A Message to China from Japan’s Takaichi Administration

The Taiwan Strait came up as an example during a debate on the legal applications of Japan’s right of collective self-defense at the Budget Committee of the Lower House on November 7, 2025, and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi gave her response when asked under what circumstances a “survival-threatening situation” would be legally applicable. China reacted sharply, to say the least: verbally accusing Japan of “neo-militarism” and then moving to normalize activities by the Chinese Navy — especially its aircraft carriers — in the waters between the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain, while its coast guard began deploying east of Taiwan’s coast. On the economic front, security provisions were applied to Japanese companies, restrictions were imposed on rare earth exports, and measures were taken to curtail tourism and other exchanges with Japan, with economic, local-governmental, and academic ties all affected to a significant degree. China has demanded that Takaichi retract her November 7 statements, but she has refused. An APEC summit is scheduled in China in November 2026, hosted by Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Takaichi is expected to attend. Significant progress in Japan-China relations has been elusive, however. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson made remarks in late June 2026 that appeared to give the green light for private exchanges between Japan and China, and a range of business associations and parliamentary groups are now scheduled to visit China this fall. Whether this supposed “green light” actually came from China’s leadership remains unclear. So what message is the Takaichi administration sending to China? First, on the Taiwan Strait. Three days after the original remarks, at a Budget Committee session on November 11, 2025, Takaichi said that “Peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are important not only for Japanese security but also for the stability of the international community as a whole. Japan has consistently held the expectation that issues surrounding Taiwan will be resolved peacefully through dialogue.” At a plenary session of the House of Representatives on December 3, she added: “Our government’s basic position regarding Taiwan hasn’t changed and is as stated in the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué.” In short, she made clear that the November 7 statement did not represent a change in Japan’s Taiwan policy. Then, on Japan-China relations broadly. At the Joint Meeting of the Committees of Both Houses on Fundamental National Policies on November 26, 2025, Takaichi said the two sides had “agreed to building constructive and stable Japan-China relations” and that “if there are concerns or challenges between us, they will be resolved through communication, communication between the leaders,” adding that “Japan is always constructive and open to dialogue with China.” Meanwhile, Diet speakers have repeatedly reached for a now-standard phrase: to “closely monitor the situation and respond appropriately, including to the effects of the various measures from China.” At the House of Councillors plenary session on February 25, 2026, Takaichi went somewhat further, saying “Japan is open to different forms of dialogue with China” and citing cooperation with “our allies, the United States and like-minded countries” — remarks likely made with her March visit to Washington in mind. In her post-visit statement at the House of Representatives plenary on March 26, however, Takaichi mentioned “cooperation with the United States” in the context of China policy but otherwise repeated the same formula. Takaichi’s public statements since November 7, 2025 have largely been repetitions of standard phrases, repeatedly asserting that Japan’s existing Taiwan and China policies are unchanged. She has also signaled that Japan is “open” to dialogue. Chinese protests have escalated regardless, and while dialogue between Japan and China has not disappeared entirely, it remains limited. Ministerial exchanges this year appear confined to APEC-related matters, given China’s role as host. Yet more recently the Takaichi administration appears to be sending a new signal. First, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi apparently exchanged a brief greeting with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi at the ASEAN-related Foreign Ministers’ Meetings. China has denied this, but it appears certain that Motegi made the approach on July 23. The day before, on July 22, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Wang in their meeting that he saw a worrying trend of deteriorating Japan-China relations. Whether Motegi’s approach was a direct response to Rubio’s remarks is unclear, but Japan is at minimum signaling a proactive stance toward dialogue with China. Second, Takaichi’s remarks at a press conference on July 27 are telling. When asked about the November APEC summit, she said simply: “I am looking forward to it.” The likelihood of a formal Japan-China bilateral meeting is low, but as host Xi would be expected to greet all attending leaders, making some form of contact difficult to avoid. These signals from the Takaichi administration are likely driven by more than just American expectations. Following what may have been a green light from the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson on June 26, Japanese business associations and parliamentary groups have announced China visits in quick succession. Whether any of this can truly “normalize” Japan-China relations remains to be seen, but the mood on the Japanese side is clearly shifting.