The United States and China are locked in a derisking race. After decades of actively entwining their economies, both are now trying to achieve a degree of separation between them. Neither side seeks at this point to decouple completely from its rival. Each is trying instead to alter the terms of their economic relationship, reducing their own vulnerability to leverage, coercion or attacks that could damage its long-term prosperity and security, while working to acquire advantages over its counterparty. This is a struggle for power, waged through trade, investment and technology development. Today’s derisking race signals the failure of the third attempt by the United States to build an open, fully integrated world economy. At the end of the Cold War, as after the two world wars, American policymakers were motivated by a mix of pragmatism and principle. They believed that there were enormous gains to be had from trade with large and potentially fast-growing markets. But they also hoped to bring to fruition the liberal dream of a ‘one-world’ global trading system in which freer flows of goods, capital and people would promote peace and freedom, as well as prosperity. In 1919 America had the world’s biggest economy, but the international political system was still multipolar, with other great powers in both Europe and Asia. Although Woodrow Wilson tried to persuade the victors, and his own people, of the wisdom of lowering tariff barriers and creating an open global trading system, both at home and abroad he lacked the ability to compel others to accept his ideas. Once rebuffed, America drew back into isolationism and protectionism. With no nation willing and able to hold it together, in the 1930s the global economy split apart. By 1945 the world had become bipolar, with the United States and the Soviet Union standing above all other nations—and America alone briefly accounting for as much as half of global GDP. American planners at first entertained hopes of reviving Wilson’s vision, but the onset of the Cold War soon forced them to abandon the idea. Instead of cooperating to create a single unified system, each superpower proceeded to build its own largely separate bloc. Organised along predominantly liberal, free-market lines, the American-led bloc was ultimately able to out-produce, out-innovate, and out-last its Communist opponent. With the demise of its former rival, the United States finally seemed set to restructure the entire world economy into a unified trading system. America and its allies hoped in the process to encourage the domestic transformation of their former enemies, preparing them to become members in good standing of what would finally be a globe-spanning liberal order. The main instrument of this strategy in the economic realm was the World Trade Organization, and its most important target was China. To gain entry to the WTO China was required to make detailed commitments that, if followed, would bring its economic policies into closer alignment with liberal principles of open markets, limited state intervention and freer trade. Political change was expected to follow close on the heels of economic liberalisation. Increased reliance on markets would lead to rising prosperity and, as had already happened in Western Europe and parts of Asia, the members of an expanding middle class would demand political rights to go with their growing economic freedoms. American strategists knew that drawing China more fully into an expanding world economy would enable it to accumulate power as well as wealth. But they were reassured by the conviction that prosperity would eventually bring democratisation, and by the knowledge that democracies had seldom gone to war with each other. For their part, China’s rulers saw the West’s offers of engagement as a trap designed to bring about their own demise. Instead of succumbing to the charms of liberalism, they remained firmly committed to a mercantilist-Leninist governing philosophy, in which the primary purpose of economic activity is not to enhance the welfare of the Chinese people but to bolster the power of the Party and, through it, the nation. Thus, even as it allowed greater play to market forces, the CCP regime took care to ensure its continued grip at home. And it approached the global economy as another domain of zero-sum struggle, one in which the aim was to strengthen China’s geopolitical position and gain advantage over its rivals. For a time, the nation’s leaders believed they had little choice but to accept the dangers of increasing interdependence with the West. Once having obtained membership in the WTO, however, Beijing began to take steps to reduce its vulnerability to foreign pressure. After the turn of the century this derisking strategy advanced along four parallel axes: To guard against the possibility of being cut off from vitally needed imports of resources and raw materials, Chinese companies were directed to buy up more overseas mines, oil wells and agricultural land and to build a vast merchant fleet and an elaborate global network of roads, railways and ports to carry their output back home. To reduce exposure to Western tariffs or trade sanctions, Beijing sought new export markets in the global south. To blunt the impact of U.S. financial sanctions, it began to build alternative international payments systems. Finally, to lessen dependence on imported technology China launched a series of costly, high-profile technology development programs, began buying cutting-edge Western companies and initiated a campaign of industrial espionage of unprecedented scope and scale. From the end of the Cold War until the mid-2010s, Washington continued to try to ease Beijing down the path towards economic liberalisation. Together with this persistence, however, there was mounting frustration over China’s trade and industrial policies and its evident failure to live up to the commitments it had made to gain entry to the WTO. As the Chinese economy grew and its level of technological sophistication advanced, these policies appeared to threaten the future prosperity and security of the United States and other industrial democracies. China’s heavily subsidized exports were hollowing out portions of the American manufacturing base. Relatively easy access to Western companies and universities was helping to speed its technological advance. Its ongoing military buildup and more assertive foreign policy stance darkened perceptions of its intentions and began to make it appear less as a normal trading partner and more like a strategic rival and even a potential foe. Despite all of this, it was not until the very end of Barack Obama’s second term that China’s increasingly forceful efforts to strengthen its position finally began to provoke a meaningful response. Washington’s belated answer to China’s mercantilist, power-maximising economic policies signalled the start of a two-sided derisking race. The American reaction came first in the form of the experimental and at times spasmodic initiatives of the first Trump administration and then the more coherent, but also limited and cautious approaches pursued by the Biden administration. Neither Trump nor Biden sought to decouple completely from China, nor did either of them formally abandon the original, ambitious goal of creating an open global economy. Nevertheless, albeit with some hesitation, at least with respect to China the United States started to move away from a predominantly liberal approach to economic relations that emphasized the virtues of openness and the prospect of mutual benefits, towards one that increasingly prioritized power and the pursuit of relative advantage. America’s derisking campaign comprised several interrelated lines of effort. Regardless of cost, it no longer seemed prudent to depend on a potentially hostile China for minerals, drugs, metals, and chemicals that might be needed in a war or national emergency. To reduce the dangers of dependence, the United States began to use tariffs to constrict imports and subsidies to cultivate alternative sources of supply. Once seen as a benign byproduct of globalization, the pervasive presence of Chinese-made electronic components and hardware in America’s critical networks now appeared to pose unacceptable risks of espionage or sabotage. Dealing with the problem of penetration by removing these imported products and replacing them with reliable substitutes called for new laws and regulations to guide private companies and government agencies. Finally, slowing the transfer of sensitive technologies required imposing tighter controls on exports and on investment flows both to and from China. Beijing has reacted to these developments by doubling down. Xi Jinping’s determination to stay the course is due in part to the fact that America’s tougher policies did not come as a surprise. Back in 2002, in the wake of China’s accession to the WTO and the 9/11 attacks, CCP strategists had concluded that they faced a “twenty-year period of strategic opportunity” during which they could grow strong without undue interference from Washington. Eventually, however, the Americans would turn their attention back to China and, recognizing how much it had grown, they would try even harder to weaken and contain it. At that point Beijing would have no choice but to press ahead. In the past five years, China has done more to increase security of supplies of food and raw materials, diminish its exposure to financial sanctions, and increase the relative importance of the developing countries as markets for its exports. Together with these defensive measures Beijing has begun to take more aggressive actions. Rather than implement reforms that might have reduced exports and lessened tensions with other nations, it has moved in the opposite direction: ratcheting up subsidies, expanding manufacturing capacity, and boosting exports that threaten to destroy others’ industries and leave them even more reliant on Chinese goods. Chinese firms are also working to dominate global supply chains for critical minerals and other industrial materials. The regime has successfully used the threat of export restrictions on rare earth minerals to pressure America and its democratic partners and is actively seeking to tighten its grip on other potential “chokepoints.” The U.S. rejoinder to this intense and purposeful campaign has been mixed and less than fully coherent. Since his return to the White House Donald Trump has expanded on some of the policies that he set in motion during his first term, but he has also taken steps that threaten to undermine their effectiveness. The second Trump administration has prohibited the importation of Chinese-made drones, robots, and internet routers that could be connected to U.S. telecommunications networks. But it has also ignored the law banning TikTok, a Chinese-controlled social media platform suspected of gathering sensitive information and spreading propaganda, instead negotiating a sale to one of Trump’s domestic political allies. To lessen dependence on China, the administration has sought to work with other countries to develop alternative sources of critical minerals. At the same time, in hopes of reviving American industry, it has strained relations with its allies by imposing across-the-board tariffs on their exports, driving countries like Canada closer to Beijing. Finally, since returning to office, Trump has tightened certain restrictions on high tech exports to China while simultaneously loosening export controls on advanced semiconductors crucial to the development of artificial intelligence. China’s course in the next stage of the derisking race seems set but America’s remains uncertain. The history of the past century suggests two alternative trajectories. Having failed once again to build a fully integrated global order, the United States may choose not only to distance itself from China but to adopt a posture of omni-directional protectionism and strict “America first” industrial policy as it did after World War I. This risks leaving America isolated as its former friends band together to protect themselves from its own predatory policies as well as China’s. The aftermath of the Second World War suggests a preferable alternative. Instead of completely abandoning liberal economic principles, Americans could decide instead to narrow the circle in which they are applied to include only those nations that genuinely share and are prepared to defend them. It is only by pooling their resources and better integrating their markets that the advanced democracies can counter a challenge of unprecedented proportions.
America and China Are Trying to Alter Their Economic Bargain
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