After Iran, US signals major security shift in the Middle East

When President Donald Trump congratulated Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan for signing the Mecca Pact, describing it as a “BIG, BOLD, IMPORTANT FIRST STEP,” he was not simply trafficking in diplomatic pleasantries. The Trump administration also tacitly endorsed a multilateral, Saudi-led maritime initiative to protect shipping in the Red Sea, sending senior U.S. military officials to the meeting where the arrangement was agreed to.The thread running through both initiatives is clear: regional states taking greater responsibility for their own security.Behind Trump’s flattery, something more important appears to be taking shape. According to Pentagon planning reported by the Washington Post, the Defense Department is exploring a broader reduction of its forces in the Persian Gulf, which would entail moving units, command centers and aerial capabilities west toward Jordan, Israel and Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast. This would mean abandoning large, fixed bases in favor of small, hardened positions. The Pentagon views the destruction caused by Iranian attacks on U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf as a “once-in-a-generation chance,” in the Post’s words, to rethink America’s force posture in the region instead of simply rebuilding it.After six months of war with Iran, the efforts suggest that the U.S. is considering a dramatic adjustment to its force posture in the Middle East — one that would put far more emphasis on regional self-sufficiency. But it’s a far cry from a U.S. withdrawal from the region.The logic for the potential adjustments is straightforward. Moving troops to Jordan, Israel and the west coast of Saudi Arabia places them behind better air defenses, giving them longer warning times in case of future Iranian attacks, while maintaining the ability to carry out strikes of their own in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. Such smaller, more dispersed bases would be a practical response to a genuine weakness exposed by Iran’s missile and drone attacks.There is an aspect of this that could easily be lost in the discussion: for years, Iran has demanded that the U.S. reduce its military presence in the Gulf as part of any efforts to de-escalate between the two countries. So any troop adjustments that Washington undertakes to protect its forces can also become a bargaining chip for talks with Tehran — one that wouldn’t involve any real concession. In one fell swoop, the U.S. could transfer some of the burden of protecting the Gulf, harden its forces, and open the door to diplomacy with Iran.There has yet to be a final decision on this issue. A Pentagon official described the military’s analysis to the Post as “prudent planning,” not a withdrawal order. Any serious change in the size of America’s military presence in the region, currently estimated at 40,000-50,000 troops, would require the approval of Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.Still, the direction is clear. America wants to remain in the region but with forces that are smaller and harder to target. The Pentagon’s planning makes clear that Washington expects regional powers to take on a bigger part of the regional defense burden and financial burden even as the U.S. lightens its presence.Trump’s public comments are consistent with this interpretation. While the administration has offered a range of objectives for its operation against Iran, Trump made his priorities clear in a recent post on Truth Social: “The number one Goal is, and always will be, that Iran cannot have, in any way, shape, or form, a Nuclear Weapon.”This is a far more modest goal than regime change or even opening the Strait of Hormuz using military force, which would require a large, continued U.S. presence around the Persian Gulf. If stopping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon is the first priority, and that goal has largely already been secured, Trump can reduce the U.S. military footprint without it looking like a retreat.Of course, history suggests this proposed process of burden-shifting will not go smoothly. Arab states have tried and failed to shoulder the regional defense burden on numerous occasions, including through efforts like the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Damascus Declaration of 1991, and the abortive Middle East Strategic Alliance, which Trump attempted to create in his first term. But the key difference with today’s regional efforts is that they are taking place as Washington appears to be seriously considering reducing its troop presence. Such a drawdown would significantly increase the incentives for Middle Eastern states to take on a greater role in their own security.Such a shift does not mean abandoning Israel militarily. Some of the forces that would move away from the Gulf would move to Israel, in addition to Jordan and the west coast of Saudi Arabia. Yet it’s notable that Washington is openly supporting the creation of an Arab-led security architecture, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and possibly Egypt down the line, that would take on some of America’s prior responsibilities in the region. Trump appears to like these regional arrangements because they contain Iran without requiring the U.S. to shoulder the burden. The possibility that these groupings may one day restrict Israel’s freedom of action does not seem to be part of Trump’s concerns.Given Tel Aviv’s close ties to Washington, Israel’s reaction to these emerging arrangements could play an important role in their success or failure. For now at least, Israeli officials and politicians have avoided addressing them directly, even as they express growing concern about a growing “Sunni axis” backed by Turkish military power. Pro-Israel analysts in the U.S. have echoed these concerns, even as they’ve endorsed the potential movement of more American troops to Israel as beneficial for both countries. America is not leaving the Middle East. At most, it is fortifying its presence and shifting some of the burden for regional security to allies who are willing to shoulder it. A new regional order is taking shape, one not designed with Israel’s interests in the forefront, but also not one that is explicitly opposed to those interests. Whether this trend will remain comfortable, for the U.S. or for Israel, may be a more important question a year from now than whether America is withdrawing from the Middle East.