearly moving towards a multipolar world” and that the movement is irreversible. That same day, Finland’s President Alexander Stubb said he hears one word “everywhere” he travels: “realignment.”Those remarks point to a world in which strategic optionality — a state’s ability to hold several relationships at once — is becoming increasingly common. States can remain American partners while deepening ties elsewhere. Saudi Arabia is one of the clearest examples. For years, Riyadh has built room to maneuver without abandoning Washington: a joint defense pact with Turkey and Pakistan, a relationship with China that helped open a channel to Tehran, and substantial military ties to the United States.Today, that strategy is being tested. The Houthis have expanded along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, threatening Saudi territory and the Bab el Mandeb shipping route. In September, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sought U.S. military action against the Houthis; Washington declined direct strikes but offered intelligence and targeting support instead.Riyadh has now reached for those alternatives. Last month, Saudi Arabia appealed to Beijing to use its influence with Tehran, and China pressed Iran to help restrain the Houthis. Turkey is now evaluating how it can support Saudi Arabia’s defense under the new defense pact. On Sept. 22, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt affirmed Riyadh’s right to defend itself and called for dialogue and diplomacy.The test is no longer theoretical. On Oct. 4, the Saudi-backed Yemeni government had launched a major offensive against the Houthis, with Saudi air support and U.S. intelligence assistance. Reuters reported that Pakistan had deployed between 30,000 and 40,000 troops to Saudi Arabia for border defense and drone and missile interception, and that Turkey and Pakistan had provided military equipment that the kingdom is using in Yemen.Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan agreed to begin implementing the Makkah Defense Alliance’s collective-defense commitments on Oct. 5, including the rapid deployment of agreed forces and capabilities while further institutionalizing the alliance. Several partners are now sharing the burden rather than one relationship carrying it.Skeptics will say this is dangerous and destabilizing, that overlapping alliances simply create more ways for a crisis to spiral. That’s a real risk, particularly because the offensive is only days old and its outcome remains uncertain. But as these arrangements were tested, Saudi-backed Yemeni forces reported regaining key positions around the Bab el Mandeb Strait without a direct American combat role.Washington is still far from irrelevant in this shift. The State Department has approved a potential $24.3 billion sale of 48 F-35s, subject to congressional approval, underscoring the continuing importance of American military power.On Oct. 2, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s former intelligence chief, offered an important qualification in an Arab News interview. He questioned whether traditional American military deterrence still suffices in an era of drones and missiles. “The value of the American presence in these states has to be re-imagined,” he said.This is a more useful way to view the Saudi shift than to see it as a move away from Washington. Riyadh does not need to replace America; it only needs to reduce its dependence on any single provider. China offers diplomatic leverage, while Turkey and Pakistan offer added security capacity. Even China, Al-Faisal said, must prove it can deliver as a broker between Riyadh and Tehran.Great powers hedge too. The question is what Washington does with that freedom.For Washington, the policy is straightforward: Stop treating every partner request as an American obligation. Ask what the partner can provide and what specifically requires U.S. involvement. Act decisively where U.S. interests are at stake; elsewhere, let partners carry more of the burden. That is strategic space, and the right direction for America’s response to middle powers moving forward.Senior U.S. national security officials met at Camp David on Oct. 2 to weigh whether to resume major combat operations against Iran and whether to join Saudi Arabia’s offensive against the Houthis, a step Riyadh has been pressing Washington to take directly. So far, Washington has held back from joining the offensive, weighing its own interests case by case.There is also an economic case for restraint. The G7 has agreed to release 100 million barrels of oil and refined fuel from emergency reserves as energy costs rise, with Brent crude trading above $100 a barrel amid regional disruptions. Those prices reflect the conflict itself — the real question is who pays to secure the route. Saudi Arabia and its partners now have more reason and more capacity to do so themselves. And importantly, America does not have to pay for it.The Middle East stays on the map, but the assumption changes: American interests do not require American ownership of every regional problem. Allies can build and test their own arrangements. Washington can decide where its involvement remains essential rather than assuming every contingency begins and ends with an American guarantee.PASSED ON MONDAY, VULNERABLE ON TUESDAY: THE MOST DANGEROUS GREEN CHECK MARK IN NATIONAL SECURITYThe old order assumed relationships created obligations. The emerging one increasingly treats them as options. America keeps every one of those allies. It just stops being their only option.That is the real evolution of the order Bush began. In his January 1991 State of the Union address, Bush described a “new world order” in which “diverse nations are drawn together in common cause.” More than three decades on, nations are still working together. They simply no longer believe they must choose only one partner — and increasingly, neither does the country that built the order in the first place.Malik AboRashid is an advisor focused on US-Middle East policy, business, and security issues. He is a graduate of the University of California, Berkeley.